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ABSTRACT
Researchers have found that young children often make ’’confusion 
errors" in judging visual stimuli for sameness. That is, children are 
reported to treat as "just the same" stimuli that are not identical in 
all respects. Explanations of these confusion errors have focussed on 
separate aspects of children's performance: language development (e.g., 
acquisition of relational terms), or perceptual and cognitive develop­
ment (e.g., visual scanning or selection of criterial features). The 
latter appear more successful in explaining the types of errors mani­
fested. For instance, Taylor (1973) found that children, judging 
sameness among schematic faces, consistently correctly matched partic­
ular features and confused others, and later evidence (Wales, pers. 
comm., 1974) suggested their responses may be affected by the presence 
or absence of a visual frame around the face.
The present series of experiments investigated potential influences 
on judgments of sameness among sets of schematic faces by children of 
pre-school and early school age. Variables examined included presence of 
a visual frame of reference around the face, type of stimulus array, 
task requirements, and salience of stimulus features relative to each 
other.
Initial results confirmed that, in tasks like matching-from-sample 
or pair-comparison, children systematically matched only certain features 
of the faces and confused other features. Type of task (including 
stimulus and response variables) and presence/absence of a visual frame 
interacted with each other to influence the response patterns. Sub­
sequent experiments suggested that neither objective visual salience of
Abstract
one stimulus feature over another, nor selection of a visual criterial 
attribute, satisfactorily accounted for the observed response patterns.
A more likely contributor was subjective weighting of features on grounds 
of their contextually-afforded significance. Faces were not compared 
feature-by-feature; instead, the criterion seemed to be sameness of 
affective expression conveyed.
It is argued that many of the con-fusion errors were not due simply 
to linguistic or perceptual immaturity. Rather, in circumstances where 
adults take "same" to refer to identity across all features, the children 
took it as "same kind of thing": their responses reflected their bases 
for classifying the faces (i.e., by affective content) rather than 
ability to judge Identity. Having judged unidentical faces as the same, 
a considerable number of children indicated in justifying their judgments 
that while certain features were the same, others were not. Thus they 
appeared able to understand and use "same" in its various adi^ut senses, 
but interpreted the task instructions differently from adults.
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PART 1
CHILDREN’S CONFUSION ERRORS IN JUDGMENTS OF SAMENESS
Judgments of sameness and the related operations of discrimination 
and classify cation are routine human activities. Infants begin early on 
to sort their world of people and objects into distinct individuals and 
categories, nm>re so as they start to acquire names for them. As Eve 
Clark recently cominied,l fundamental to such categorisation is the 
capacity to decide when things are similar enough, or too dissimilar, 
to be treated as the same.
From the outset, then, children need some grasp of sameness and 
difference. By the age of three or four, their appreciation of these 
concepts appears weH-developed, at least in everyday situations. They 
readily solve puzzles where they have to spot the differences between 
two not-quite-identical drawings, and can successfully play the kinds of 
picture matching and sorting games that are common fodder in preschool 
centres. Yet, when confronted with such tasks in psychooogical experi­
ment, those young children are shown to be far from adult in their 
treatment of sameness and difference. When asked to find in a test 
array an item that is different from the target indicated by the experi- 
mmnter, they may choose one that is identical. Or they may give a 
false "same" response, treating unidentical stimuli as just the same.
The occurrence of false "same" judgment, or confusion errors, has 
been democitrated over and over in a variety of experimental settings.
It appears that the young child often treats items as "the same" when 
they are merely similar in some respects), and in circumstances where 
an adult would call them the same only if they were identical in all
- 2
respects. The phenomenon of children's confusion errors is the main 
concern of the research programme to be reported here.
Gregson (1975, pp. 15-18) distinguishes two types of false "same" 
judgment. In one, the subject simply fails to detect any difference 
between unidentical items. In the other, he does perceive a difference 
but nonetheless decides the items are the same. Proposed explanations 
for children's confusion errors reflect this dichotomy. Errors that are 
believed to be of the first type attract perceptual explanations -- the 
child failed to see the difference. Accounts based on language are 
associated with the second type of error -- the young child may let per­
ceived differences pass because he does not understand the word "same" 
to mean completely identical; he thinks partial similarity suffices.
In both these cases, the child is seen as failing as a result of his 
(perceptual or linguistic) ipnpttrity. There are, in addition, accounts 
that lean more towards cognitive functioning, implicating strategies of 
information-processing and decision-making. Here, the child is regarded 
as thinking in ways that are not necessarily immpture as such, but are 
not the ways that an adult would follow given the same situation.
To evaluate theory in the light of emplrical findings in this 
field is a daunting task. Besides direct examination of same-c^i-fferent 
decisions, evidence can be drawn from studies of classification, 
discrimination-learning, recognition, concept-attainment, and so forth, 
which involve judgments of identity or similarity and difference to some 
degree. The methodological diversity, together with the variety of 
stimuli and of types of stimulus transformations employeO, make it dif­
ficult to collate and compare results across the nummrous experiments 
that have been conducted. A selective outline of some of the reported
- 3 -
studies and the main findings and theories will be presented to provide
a general background to the programme of new research to be described.
Dspite the range of task and stimulus variables employed, certain 
regularities have emerged in the data on children's confusion errors.
One of the most interesting of these, for present purpooes, is that con­
fusion errors occur in rather systematic patterns. Some sorts of dis- 
criminanda are consistently frequently confused, even by child^^^n as old 
as seven or eight years, while others are almost invariably correctly 
distinguished by three-year-olds. For instance, as we shall see, dif­
ferences in orientation of a figure are often confused by preschool 
children; but they rarely confuse different shapes.
In the meantime, let us take for granted the occurrence of such 
systematic biasses in the distribution of confusion errors. For, this 
finding that errors are associated with only certain types of stimulus 
transformations allows us inrnieeiiaely to comnent on the language-based 
view that asserts that young children have only partial understanding of 
the meaning of the word "same". The plan will then be as follows.
After noting some problems for that language-oriented approach, we 
shall return to examine more closely what sorts of discriminanda are 
confused and in what and how those errors might otherwise
be explained. Perceptual and cognitive factors that have been forwarded 
to account for the findings include children's visual strategies for 
inspecting and commaring stimulus figures, their modes of perceiving and 
interpreting stimuH, and their decision-rules or -criteria. Meh of 
the evidence points to the child's increasing differentiate ion of stimulus 
properties with age. Studies of concept- and category-formation and 
recent extensions of research on separability versus integrality of
- 4 -
of stimulus dimensions will be noted in this connection. Part 1 con­
cludes with a brief comment on psychon'meric approaches to similarity 
judgmmnts.
The rest of .this report is devoted to the new experimental investi­
gations of the present programme, which was initiated in the wake of 
some intriguing previous findings. Throughout, the stimuli consist of 
sets of schem^i^ic drawings of faces. Part 2 (Experiments 1-3) examines 
the effects of type of task (^^r^niplua-ting stimulus array and the kind of 
response required of the child) and of pinseice/absence of an external 
visual frame surrounding the stimulus (a perceptual cue) on the degree 
to which children confuse the outer shape or, instead, the internal 
detail of the faces.
The remiining experiments concentrate on the differential distribu­
tion of confusion errors among only the internal. face features. In 
Part 3 (Experiments 4-6), the relative contributions of perceptual and 
cognitive factors are assessed. Are confusions due to failure to notice 
a feature or detect a difference (visual), or to deliberate ignoring of 
it (cognntive)? The possible roles of physical saliency of stimulus 
features, subjects' visual scanning strategies, and subjects' assignment 
of differential priorities among stimulus features, are considered.
Part 4 continues to address those issues, examining the subjects' justi­
fications for their sameness judgments during Experiments 2 to 6. 
Implications as to the children's decision-criteria and lnddrstaidiig of 
the experimenter's test question are discussed. Experiment 7 emilcys a 
method intended to clarify and restrict for the child the pD^^ible inter­
pretations of the task requirements. The question is whhther, when the 
strictness of the decision-rule expected by the experimenter is nmpphsisnd
- 5
in the test instructions, the child will then adopt the adult's criteria
for samennss.
Part 5 (Experiment 8) constitutes a final word on the differential 
distribution of confusion errors among the internal face features. Do 
such schematic faces have a "criterial attribute" that children will 
consistently treat as more important than other features, or are they 
judged on some more global basis? The test is whether or not children 
will redeploy their attention among the attributes when their variation 
alters the global character of the faces. A summary of the findings and 
general discussion concludes the report.
L^r^cjt^uag--^oriented explanations for con-fusion errors
The sort of account here is that which is founded in the
"semaatic--feature theory" of child language acquisition. It stems 
largely from the work of Eve Clark (e.g., 1971, 1973a,b), who extended 
the linguists' method of comppnnenial analysis to children's acquisition 
of lexical items. It has been applied especially to the acquisition of 
temporal and spatial prepl>ni■tions, deictic verbs and delnonttraaives, 
com^pa^a^i^ive expressions, etc.* What concerns us here is its app^a^on 
in the domain of so-called polar adjective pairs (e.g., big-wee, more- 
less), for the terms same-different have been included in this group 
(see, e.g., E.V. dark, 1973a; H. dark, 1970; Donaldson & Wales,
1970; fe^es et al., 1976; Webb et al.. 1974).
For a general picture of this approach to language acquisition, see (e.g 
Donaldson & Baa four (1968), Campbee l & Waaes (1970), Waaes & Camppbel 
(1970), Seymour (1974), Macrae (197(5), Gatherco^— (1978), as well as the 
E. Clark papers cited above. Clark & Clark (1977, Chs. 11 & 13) provide 
a useful overview. Waaes et al. .(1976), Grieve & Hoogenraad (1976) and 
Macrae (1978),.among others, offer contrary evidence, wI^I- Richards 
(1979) gives an extensive critique of Eve Clark's approach.
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Tins is not the place for an extensive critique of sem^antc-
feature theory. Suffice it to say that this approach in general is not 
’without problems. The terms samm-different are especially troublesome.
Put simplst^^carly, the reasoning within this framework goes along the 
following lines.
SalmniSSsdifference is viewed as a iimeniisi. For aduKs, the 
term "same" is held to apply to the positive pole of the dimennion, 
referring to perfect identity. The young child initially acquires the 
idea that both "same" and "differeit" have to do with the general domain 
of (dis)similarity. GraduuHy, he attaches further semaatic features to 
the word "same" that allow him to refine his understanding of its 
meaning and to locate it towards one end of the continuum. At this 
point in his dev^lopm^nn;, he takes "same" to mean "similar in some way".
The addition of features and refinement continue until "same" comes to 
be located at the pole. Now the child takes it to refer to comppete 
identity in all respects. MeaaiWile, the child at first equates "different" 
with "same", realising only that both words have to do wth similarity.
Once he has grasped that "same" belongs at the positive end of the con­
tinuum, he begins to distance ff^^r'^nt:" from it, attaching the negative
so that it becomes "not identical".
At the theoretical level, one problem with this treatment of same- 
different is that they do not behave like the other polar adjective 
pairs. "Sam", for exam^p’e, is regarded as restricted to the extreme
end of the dimension (perfect identity), whi'le "differeit" refers to any 
point not at the positive pole. Other polar adjective pairs do not 
exhibit this extreme skew. There is, moreover, no single dimension of 
samennss-difference in reality. Objects may be simultaneously the same 
with respect to one quaHty, such as size, and different in another, such
- 7 -
as colour. Judgments of sameness may, indeed, involve perceptual- 
cognitive processes that are independent from those operating in 
judgments of difference (e.g., Tversky, 1977).
At the empirical level, such a tinatmnit does neatly encompass the 
developmental side of children's samennnsi-diffnreice judgmmnts. The 
gradual decrease with age in number of errors made is accounted for by 
the child’s iicinasiig refinement of the semaniics of "same" and "dif­
ferent” (e.g., Donaldson & Wales, 1970; Webb et al.. 1974 — but see 
also Glucks berg et aL.. 197&, for possible criticiem of their work).
But there is one important aspect of the error data that this approach 
fails to deal with. TUs is the repeated finding, already noted, that 
certain sorts of discrminandi ire more confus able thin ire others. If 
it were simply the case that the young child understood "same" to mein 
merely "similar in some way", presumably any kind of similarity wuld do. 
His confusion errors world be randomly distributed across the range of 
stmulus transformations studied. In practice, howver, the errors fill 
in quite systemaiically biassed patterns. So, wahle accounting for the 
developmental decinise in number of errors, semaiiic-fnituin theory 
fails to explain the types of confusions that occur. At best, then, 
this language-oriented explanation is inadequate on its own.
Let us now return to consider exactly what types of confusion 
eiiois occur and alternative explanatory hypotheses.
Confusion errors and type of stimulus transformation
Among the principal sorts of stimulus tiinsfoimatiois to hive been 
studied ire variations of form, orientation, colour, size, detail, etc. 
VrurUlot (1976) provides in extensive review of experimental and theo­
retical work on children's judgments of slminins-ddffninice in relation
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to these stimulus variables. A sketch of the main trends in the findings 
and proposed explanations is provided below.
Orientation and reversal
Niumrous experiments have demo^rated children's freiuent failure 
to distinguish between stimuli that differ by orientation or reversal.
Even within this general domain, however, some sorts of variations seem 
more confusable than others (s-e VuurUlot, 1976, Ch. 3). A 45° rotation 
such that one stimulus is horizontal and th- other vertical (e.g., I vs —) 
elicits hardly any confusion errors from preschool children. Diagonal 
lines of different orientations ( \ / ) are more often confused with 
each other. Rotations of 180° (e.g., d vs p ) and inversions ( b P ) 
are moOdeaaely confusable; wlnl- reversals that turn th- figures into 
"mirror images" of each other ( b d ) produce the most nuimrous -- and, 
developim-naHy speaking, the moot persistent -- confusion errors.
Comiderable research effort has been spent on children's 
bility to this last kind of reversal confusion. One comronly-cited 
study is that of Rudel and Teuber (1963), who demonttrated preschool 
children's failure to distinguish such reversals with pairs of single 
obl-iiue lines or of horseshoe shapes (C~ ZD). Using a kind of habitua­
tion and transfer paradigm, Bornntein and Gross (1978) found that babies 
made no distinction between reversed stimulus pairs consisting of faces, 
of single lines, or of horseshoe shapes, although they were sensitive to 
other differences in orientation with those stimini.
Following Rudel and Teubbr*i study, several investigators demon­
strated th- importance of the alignment of reversed stimuli relative to 
each other. Huutenlocher (1967a,b), for instance, found lefi:-^i^igat 
reversals of horseshoe shapes presented in left-right alignment (Cl 33)
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to be highly confusable; but they were generally successfully di scrim- 
inated when they were presented in up-down alignment (^). Similarly, 
up-down reversals were confused far more often when displayed in up- 
down alignment ( jj ) than in left-right alignment (DU)’ Sekuler and 
Rosenblith (1964) obtained alignment effects with rotated triangles and 
circles containing a gap in the circumference; and Vurpillot (1976) 
reported these effects with novel geometric forms (e.g., LJ ). Appar­
ently, such reversals are confused when they are presented as true 
mirror images of each other, but can be differentiated when not aligned 
as exact mirror images.
Explanations for these mirror-image confusions have implicated 
neurological mechanisms (to do with symmetry and asymmetry of represen­
tations between the cerebral hemispheres), perceptual factors (to do 
with visual scanning paths and spatial relationships) and cognitive- 
social factors (to do with the adaptiveness of ignoring certain orienta­
tion differences in the real world). Bryant (1974), Vurpillot (1976) 
and Bornstein and Gross (1978) review them. The current trend favours 
the last-mentioned of the three schools of thought over the more tradi­
tional "mirror-image” explanations. There are, however, several 
irregularities in the data that no theory as yet seems able to deal with 
single-handedly.
One is that up-down mirror images are generally confused less 
often than are left-right ones, even when stimulus alignment is con­
trolled. That is, children do not simply confuse any mirror-image pair. 
It is hard to explain this in terms of a general problem with the visual 
comparison of stimuli in this kind of spatial arrangement or of a 
general tendency deliberately to ignore mirror-image transformation 
differences.
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Another is that the type of task and the type of inspoisn required 
of the child can affect whether or not he distinguishes the stimuH. 
Jeffrey (1958), Hendrlckson and Muehl (1962) and RosenbHth (1965) hive 
shown that preschool children could differentiate mirror-image pairs 
when they signalled their decision by i mtor response, such as pushing 
a button or pulling a lever on the left or on the right, where they 
failed with i verbal response. Differences hive been found between 
visual discrimination and copying pnifoimlice on the same set of stimuH, 
although pretraining may help to reduce errors in both types of task 
(e.g., Jeffrey, 1966; Huutenlocher, 1967b; Olson, 1970; Strayer &
Aims, 1972?). Over and Over (1967) deiicitrlted that, while six-year- 
olds made mirror-image confusions of single oblique lines when the 
stimuli were presented in pairs as in the conventional s•imultlieous 
comparison or successive discrimination-learning even four-
year-olds could perform successfully when those stimuli were presented 
in a 1^10^ ng-from-sample format, where the subject his to choose from 
a miutiple array one figure that matches a "standirdl" given by the 
experimenter. Bryant (1974) also emihhlises the importance of such 
methddooogical factors. Mirror-image confusions are apparently not a 
simple perceptual miter, then.
Furthermooe, despite the common report of these confusion errors, 
children — and even babies -- hive been shown to be generally sensitive 
in other respects to differences of oiieitltioi (e.g.. 1930;
Walson, 1966; Olson & Baker, 1969; Bornntein & Groos, 1978). It is 
likely that the type of stimulus figure -- its coimnexity and inherent 
degree of directionality — is Certain kinds of stimuH,
especially those depicting fiminar items (such as faces), tend to be 
treated is micncooiented. Rotations from the canonical orientation ire
perceived is altering the nature of such i figure, and ire correctly
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discriminated. Thus Sinclair and Piaget (1968) found that two squares, 
one in canonical orientation and one rotated, were judged to be different 
entities by four-year-olds; not until the age of six did children begin 
to realise that, regardless of orientation, both figures were the same 
siuare form.
Po)y-orinttnd stimuli — those lacking any canonical orientation — 
are another maater, particularly if they are u^^^r^il'iar forms as well. 
Wiiliams et al. (1976) obtained an increase with age in orientation con­
fusions in pair-compariiot of eight-sided random polygons. Even ad^ts 
may sometimes exhibit such orientation effects as a function of type of 
stimulus. Gibson and Robinson (1935) found that aduK subjects recog­
nised outlines of familiar, montnoriented stimuli much better when they 
were presented in canonical orientation than when they were rotated, 
wh'ile poly-oriented figures were recognised eiuaaiy well in all 
orientations.
These sorts of results might suggest the influence of experience 
and of real-world knowledge about when orientation is likely to be 
important or not. Lila Ghent Braine, in has empPhsised the
visual side of children's performance on such orientation differences.
She conducted a series of investigations using stimuli that varied in 
whether or not they were interbretable as montnorientnd and in degree of 
directionaaity, as specified by, e.g., the presence of a gap or some 
detail at one end of the figure (Gi^nn;, 1960, 1961; Ghent et al., I960; 
Ghent & Bernnte^, 1961; Braane, 1965; Barroso & Braine, 1974). Her 
results led her to conclude that lJndde-flvei differ from older children 
in terms of which part of a stimulus figure they visually fixate first, 
and in whica direction visual scanning of the figure proceeds. (Thesn 
results are discussed in morn detail in Part 3, pp. 133-131.)
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Wohlwill and Wiener (1964) agreed with Ghent Braine that while young 
children are sensitive to orientation, their perceptual judgments may 
be helped or hampered by the nature of the stimuli in terms of degree 
of directionality, location within the figure of a "focal area", and 
location of distinguishing features. This kind of research can be 
criticised, however, for making assumptions about what defines canonical 
orientation, directionality, focal area, etc., and for generally "going 
beyond the information given" (see Vurpillot, 1976). In any event, as 
we have already noted, such a visual scanning-strategy account alone 
fails to handle the complexity of the findings from the experiments of 
other investigators.
Some final remarks on the orientation-confusion research. With 
stimuli that vary in multiple ways, orientation is typically the 
property that is most often confused. Taylor and Wales (1970) gave 
children matching-from-sample tasks with geometric figures that varied 
in number of sides, degree of curvature, degree of openness, etc., as 
well as in orientation. Differences of shape and what Taylor and Wales 
called "discrete" transformations, such as openness versus closure, 
were readily discriminated by three-year-olds. So-called "continuous" 
variations, as in number of sides or size of gap, were associated with 
some confusion errors. Orientation differences ("continuous") were 
still confused by five-year-olds. Those authors assumed that the 
children were differentially weighting the various sorts of transforma­
tion, taking some kinds of difference to be less important than others, 
i.e., deliberately disregarding orientation and giving precedence to 
shape.
McGurk (1972) argued a similar case, but on sturdier grounds. He
used an assortment of stimuli, some abstract and some realistic.
- 13 -
Chi^diei were given two tasks. In the first, where orientation ilone 
was varied, the subjects showed good identification of orientation 
differences. Subsequuemy, they received a maachiig-from-slmple task in 
whhch size ind/or colour varied is well is orientation. Now, orienta­
tion was confused whi'le size and colour were usually correctly matched. 
McGurk concluded that children can discriminate orientation, but when 
other stimulus properties also vary, orientation becomes relatively 
less salient. If the nature of the task or the stimuli is such is to 
direct the child's attention to the orientation differences, confusions 
are avoided.
In short, taking the Taylor-Waies and McGurk results along with 
the earlier-mentioned (p. 11) findings of orientation effects in older 
children and aduuts (Wiiliams et l., 1976; Gibson & Robinson, 19355), 
it appears that oiieitltioi and reversal confusions are better explained 
in terms of cognitive-social factors thin purely perceptual ones.
What about other sorts of confusion errors? These can be dealt 
with more briefly, since the results are usually less 11^1^!^ in 
interpretation than are those on orientation and reversal. Vernon 
(1966) and VuurWot (1976) provide useful overviews.
Shape and its comilexity
If ciisitatioi is the stimulus property that attracts the greatest 
number of confusion errors, the opposite is true for shape (contour, 
form, etc.). Onny shapes that are both highly comppex and highly alike 
fail to be discriminated by children over three years old; then there 
is i gradual increase with age in the amount of ccmilexity the child can 
handle, Santa Barbara and Pare (1965), for examile, gave children 
stimulus figures composed of stir shapes varying in type of star and in
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number of prongs, for pair-comparison. Three -year-olds could success­
fully distinguish th- different stars as long as they had only a fnw 
prongs, but confusion errors increased as the number of prongs increased. 
Fve-year-olds, on the other hand, could differentiate the morn comp^x 
stars. Brown and Goodst-in (1967) obtained a similar result with random 
polygons: five- and six-year-olds iuickly distinguished the simpler 
ones, but made errors as the number of sides increased to 12 or more. 
Errors in such situations are likely due more to the younger child's 
limited capacity for informaainn-processitg than to anything else.
Shape, size and colour
When shape is varied along with other stimulus propp-tins such as 
size or colour, it is generally the case that shape dominntes as the 
basis for sameness judgments. Long (1941) demonttrated that four- to 
seven-year-olds confused size morn often than shape but that they were 
able to learn size discriminations iuite readily. Parkas and El kind 
(1974) gave children of five to nine years the task of comparing geo­
metric figures for size, at three distances. Confusion errors were 
fewer (1) with age, (2) with rnducnd distance, and (3) when the standard 
(larger) figure was on the left than on the right of the test figure.
This impFcates the visual side of the comparison process more than usuaa
Whhreas McGurk (1972) found that preschool children discriminated 
size and colour differences eiuaaiy well in maaching-frnm-sample, Ol-ron 
(1962) found that they confused colour more often than height, which in 
turn was confused more often than form, in a pair-combariion task. (By 
agn seven, subjects distinguished variations in all three properties
For the possible influence of other sorts of 01^61^, sne (e.g.) 
Zusnn (1965), fHdford & Macdonald (1977).
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with equal success,) The reason for the discrepancy between those two 
sets of results is not clear. Perhaps it lies in the differing method­
ologies employed, or perhaps the relative phyical saliencies of size
and colour differed in the two studies.
Colour and shape combbnations have been maiprd-ated in a number of 
experiments. There is general agreement that responding on the basis 
of fom increases with age, while responding on the basis of colour 
decreases; but there is disagreement as to which of the two, form or 
colour, actually predominates for younger children (age five or less). 
Again, these discrepancies might arise from mt^t^oooli^ggc^iaZl or physical 
saliency differences across experiments. Reichard et al. (1944) found 
that in a free classification task four- and six-year-olds consistently 
sorted by form rather than colour wiile five-year-olds did the reverse. 
In constrained classification (where the experimenter stipulates the 
basis of grouping), however, those children tended to sort randomLy; 
only after age six could subjects consistently classify by the named 
attribute and ignore the other, irrelevant one. Corah (1966) in a 
three-choice-oddity matching task, and Suchman and Trabasso (1966) and 
Odom and Mwmauer (1971) in concept-learning tasks, mi found that shape 
OgminateO over colour at age five and colour responses decreased further 
with age. et al. (1976) found that shape was preferred to colour
when the stimuli were solid, realistic objects (books, pens, matchboxes, 
covered in coloured plastic), while colour was preferred vrfien the shapes 
were less ”mianingful" (two-dimensional drawings of geommtric forms). 
(See also C^mpell et al.. 1976, for an interesting longitudinal study.)
A study by Hale and Lipps (1974) directly addressed the issue of 
whether the reason that an attribute is apparently overlooked in such 
tasks is because it is not perceived or because it is assigned low 
priority. In a three-choice-oddity task, children over about age five
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chose mtches of shape and confused colour, while the reverse held for 
childisi under five. A subsequent comepcnni“selectioi task dnmcntrated 
that, whhchever attribute the subject had used in the thres-chcice-oddity 
format, he was nonetheless aware of differences in the other, previcusly- 
ccnfusnd attribute and could successfully differentiate both shape and 
colour when required to. Thhs suggests that deliberate selective 
inattention, rather thin perceptual failures, my underly confusions of 
an attribute when the stimuli vary in miutipls ways (cf. McGuuk's [l97z] 
findings, mentioned sirlier on pp. 12-13).
Internal detail
Elins V^urpilot and her colleagues hive systemaiically investigated 
ths possible rols of perceptual failures in confusion errors. In a series 
of experimenns, children were given pictures of houses for pair-comparison 
(e.g., Vuurnlot, 1968; Vuurnict & Moci, 1970; Berthoud & Vuurnlot, 
1970; Vuurnict et al., 1971). In the typical format, each house had six 
windows; houses varied in whether the contents of ths windows differed, 
or whether the same windows were present but in diff-rent orders (e.g., 
such that the two houses were mirror images of each other). Houses dif­
fering in window-contents generally attracted fewer false "sims" judgments 
than did houses differing only in wiidow-pprmiUaaion. Children who made 
confusion errors were found to inspect the pictures iiccmileee^y, to scan 
in u^s^^^s^^em^i^ic cr inappropriate paths, to fixate fsw of the relevant 
details, and to inspect the stimuli for a shorter time thin did children 
who made successful pair-comparison discrimiiaticis.*
* Other investigators whose work im^pi’cates such visual processes include 
Zaporozhets (1965) cn the degree to which children's eys movemmnts system­
atically follow contour lines; Faw and Nunnily (1968) and Malkw-rth and 
Bruner (1970) on children's visual fixations cf parts cf a stimulus as a 
function cf "high information value", high contrast, novelty, pleasantness.
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WMie nmppasislng th- role of immature visual inspection strategies, 
Vur-rUlot nevertheless admits that some confusion errors may have morn to 
do with linguistic and cognitive factors such as the young child's 
unrefined notion of sameness or his assignment of differential importance 
among stimulus attributes. Ths was evident in a two-part study she con­
ducted using pairs of comalex pictures, such as schem^a^-ised landscapes, 
as stimuli . (VurpHlot, 1969). The two pictures in each pair differed by 
only minor alterations among the mass of identical detail. Differences 
were mad- up from among four types of transformation: (1) a detail was 
ppeiett in onn picture, absent in the other; (2) a detail was halved in 
size in one picture; (3) a detail was rotated 45° or was
displaced to a new location (classed as a single kind of variation);
(4) the shape of a detail was transformed (but, Vuuplilot claimed, not so 
that it became a different kind of object — e.g., a moon might change 
from full to ^-^-1^).
In thn first half of th- study, children were given a detection task. 
They were told that thiri were differences between the two pictures, and 
that they should point them out. Four-year-olds readily spotted diffnr- 
etcns involving shape and presnnce/absence of a detail. Size differences 
were not usuaaly indicated until age seven, w^i*ln displacema-t/rotation 
shifts were often missed even by seven-year-olds. Detail-changes that 
had the effect of altering a major contour line warn more often indicated 
than were those same transformations if they were performed on an 
interior detail.
/continued/ etc, El kind (1964) and El kind nt . al. (1964) comment on 
children's unaduutlike perception of ambigunui figures and of parts 
versus wha)es, respectively.
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In the second experiment, the task was conventional pair-comparison 
for same-different judgment. The order of con-fusion errors paralleled 
the order already observed in the detection study: displacemenn/rotation 
and size transformations were frequently confused. Pair-comparison per­
formance, howevvr, was generally inferior to detection performance; and 
children who gave false "same" pair-comparison judgments could still 
point to differences between the pictures. Whiie failure to detect a
difference probably contributed to the observed distribution of confusion 
errors with these highly complex pictures, then, there was
more to the errors than that. The children appeared to be deliberately 
ignoring some of the differences in the pair-comparison task.
A study by Ricciuti (1963 -- reported in Gibson, 1969, p. 346) also 
points to the role of this kind of selective inattention. Subjects aged 
three and upwards were given a matching-from-sample task with stimuli 
that varied in shape (geometric forms) and in ddetils such as the ppree^^cce 
absence of dots, external protrusions and indents in the contour line.
The children chose ma Itches based on gross similarity of contour and con­
fused differing details, even though they demoontrated that they could 
perceptuany distinguish the defams. Ssch finddngs rrinforce a point 
made by Imai and Garner (1965): there is an important distinction to be 
made between what a subject can do and what he does do. T^c^^e authors, 
too, found that whereas physical detectability governed the pattern of 
responses in one kind of task, constrained classification, subjective 
preferences for one stimulus property over another, regarddess of physical 
discernibbiity, dominated under free classification of the same stimuli -­
and their subjects were adults,
* Again, cf. the similar method and findings of MGuur's (1972) two-part 
study; see pp. 12-13.
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From generaiisation tc . diffnieitiition:__ 1. Crltnriil attributes
Iimmturn strategies cf visual lislnctici cf stimiui, is we hivn 
senn, may contribute tc childiei'i confusion niicis but are maMi cn 
their own tc account fcr ill cf the findings. In p^a^iiicl1li, they fail tc 
explain why some kinds of differences ire confused when it is likely cr 
certain that the children can and do detect them. Chi^diei are sensitive 
to differences in orientation, size, colour, etc. As Vuuili^ct (1976) 
remarks, children can correctly name and match colours long before they 
will successfully distinguish them in a pair-comparison task. And 
several investigators have reported that following a confusion errcr the 
child will prccned tc point out ways in winch the stimuli hs just judged 
tc bn thn same are in fact different. O^rcn (1962), for instance, 
quotes one cf his French subjects who confused size as saying, "Si, ils 
sont tcus parriis, mais il y in a un plus petit et un plus grind" (see 
also, e.g., Taylor & Wails, 1970; Vuuilllct & Moi, 1970; Keemer &
Smith, 1979). Is it then that children emp^y different decision- 
stratsgies or looser criteria of sameness thin adidts?
In the 1960s, Elsancr Gibson and her colleagues conducted a series 
of experiments in the discrimination-learning tradition that give rise 
tc in influential alternative theory cf childrei‘s confusion errors (e.g., 
Gibson st al., 1962; Gibson, 1963, 1965, 1969, 1971; Pick, 1965; see 
also Schailer & Hairi's, 1974). A sst cf basic "letter-liks forms" was 
constructed tc serve as standards. Transfcimitiois were appHed tc pro­
duce fcr each standard a series of variants. The child's task was to 
achieve discrimination cf each variant from its standard. In keeping 
with other experimenters' findings on confusion errors, transformations 
that effected "dlscrete" alterations cf contour, such is brsik versus 
closure, were readily discriminated by the youngest subjects (four-year-
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olds). "Continuous" contour changes, such as substitution of a curved *
line for a straight one, and transformation by rotation or reversal, 
provoked a fair number of errors from four-year-olds but performance 4
improved markedly with age. Slanting the figure in various directions to 
produce a transformation of perspective yielded the hardest variant for 
the children to distinguish. The error rate here was near 80% for sub- 
jects up to age six, and improved only slowly thereafter (to 60% for 
eight-year-olds). |
Gibson's account of these error patterns focussed on "criterial 
attributes" or "distinctive features".* The argument runs as follows. |
Young children have only limited cognitive capacity for information-
processing and storage. The child adapts to this by encoding stimulus I
information in ways that abbreviate and/or omit certain aspects of it.
Through experience, he develops a notion of what sorts of information
are likely to be important and what can normally be safely disregarded in 4
given situations. In discriminations and sameness judgments, he there-
fore treats some stimulus attributes and some kinds of transformations
as more critical, or criterial, than others, and ignores differences that -J
he regards as "minor".
What is most criterial for differentiation of letters of the alphabet 
are topological differences such as closure of a gap, presence/absence of 
a line, etc. (compare H vs A, P vs R) that noticeably alter the shape of 
the outline; perspective is normally unimportant. The observed order of 
discriminability among the transformations of the experimental letter-like
The term "criterial attribute" is here preferred, since "distinctive 
feature" can be ambiguous. Some authors use the latter to refer to any 
feature that differs between stimuli instead of to the one, of several 
possible stimulus properties, that subjects treat as criterial to 
sameness-difference.
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forms illustrates this. The argument is extendable to the patterning of 
confusion errors with other sorts of discriminnddn. The form and function 
of objects are supposed to be of special interest to the preschool child. 
Hh therefore tends to assign higher priority to shape than to, say, size 
or colour, and lowest to differences in orientation and perspective which 
he has found in general less likely to be impprtant variables.
What develops with age is then not so much the child's ability to 
make perceptual discriminations as his cognitive capacity to encode 
larger amounts of information efficiently. Hand in hand with that growth 
goes the refinement and modi■ficatiod of the child's decision-criteria in 
making sameed-s-differedGe jcdgme-ds.
Ws explanation of how the child proceeds from apparent overgener­
alisation to finer and finer differentiation of stimulus properties fits 
reasonably well with much of the emplrical data on confusion errors. It 
also ties in rather neatly wth work in other fields that has indirect 
bearing on same-d-ssdifference judgments.
Reinted areas: categories and concepts
The classification of items into categories is obviously relevant.
(For maaor studies in this area in general, see, e.g., Vygotsky, 1962;
Inhelder & Piaget, 1964; Bruner et al., 1966.) A common finding has
been that young children, if they sort consistently at all, group items 
*
on the basis of global functional or perceptual simiiarities; around age
*Jl^ere has been some debate as to precisely what are the stimulus character 
istics used by young children in categorical and conceptual behaviour. 
WhUe the Clarks have taken a perceptual criteria! features kind of view­
point, Kaaherine Neeson has argued the primacy of more global functional 
bases (see, e.g., E. Clark, 1973b; H. Clark, 1970, 1973; Neeson, 1972, 
1973, 1974, 1978). In practice, since perceptual and functional character 
istics are often confounded in stimud, results can be ambiguous. (See 
also Saltz et al., 19722.)
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six or so, they attend increasingly to separate stimulus attributes; 
finally, they progress to abstract bases of sorting. Studies whose 
results are in keeping with this pattern include those of Sigel (1953), 
McCoonnll (196-4), Rossi (19^/^^, Rlcciuti (1965), AA-Issa (19619), Pick 
and Frankel (1974). Rock et al. (1972) showed that adult subjects 
resorted to global bases of similarity and overlooked differences of 
detail (unless specifically directed what to look for) when a recognition 
task was made difficult by the use of highly complex figures and tachisto- 
scopic presentation.
The work of Eleanor RRsch and her colleagues on "natural categories" 
ties in with the general view that children proceed with age from undif­
ferentiated to differentiated and uu'timaaely abstract moods of encoding 
stimuli (e.g., Rosch, 1973a,b, 1977; Rosch & Megi’s, 1975; Rosch et al., 
1976). Some aspects of this research also have interesting impRcations 
with regard to speecfic findings in the confusion-error lieerature.
Io Rosch (1973a), it is suggested that certain kinds of geometric 
figures (particularly those of good GestaK form) may act as "core" or 
"prototypicaT" instances of categories, while transformations of those 
figures are fuzzier, "boundary" category mei-mees. A perfect square, for 
instance, is a prototypical tetragon; a variant such as a trapezoid, 
whUe still belonging to the tetragon category, is not prototypical (and 
so on for the circle, triangle, etc., categories). Rosch (1973a) demon­
strated that Ameican children and Dani aduRs (the latter having no 
experience of geormeric forms), given the task of learning names for 
instances of concepts, did appear to treat such stimuli in terms of proto­
types and sets of variants, some of which were closer to the prototype 
than others. To take the exampR of the squareness concept, a variant 
containing one curved side was rapidly learned, i.e., was seen as close
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to the prototypical square; whUe an Irregular tetragon, which subjects 
took longer to associate with the "square" names, was treated as a boundary
instance and dissimilar from the prototypical square.
In her 1975 paper, Rosch went on to propose that category prototypes 
serve as "cognitive reference points", and that non-prototypical membbrs 
are perceived and judged in relation to those reference points rather than 
to each other. In one experiment, adult subjects were required to 
indicate perceived psychological distances among stimuli by positioning 
them in physical space. One of the stimulus sets consisted of single 
straight lines of various orientations. Rosch originally proposed that 
within the domain of orientation there are three reference points: the 
strictly vertical, the strictly horizontal, and the 45° diagonal. In 
fact, subjects used only the vertical and horizontal axes for reference. 
Diagonal lines were perceived only in relation to those two axes. Thi’s 
suggests that horizontaHty and verticality are distinct categories of 
orientation and that diagonals may be boundary menmers of those categories 
instead of separate concepts in their own right.
There are obvious links between this and the confusion-error 
research. On the basis of Rosch's studies, one would predict that proto­
types of distinct categories should not be confused wth each other. The 
data confirm this: perfect squares are readily distinguished from perfect 
circles; horizontal and vertical lines are not confused. Secondly, 
transformations that only slightly mar goodness of fit to the category 
core should be confusable with the prototype, whereas transformations that 
turn the variant into a poor category member should be distinguishable 
from the prototype (cf. children's actual performance on perspective 
versus topological transformations of a standard). Boundary instances 
may, however, be confusable with each other (cf. the observed orientation
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confusions between differing d^opsas, as opposed to correct discrimina­
tion between diagonal and vertical, or diagonal and horizoi^taa).
The notion of prototypes has also attracted attention in the field 
of artificialcooncept attainment. Whhle this r-s-arca does bear on ^h- 
issues of children's ability to distinguish-stimulus attributes, weighting 
of one attribute over another, bases of similarity and difference judg-
etc., the area is too comppex and too indirectly relevant for 
detailed consideration here. Bolton (1972) provides a fairly comprehen­
sive review of the field.* Authors who have given specific consideration 
to the abstraction of prototypes (sometimes called "schemas") include 
Bruner et al. (1956), Pick (19655), Posner (196?)), Re-d (19722), Lasky 
(1974), Posnansky and Neumann (1976), Deveiopme-damy speaking, th- 
findings tend to agree with those of the classification and discrimination 
studies: Preschool children perceive the stimuli globally; by age six 
or so, they differentiate relevant stimulus attributes, but if they do 
engage in prototypical representation of stimulus information their proto­
types are iccomelete — they abstract only part of the necessary icforma- 
aion; after about ag- eight they perform Gomee-tnC^y, attend to all 
relevant attributes, switch basis of responding when required to, and 
abstract informative prototypes.
* For a general picture of the range of stimuli emp^yed and of theories 
forwarded, see also (e.g.) Bruner et al. (1956), Bourne & RRStle (1959), 
Keedder & Ke-dder (19622), HuCten^ocaer (1964), Mcconc-l (196-4), Suppes & 
Rooenthal-Hi 11 (1968), Steinberg (1974), Bozind & Goiuet (1974).
Performance in tasks like classification, discrimination-learning, cocc-pa- 
attaicment, etc., may be influenced by factors such as the mmaningfulcess 
of stim^ui, their ame-cai^ity to verbal labelling, imagery, etc. Since 
results in these areas are, however, contradictory acd inconclusive, they 
will cot b- discussed here. For illustration, s-- Vaaddrp']as & Garvin
(1959), te-dder & te-dder (1962), Mcconc-l (1964), Rossi (1964), Clark 
(1965), Faw & Nu^ny (1968), Dinks (1970), Meaniushi (1974), Saltz & 
Finkeistein (1974), Waaes et al. (1976), Jdrg & Hermann (1977).
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From generaaisation to differentiation: , 2, Integral-separable stimulus 
dimensions
WhUe the majority view, then, is that preschool children focus on 
general similarity among stimuli and coos graduaHy with age to discrimi­
nate attributes individuaaiy, a few researchers have obtained results that 
apparently run totally counter to the main trend. Several of the studies 
by Saltz and his colleagues have produced this reversed pattern (e.g.,
Saltz & Sigel, 1967; Saltz et a., 1972 -- Koostn, 1976, cites further 
examm^). As early as 1919, Olaparede concluded that children learn 
first about difference. Olaparede questioned children about similarity 
(Are a bee and a wasp the same? How? Wi’ch are most alike: a bee and a 
bird or a bee and a flower? Etc.); the children, even five-year-olds, 
responded by indicating differences and rarely mentioned resemblances.
Although relatively few and far between, such counOer~fiodiogs are 
potentially troublesome for the Gibsoni'an generaaisatioo-to-dicrrimioatioo 
theory. Kogan (1976) suggests a way of reconciling the discrepancies: 
they have to do with the nature of the stim^H. Young children follow 
the more usual overgenera)isatioo pattern (resulting in con-fusion errors 
in saoesdiffereot judgments) when stimulus differences are located in 
details and thorough visual inspection is required for them to be per­
ceived. They distinguish between stimuH, however, when the differences 
are im^eeiately noticeable from overall GGetaK. Saltz and Sigel's (1967) 
stimuli were photographs of boys' faces, varying in identity of boy and in 
facial expression. Saltz et al.'s (1972) stimuli were reaaistic pictures 
of various categories of entities (assorted food and furniture items, kinds 
of animal, etc.). Io both these cases, differences were readily appre­
hensible from GeetaK properties. Hence Saltz's finding of apparent
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"overdiscrimination" in five-year-olds. According to Kogan, those subjects
were reacting to global dissimilar ties rather than discriminating detail.
Other investigators who have used faces as stimuli have sometimes 
observed this kind of pattern too (e.g., Odom & Lemond, 1974). Carey and 
Diamond (1977) and Diamond and Carey (1977) gave children photographed 
faces wearing extraneous parapher^'inaia — hat, spectacles, distinctive 
hair-style, earrings, etc. — for mbnchlngnfrom-(seeia^y-presented)- 
samle. The task was to identify the individual's face, regardless of 
paraphcr^al'a. Five-year-olds performed correctly when the faces were of 
people familiar to them; here, their judgments did seem to rely on global 
facial configuration. With unfamiiiar faces, however, even eight-year- 
olds mismatched. They were apf^^t^^r^ntly distracted by the parapherinlia. 
Those authors interpreted the confusions of unfarniiiar faces to indicate 
that the children were not perceiving the stimuli configuraHy, but were 
attending to the salient detail. There is an alternative, Gibsonian 
interpretation, however: the children might have been choosing matches 
on the basis of the overall similarity afforded by the configuration of 
face-plus-parapheeralia. Those studies are therefore inconclusive in 
terms of the general'sation/differentiation issue.
Firmer evidence -- and an elaboration of Kooaa’s (1976) explanation - 
is available, howwver, in the research of Garner and some recent extensions 
of it. Wooking mainly with aduK subjects, GGrner in the 1960s addressed 
such topics as GGetalt goodness versus comblexity of pattern and subjects’ 
use of stimulus prc^jD^y^r^-ies versus abstracted rules for partitioning 
stimulus sets into subsets in encoding information (e.g.. Garner, 1962, 
1966; Garner & Clement, 1963; Whitman & Garner, 1963). Garner (like 
Gibson, e.g., 1971) embhhnised that people perceive and process stimulus
information in ways designed to reduce uncertainty (see also Osler &
Kofsky, 1965). 56
More recently, Garner has concentrated on one aspect of the relation­
ship between stimulus structure and subjects' modes of perceiving that is 
pertinent to the question of overgeneralisation/differentiation (e.g.,
Garner, 1970, 1974; Garner & Felfoldy, 1970). According to these -J
authors, some kinds of stimuli are composed of dimensions that can be 
independently varied and independently perceived -- size and colour, for
■•i
example. These are called separable dimensions, and a subject who does
differentiate them is perceiving in the separable mode. With other
stimuli, however, variation in one dimension brings about a change in the 
appearance of the whole stimulus, as if affecting the other dimensions.
Thus variation of saturation alone, or of brightness alone, is perceived 
as an overall change of colour. Such dimensions are called integral.
Integral dimensions are normally not perceptually differentiable. But it 
is not always the case that separable dimensions are perceptually dif­
ferentiated. Structurally separable stimuli may sometimes be perceived -J
integrally (see further Treisman & Gelade, 1980).
This model has now been applied to children's perceptions and judg­
ments of stimuli. In a series of experiments varying integrality and 
separability of stimulus dimensions, Deborah Kemler and Linda Smith have 
demonstrated that young children perceive integrally stimuli that older 
subjects (from about age eight upwards) perceive as separable (e.g.,
Smith & Kemler, 1977, 1978; Kemler & Smith, 1978, 1979; Baron, 1978, sum­
marises their work and cites further references). In tasks such as free 
or constrained classification and three-choice-oddity matching, five-year- 
olds therefore based their responses on global similarity (cf. generalisa­
tion), while older subjects attended to stimulus properties individually
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and gave OimessSona)ly-based responses (differentiation). With certain 
kinds of stimuli and tasks, the two perceptual-judgmental modes yielded 
the same outcome. Io other contexts, howwver, the two modes produced 
quite distinct response patterns. Wen the task called for attention to 
separate dimensions and the stimuli were separate, older subjects' 
performance was superior to that of younger subjects (by such measures 
as speed of sorting). But in other cases, the integral mode of attending 
to global similarity had a facilitatory effect, so that the younger sub­
jects performed better than the older. (Kagan et a., 1963, made similar 
observations, although before Garner's model was avaalable.)
The Kemler-Smith research thus manages to knit the aaeprrsny 
anoma^s results of Saltz (etc.) into the main Gibsoni'an framework.
That is, children do seem typically to overgenora)ise before they come 
to differentiate. But whereas most experimental methods favour fine dis­
criminatory behaviour, in some (now specifiable) task-stimulus contexts 
the younger integral, wheSlstic modes of perceiving and encoding stimuli 
are actually advantageous.
A note on psychoi^n'c studies of samesoss-(Uifference
Psychonmeric approaches to perceptual and conceptual phenomena are 
being aeplied increasingly in the area of similarity-dissimilarity.
Authors who have devoted attention to classification and simiiarrty 
relations include Sjdesrg (1965), To^rson (1965), Reed (1972), Tversky 
(1977), Krumeeasl (1978), Schwarz and Tversky (1980) and Li an (1981).* 
Gregson's (1975) book contains thorough reviews of emplrica), methodooogical
Awng others, Shepard (1964), Shepard & Chipman (1970), and Leveet (1970), 
w^i’le not dealing directly with sameeoss-difference judgmenOs, comment on 
relevant aspects of methodooogy and data anaaysis.
and theoretical issues in the psychometrics of similarity. These studies 
have tended to deal as much with the question of approppiate means of 
data analysis as with the patterns of subjects’ responses theeseeves.
What has often been of interest is the degree of fit between the perceived, 
or subjective, structure of the stimulus set and its objective structure, 
the latter supposedly specifiable on purely physical grounds independently 
of the former.
With respect to sametetssdifftrtect judg^^e^n^, there are several 
problems in the psychomeeric approach. One, noted by Torgerson (1965), is 
that a distinction needs to be made between similarity as a "basic" (per­
ceptual) relation and similarity as a "derivative" (cognitive) relation. 
Both Torgerson and Gregson (1975) coement on the potential commlexity of 
the cognitive processes involved and on the fact that people may switch 
between various cognitive strategies. Existing psychologic mod^s are 
inadequate because they are largely tied to the phhsicaa, the objectively
and as yet lack the eechintry to handle the psychological -­
the comelexity and subjectivity of subjects’ decisions about similarity. 
Gregson sums up the problem: "... there are many varieties of similarity, 
some of which may be eaahhtetica^y well-behaved and others not ...”
(1975, p. 2). Since, as we have seen, young children’s judgments
do not always mirror the objective structure of the stimuli and are 
possibly even more subjectively-based than are those of adults, psycho- 
meeric methods would seem inappropHate for the study of confusion errors. 
Haase "same" judgments in fact rarely feature in the psychoi-meric litera­
ture, partly because the nature of the enterprise precludes this as an 
issue, and partly because the subjects are usually adults, not children.
One study with adut subjects that has given rise to subsequent 
research with children (including, indirectly, the series of experiments
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to be described in the following parts of this report) is Tversky and 
Krantz's (1969) test of their "interdimensional additivity hypothesis". 
Their stimulus set consisted of schematic drawings of eight faces, each 
composed of three distinct features (attributes); shape of head, mouth 
and eyes. There were two variants, or levels, of each attribute.
(Figure 1 of Appenddx 1 illustrates a stimulus set constructed along 
similar principles to that of Tversky and Kranz.)
Tversky and Krantz predicted that the perceived degree of dissimi­
larity among stimuli would depend partly on the number of actually 
differing attributes, a quannitative measure. A pair of faces differing 
in two attributes would be judged less alike than a pair differing in 
only one attribute. (As in traditional discrimination-learning tasks, 
the focus here is on difference rather than samennss.) Besides this 
quaatitative feature-count, Tversky and Krantz allowed a qualitative com­
ponent to judgments of relative dissimilarity among stimuli; subjects 
might treat one kind of variation as m^lcing more of a difference than 
another kind. They might, for instance, judge a pair of faces differing 
only in shape of head to be less alike than a pair differing only in eyes. 
Now, the prediction from the additivity of dimentiots hypothesis is that 
a pair differing in shape and mouth will then be judged less alike than a 
pair differing in eyes and mouth. That is, the rank order of dissimilarity 
for pairs differing in two attributes will follow the order for pairs 
differing in one attribute. Tversky and Kranz's predictions were borne 
out by their data. Through psychometric stimulus pairs could be
ranked according to degree of perceived dissimilar!*ty, and the order of 
dissimilarity was found to be preserved when n further dimension of dif­
ference was added across stimulus pairs.
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How does this work relate to children’s sameness-c^i^fe^ence 
judgments? Although Tversky and did not thsmf^Sves address the
issue of false "same" responses, their framework has been extended to 
children's confusion errors. John Taylor conducted a wide-ranging 
investigation of children's sameeess-difference performance, reported in 
his doctoral dissertation (1973). One of Taylor's experiments was 
sttaiulated by the Tversky and Krantz study outlined above. It 
was the data on confusion errors emerging from that experiment, together 
with apparently conflicting observations by another investigator, that 
formed the starting point for the research programme described in the 
remainder of this report.
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PART 2
EFFECTS OF PRESENCE/ABSENCE OF VISUAL FRAME AROUND STIMULI 
AND OF TYPE OF TASK ON DISTRIBUTION OF CONFUSIONS
The Taylor experiment in question is the third reported in his 
dissertation (1973). In it, he followed Tversky and Krantz (1969) 
for the design of one of his stwulus sets — eight schematic faces.
The task was Children (aged 3; 10 to 7;6 years)
were presented with an array consisting of the eight faces plus, at the 
foot, a "standard" identical to just one in the array. (Figure 1 of 
Appendi*x 1 shows the stimuli and their order in the array.) Each child 
was asked to "find a picture up here [in the array] that's just the same 
as this one [the standard]", for all eight standards.
One of Taylor's aims at this point was to determine how stimulus 
pairs that were incorrectly chosen as matching (i.e., that were confused) 
would be distributed in both quaanitative and qualitative terms -- i.e., 
with regard to both number and type of attributes confused. On the basis 
of the Tversky and Krantz work, Tay^r made two predictions:
(1) that the frequency of confusion errors would directly paraHel the 
number of actually identical attributes -- e.g., that stimuli sharing 
two attributes would be more often confused than stimuli sharing just 
one attribute;
(2) that the "order of similarity" exhibited for matched stimulus pairs 
that actually diff^^r^^d in one attribute would determine the order for 
chosen pairs differing in two attributes. (Ths he called the 
"ordering hypothesis"; cf. Tversky and Krotz's additivity hyppthhsis.)
Thhs second prediction rests on the assumption (not initially fore­
grounded by Tay^r) that not all attributes are "equar1. It is in fact
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the attributes, rather than the stimulus pairs, that would exhibit an 
order-of-similarity effect. If there is indeed any systematic ordering 
among the particular stimulus pairs (wrongly) chosen as matching, it 
would simply reflect that the child is overlooking one attribute more 
than another.
It was Taylor's data as they relate to this assumption, rather than 
to either of his predictions themselves, that stimulated the present 
research. The important finding, resulting from both multidimensional 
scaling and hierarchical clustering analyses of the children’s choices as 
match-to-standard, was that shape of head was the attribute most often 
correctly matched, while mouth was the most often confused. Despite some 
variability across subjects, the pattern was essentially unchanged when 
individual response patterns were considered: of the 48 children whose 
choices showed a consistent error pattern, two-thirds correctly matched 
shape of head, and correct matches of eyes tended to be more frequent than 
were matches of mouth.
What made these data especially interesting was an apparently con- 
2
tradictory finding by Roger Wales (pers. comm., 1974). In a demonstration 
of children's confusion errors in sameness judgments, Wales used a 
stimulus set modelled directly on Taylor's (and hence on Tversky and 
Krantz's, 1969), but observed that the internal features (eyes, mouth) 
were more often correctly matched than was shape of head.
Whence the contradiction? One salient difference between Wales's 
demonstration and Taylor's experiment was that, although the discriminanda 
themselves were the same in the two cases, the visual background of the 
individual stimuli was not. That is, both employed the same faces, drawn
in black ink on white card and having the same three attributes each with
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their two levels. But in Taylor's stimulus set, not only were the 
ellipses depicting shape of head drawn in black; each entire face was 
set within a square, black frame (as shown in Figure la, below). W'Hts, 
in contrast, cut each face out of the card around the shape of head., so 
that the ellipse representing shape was given not in black ink but by the 
cut-out outline; and Walls’s stimuli had no surrounding frame external 
to the head (see Figure lb). (Notice that the illustrations of the 
stimuli in Appendix 1 represent Taylor's framed set.)
Figure 1
Illustration of two of the set of eight schem^a^'ic faces used by Taylor and 
Waaes. Tay^r's faces were each surrounded by a square frame; Waaes's 
were cut out around the outline of the head.
a. TAYLOR (FRAMED) b. WALES (UNFRAMED)
(Solid lines indicate what was drawn in black ink; dotted lines 
indicate an outline that was cut out, not drawn.)
It is easy to imagine several possible reasons why the children 
should have chosen matches on the basis of shape of head with Tayyor's 
stimuli, and on the basis of internal features with Waals's. It could be, 
for instance, that the presence of a surrounding frame "draws the eye" of 
the child towards the edges of the stimulus figure, leading him to over­
look the internal features. Coo wisely, when the frame is absent and 
the shape of the head is cut out instead of outlined in black, children 
may have difficulty detecting the shape (because it is less salient than
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the internal features) or may actively disregard it, deliberately con­
sidering only the ink-drawn parts of the figure. Or perhaps ^^^I^h’s 
subjects were using as a cue the visual-spatial relationship between the 
borders of the square frame and the ellipse of the head shape. That is, 
in the vertical orientation the ellipse is close to the frame at top and 
bottom but distant from it at the sides, whhle the reverse is true for 
the horizontal ellipses. So the surrounding square may serve literally 
as a frame of reference, highlighting the visual difference between the 
two levels of shape of head without affecting discriminaaiiity of 
internal features.
W^feyer the reason, howevvr, the Tay^tr/Wales findings point again 
to the operation of perceptuaa-cognitive factors rather than purely 
linguistic ones in the occurrence of confusion errors. To explore 
further the lerceptual-cognitivs aspects of children's siiois in sameness 
judgmeets, and in particular the effect of presence versus absence of a 
frame around stimulus figures, became the initial objective, then. 
Clearly, the first task was to attempt a replication of the Tayyor/
Waaes findings.
EXPERIMENT 1 
Matching-from-s ample
Tayyor's design was followed as closely as possible, from the 
description of the third experiment in his dissertation (1973).
Maateials
As in the Taylor and Waaes work, the stimulus faces wore drawn in 
black ink on w^hte card, and consisted of three attributes each having
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two variants. These were: Shape (vertical vs horizontal ellipse);
Eyes (circles either left white in the middle or -filled in black); and 
Mouth (straight line vs curved-up line). These attributes and levels in 
all combinations generate a total of eight schematic faces. The set is 
il1ustrated in rrduced scaae in Figure 1 of Apppenix 1; for ease of 
reference?, it is also reproduced in the text below (Figure 2, p. 37).
Two of the faces, representing between them both levels of each attribute, 
are shown actual size in Figure 2 of the PppencHx. The ellipses depic­
ting Shape masured 9.5 by 6.5 cm across the axes.
Two such sets of eight faces weer pprdimcd:
The Framed set paaatle^ed Tayloo's stimuui. A white board
was divided by straight black lines into nine squares each of side 11 cm. 
The eight faces were mounted in the squares, leaving the centre bottom 
frame blank. The outlines of the nine squares on the board thus provided 
the square frames around the faces (see Figure 2, next page).
The Unframed set copied Wa^s's stimu^- The eight faces were cut out 
around the elliptical outline of the head, and were displayed on a matt 
grey background. The spatial array was as for the Framed set, with the 
same distance between faces but without the dividing lines that served as 
frames. Pga™, the centre bottom space in the 3x3 array was left blank.
P further two groups of eight faces were constructed, mounted indi­
vidually on wiiHe cards, to serve as "standards". One of these groups 
matched the Framed set, each face being surrounded by an ll-cm-square 
black frame drawn troccU the edges of the card. The other matched the 
Unframed set, with each face cut out. PPl stimuli were covered in 
washabbe, clear film.
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Figure 2
First stimulus set — used in Experiments 1, 2, 3 and 7.
ii
Stimulus composition followed that of Taylor (1973) and Wales (pers. coiron., 
1974). The above array illustrates the Framed set (cf. Taylor).
.,JsS|
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The array of eight faces was fixed in the same order throughout, 
for both sets and for all subjects, following Taylor's design. (This 
order was originally randomly determined by Tayyor.) Each face in the 
array was assigned a number (written on the back of the card) for ease oo 
reference. The Figures illustrating the stimulus set show the order of 
the array and the reference-umber of each face.
An additional set of five stimuli, together with five copies to 
serve as standards, were used for preliminary practice. These consisted 
of "stick figures" in various positions (standing, running, kneeling, 
lying down, kicking), drawn in black ink on square white cards, without 
frames,
Subjects
Subjects were children in attendance at a single playgroup in St. 
The playgroup served both a local housing estate and profes­
sional famiiies, so that the children came from a fair mix of backgrounds 
Eight of the enrolled children were unavvilable or unwilling to complete 
the experiment. Thhs left a total of 18 subjects, assigned to two groups 
of nine, balanced as far as possible with respect to sex and chronolog­
ical age. Group I contained five boys and four girls, whose ages ranged 
from 3;7 to 5;0 years (mean 4;2); Group II contained four boys and five 
girls, aged 3;7 to 4;9 years (mean 4;1).
Procedure
Within the playgroup room, a corner containing a low bench and tabl 
was partitioned off. CMldren were taken individuaaiy, invited to "come 
and look at some pictures". Chi'ld and (E) sat side by side
on the bench, and stimuli were laid on the table in front of the child.
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The matching-from-sample task followed Taylor's method. One set of 
eight faces was displayed on the table. On each trial, a standard -­
identical to one in the set — was placed in the blank space at the 
centre bottom of the array. The child was instructed first to "look 
carefully at all of the pictures", then was asked, "Can you find a picture 
up here [e gestured to the arrayj that's just the same as this one [e 
pointed to standard]? Point to one that's just the same as this one"
(with stress on "just the same"). If the child did not volunteer more 
than one choice as mtc^h^-t^o-st^andard, E asked, "Is there another one 
that's just the same as this one?". The child's first and subsequent 
choices were recorded in order.
A test session continued for eight such trials, each of the eight 
stimuli of the array appearing once as standard. The eight standards 
were presented in random order, differing for each subject and each 
session. The child was given no feedback as to (in)correctness of his 
responses, although E offered frequent verbal encouragement throughout.
Each subject received two test sessions, one with Framed stimuli 
and one with Unframed. The nine children in Group I performed the task 
first with the Framed set, and about a week later with the Unframed; for 
Group II, the order was reversed. Thus each child acted as his own 
control across the two stimulus conditions.
A single test session'lasted for about 10 minutes. It was preceded 
by five trials with the set of practice figures, using the test-session 
procedure. The p^^c^^ice array contained just two rows: three stimuli in 
the top row and two below, with a space in the middle of the lower row 
for the standard. If a child failed to choose a correct match on all of 
the first three practice trials, E interrupted with questions about the 
figures (What do you see in the picture? What is this man doing? Etc.).
- 40 -
E deironstrated and explained the correct choices for the first three 
standards, then presented the remaining two. Three children (not the 
youngest) failed in the first three practice trials, but all were correct
on the last two of these trials.
Predictions
The children's responses yield three kinds of information:
(1) which pairs of faces are matched (correctly or wrongly) with each 
other;
(2) how many of the three attributes are actually correctly matched in 
those pairs;
(3) which of the attributes (Shape, Eyes, Mouth) is/are correctly 
matched.
For present purpooes, the first two of these are only of passing interest 
It is the last that is important, for the main question here concerns 
the effect of the stimulus condition as it relates to the contradictory 
results of Taylor and Wales (cf. Taylor's hypothesis" — see
earlier, p. 32). The expectation is thus as follows:
With the Framed faces (as there should be a greater number of
correct matches of outer Shape of head (S) than of internal features 
Eyes (E) or Mouth (M). With the Unframed stimulus set (as Waes’s), 
internal features should be correctly matched more often than Shape.
Now, each chosen face may actually match the standard in one of 
eight ways: in all three attributes, SEM (perfect match); in two attri­
butes, SM, SE or EM; in just one attribute, S, M or E; or in Zero 
attributes (total mismatch). Thus responses can be categorised according 
to these eight sorts of matches (whi‘ch, incidental, inform about both 
the number and the kind of attribute(s) correctly matched).
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The main test is then for effect o f s tirnulus condition o n the dis­
tribution of nhoines among these resfsnnn eaneterdrs. On 0he fbsis od 
the assumptions about what undtrSies the Taylor/Wales discrepancies, the 
predictions now benome:
The nresenne of the square frame rrunt d he e anee s houui d reate e a Sa'a s in 
responding towards the SM, SE ant S ^tegon'es -- i.e., those is which 
Shape is norrectUy uutnhed. The Unframed stimuli should be assoniated 
with responses meanly in the EM, M and E nategories -- but a^ao some in 
SM and SE, sinne these innUude an internal feature and some Shape-
may onnur innidentany, by neance. Both stimulus sets are 
expented to be equal with respent to the nategorifs SEM and Zero — total 
mades and mi suu'cHos.
In line with Taylor's data but of less importanne here, we may aUad
expent:
(a) that the greater the degree of antral similarity between particular 
stimuli, the more often they will be neoafn as notching fane other; e.g., 
that fanes sharing two attributes wihh hhe tanteatd wilt let chofon more 
often than those sharing orny one atrribuet w/iht tt ; ndd
(b) that younger nhiltsen will aneievf fewer perfent matches, and will 
nhoose on the basis of fewer actually-shared attributes, than older 
hhildreo.
RESULTS
Winch (hdmbinatidna of) attributes are norrectly mutnhed?
The nuuUera of nhoines falling into the eight response haterorifs 
deshr'ibft above was nalnulated separately for the two abbjent groups and 
the two stimulus conditions. Tabbe 1 sbIUluaSses these resu!ts, oor the 
hhildseo's first responses onny. Thest da't weet arriedt at at folowv:^.
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TABLE 1 (Experiment 1)
Distribution (per cent) of First Choices according to
attribute(s) shared with the standard
z
ATTRIBUTES
MATCHED
GROUP I 
(n = 9)
Frame UnFr.
GROUP II 
(n = 9)
Frame UiFr.
ALL SUBJECTS 
(N = 18)
Fr^me UhFr.
r sm
2 attributes J 
correct j
LEM
1 attriLbute J 
correct j
I E
38.7 54.8
25.8 14.3
16.1 14.3
9.7 7.1
9.7 7.1
0 2.3
33.3 39.6
15.6 26.4
17.8 9.4
22.2 11.3
8.9 7.5
2.2 5.7
35.5 46.3
19.7 21.1
17.1 11.6
17.1 9.5
9.2 7.4
1.3 4.2
No, responses 
in above
31 ' 42 45 53 76 95
No. Zero matches
No. SEM matches
1 0
40,_ . 30
4 0
' 23 19
5 0
63 49
Total responses 72 ! 72 72 72 ..144 .... _JL44 .
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The total number of first responses per subject-group with each stimulus 
set is 72, i.e., nine subjects x eight trials each; the total number per 
stimulus set, combining both groups of subjects, is thus 144. In terms 
of the predictions set out above, the principal concern here is those 
response categories in which the choices match the standard in either two 
or one attribute(s) — i.e., in which they shared with the standard SM or 
SE or EM; or S or M or E. So the numbers of perfect matches (SEM) and 
mismatches (Zero) were first subtracted from the total of 72 (or 144) 
responses. The remainder then gives the number of responses distributed 
among the six two- and one-attribute^-correct categories. In Tabbe 1, 
the distribution over these six categories is expressed as a percentage 
of this remainder. By this means, any apparent differences due to dif­
ferential numbers of Zero and SEM responses are eliminated, making the 
results compprabbe across the various subject groups and stimulus sets.
Now, look first at the right-hand columns in Table 1, where the 
results for the Framed and Unframed stimulus sets are compared with each 
other over all 18 subjects combbned. (For the moment, we disregard the 
categories Zero and SEM.) We predicted that with the Framed set, the 
children’s responses would fall mmstly in the categories SM, SE and S.
By inspection alone, this has indeed happened. For the Unframed set, in 
contrast, although some responses were expected in categories SM and SE, 
there should be more in EM, M and E both relative to the other categories 
within the Unframme-set condition and relative to the Framed set.
Clearly, the responses do not follow the predicted pattern for the 
Unframed set. Although there is a slight shift in the expected direction 
for the one-attribute-shamd categories S, M and E, for the two- 
attributes-shared ones the shift is in the oppooite direction! That is, 
a greater number of choices match the standard in either SM or SE than in
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EM; and the proportion of EM matches relative to SM or SE matches is 
lower for the Unframed than for the Framed set. The pattern is not
essentially altered if the two groups of subjects are examined separately 
(left-hand columns of Tabbe 1).
Nor is it altered by the inclusion in the data of the children's 
subsequent choices, as Tabbe 2 shows. This table is constructed in the 
same manner as before, except for the obvious difference in total numbers 
of responses. Whie there were some refusals to make multiple responses, 
on most trials one or two additional choices were offered (with or 
without prompping), though occasionally there were as many as five 
further choices. (The bottom row of Tabbe 2 adds the mean number of 
choices made per trial. The maximum possible in any one trial is of 
course eight, the number in the stimulus array.) This means that the 
total numbbrs of responses is no longer fixed at 72 per subgroup (or 144 
per stimulus set with combined subject groups), but can vary. In 
practice, however, there was little difference in frequency of responding 
across the subject groups and stimulus sets (see second-bottom row in 
Tabbe 2). (In both tables, of course, the maximum possible number of 
entirely correct matches -- category SEM — remains at 72 per subgroup and 
144 for combined groups.) .
At first glance, then, the children's performance with Framed 
stimuli confirms Taylor's finding of Shape-based matching. But the 
Unframed set also appears to have elicited Shape-based in con­
trast with Waaes's claim of internal feature matching and Shape confusions 
with unframed stimui*.
In the form in winch they have so far been presented, howwvvr, the 
data may be misleading for they contain several potentially complicating
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TABLE 2 (Experiment 1)
Distribution (per cent) of All Choices (including multiple) 
according to attribute(s) shared with standard
ATTRIBUTES
MATCHED
GROUP I 
(n = 9)
GROUP II ALL SUBJECTS 
(N = 18)(n -
Frame
9)
UnFr.Frame UnFr. Frame UnFr.
r sm 44.6 47.9 32.7 34.8 38.0 40.8
2 attributes ) 16.3 15.6 14.2 18.2 15.1 17.1correct
. < EM 21.7 15.6 20.14 13.0 21.0 14.2
f S 5.4 10.4 18.6 13.0 12.7 11.8
1 attribute J< Mcorrect ) 6.5 9.4 9.7 11.3 8.3 10.4
‘ I E 5.4 1.0 4.4 9.6 4.9 5.7
No. responses 92 96 113 115 205 211
in above
No. Zero matches 5 4 11 7 16 11
No. SEM matches 59 57 44 37 . 103. 94
-
Total responses 156 157 168 159 324 316
Mean no. choices
to each standard 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.2
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factors, apparent in the above tables. Firstly, it is evident that the 
assumption concerning the equality across conditions of numbers of per­
fect ma Itches and mismatches was unfounded: both more SEM and more Zero 
responses occurred with Framed than with Unframed stimuli'. Seconddy, 
regardless of stimulus set, the subjects in Group II fared generaHy 
worse than those in Group I, as reflected in the differential achievement 
of SEM matches. These two factors together mean that the distributions of 
choices among the "crucial" categories are based on unequal response 
rates across the various subgroups and conddtions, which may help to 
conceal other real differences in response patterns. Thirdly, the parti­
tioning of the categories itself compllcates the issue. Recall that one 
of the predictions, following Taylor, was that there should in general be 
more choices of two-attribute matches than of one-attribute maches. This 
is confounded with the primary expectation of SM, SE and S matches with 
Framed stimuli and of EM, M and E matches with Unframed: rather than 
choosing singlg M orE matches, the chhidrrn may have bben selecting 
matches of SM and SE iisteaa.
Apart from these considerations, statistical analyses of the above 
data are unwarranted because of the small or empty cCl frequencies. It 
was therefore decided that it may bb more l)r^ofi^aat>ne to collapse hhe 
response cacaterirs, i nnt correet maaches of Shape, of Mouth and
of Eyes. A^orn-mg! y, e ht tatal nummbr of times each attribute aas cor­
rectly matched was summed across trials and children for each subgroup, 
and converted into a percentage of the total possible correct. Table 3 
presents these data for first choices only. (Since each child makes eight 
first choices per stimulus set, the total number of times an attribute 
can p^^^ibly be correctly matched in a subgroup of nnn^ subjects ie 7e — 
or 144 for both groups comm^ed.)
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TABLE 3 (Experiment 1)
Per cent correct matches of each attribute in First Choices
ATTRIBUTE
MATCHED
GROUP I* GROUP II*
(n - 9)
ALL SUBJECTS**
(N = 18)(n -
Frame
9)
UnFr. Frame UnFr. Frame UnFr.
SHAPE 87.5 86.1 76.4 83.3 81.9 84.7
MOUTH 83.3 86.1 69.4 68.1 76.4 77.1
EYES 73.6 59.7 54.2 56.9 63.9 58,3
Total no. possible
correct per 72 72 72 72 144 144
attribute
*Percentage calculated out of 72 = Total no. first 
choices = Total no. possible correct per attribute
**Percentage calculated out of 144 = Total no. first 
choices = Total no. possible correct per attribute
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TABLE 4 (Experiment 1)
Per cent* correct matches of each attribute in 
All Choices (including multiple)
• ATTRIBUTE 
MATCHED
GROUP I 
, (n = 9)
GROUP II ALL SUBJECTS 
(N = 18)(n =
Frame
9) ,
UnFr.Frame UnFr. Frame . UitfFr.
SHAPE 80.8 81.5 70.8 71.1 75.6 76.3
MOUTH 76.9 80.9 65.5 66.0 71.0 73.4
EYES 59.6 56.1 48.8 52.8 54.0 54.4
Total no. 
responses 156 157 168 159 324 316
Total no. possible 
correct per 
attribute
, 288 288 288 288 576 576
*Percentage calculated out of Total no, responses made
in each condition separately { Total possible correct) .
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Table 4 gives the results for all choices (first and subsequent 
choices combs’ned). Agalt, they ane expreesed an peeceettige, bsU thos 
time tot out of the totnl theoretically possible correct foe
this fnr exceeds the totnl possible it practice. For each subgroup, the 
maximum possible correct per nttribute could be tn^t ns 288 (i.e., for 
nty givet etatdned, there exist four p^si^e coorrec manteos to each 
sern^fe attriSutn; 9 subjects x 8 teiale x 4 possible correct = 288). 
But it fnct, to obtnit such n maximum, n subject would hnve to make 
sevet choices to ench st^derd (sitce the nmy of eight cottnited otly 
ote nttien mismatch for ench stntdned)! Typi'caHy, the tuBber of 
resrotsee to n sitgle stnndard wns nctually otly two or three (see the 
bottom two rows of Table 2). The pnecettngne quoted it Table 4 were 
therefore ^1^^^ ot the basis of these nctunl ^spotse frequencies, 
which were trented ns "equivalett it rractice" to the maximum possible 
correct.
Once more, insrectiod nlote suggests thnt whi'le rerfocmntce with 
the Frnmed stimuli exhibited the expected tretd, peefocTOntce with the 
Unfrnmed otes did tot. It fnct, the two stimulus cotditiots produced 
remarkably simi'lnr ^spotse patterns.
These dntn wem subjected to atalysee of vaeiatce ("Thorn-fnetoe 
with repented measures, Case I": Wintr, 1971, pp. 539ff).
Ench subject was observed utder nil eomblnatiots of Factors B ntd C (two 
stimulus sets ntd three nttribute ^spotse cntegories, respectively), 
but utder otly n sitgle level of Factor A (order of presentntiot of 
stimulus sets — Fenmed first or Unf^med first). The subject-groups 
were tested utdee Factor A but crossed with Factors B ntd C. SuOTnasiee 
of the results of the nta^yees nre presetted it Table 5 (for first 
rneeonene otly) ntd ^^^Te 6 (for nil responses).
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TABLE 6 (Experiment 1)
Summary of analysis of variance on All Choices
SOURCE SS df MS F
Between Subj. 768.49 17
A (order) 44.08 1 44.08 <1
error a 724.41 16 45.28
Within Subj. 1294.50 90
B (stim. sets) 0.23 1 0.23 <1
AB 1.56 1 1.56 <1
error b 278.70 16 17.42
C (attributes) 306.69 2 153.34 8.758
AC 4.06 2 2.03 <1
error c 560.26 32 17.51
BC 0.57 2 0.29 <1
ABC 5.57 2 2.79 <1
error be 136.85 32 4.28
£
<0.005
i
i
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Whether all responses or just the first ones are considered, these
analyses confirm that there was virtually no effect whatsoever of stimulus 
set (F < 1 in both cases): the children behaved in the same way with the 
Unframed as with the Framed faces. As might be anticipated, the effect 
for responses is highly significant (p < 0.005 in both cases): the 
frequency of correct ma itches differed significantly among the three 
attributes.
For a mare precise examination of this effect, t_-tests for matched 
pairs were conducted on the differences between pairs of attributes in 
frequencies (per cent) of correct matches. The results follow:*
Shape vs Mouth: There were no differences in correct matches between 
Shape and Moiith. Thhs was true for both stimulus sets, and for first and 
mdt^iple responses (p )> 0.1 minimum).
Shape vs Eyes: Throughout, Shape was correctly matched significantly 
mare often than Eyes. Framed set, first choices: j = 3.56, p < 0.005; 
all choices: t = 4.26, p <0.001. Unframed set, first choices: j = 
-4.78, p <0.001; all choices: t = -4.39, p < 0.001. (Note that the 
negative values of jt for the Unframed set show that the outcome was the 
opposite of that predicted: there should have been mare Eyes- than Shape- 
matches, according to the original expectation.)
Eyes vs Mooth: These tests gave less consistent results. For Framed 
stimuli, the expectation from Taylor's findings was for more Eyes- than
Whhie no such difference emerged for first responses 
(jt = -1.82, p >0.1), there was a significant difference when all 
responses were considered (jt = -3.76, p < 0.001) — and in the "wrong"
Unless otherwise indicated, the p-values are for one-tailed levels, since 
the expected direction of difference was specified in advance; 
df = 17 throughout.
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direction: Mouth was correctly matched more often than Eyes. There was 
no indication from Wales as to direction here. T^o-tc^iled tests revealed 
significant differences for the Unframed stimuli in both first responses 
(t = 2.21, p < 0.05) and all responses (t = 3.21, p < 0.01). Again,
Mouth was matched correctly more often than Eyes.
Returning to the analyses of variance, Tabbes 5 and 6 show that none 
of the interaction effects reaches anything near significance. One 
factor remaps, however: the effect of the order of presentation of the 
two stimulus sets is significant at p < 0.05 for first responses -­
though it disappears when subsequent responses are included. But this 
effect is probably not as troublesome as it might seem, since order of 
presentation does not interact with the other factors. From Tabbe 3, it 
is clear that the response patterns themselves — the crucial issue 
here — varied little under the two orders of presentation. Rather, the 
matching performance of Group I subjects (who received the Framed set 
first) was, in overall terms, superior to that of Group II (who received 
the Unframed set first). It is not a practice effect, for Group I sub­
jects did genera!ly worse in their second session (with Unframed stimuli) 
than in their first. This is demonstrated in Tabbes 7 and 8 (first 
responses and all responses, respectively), showing the number of choices 
that were correct in all three, in two, in one, or in no attributes, 
regardless of type of attribute.* Possibly there is something about the
* The visual search patterns of the children are possibly relevant here. 
During the task, the Experimnter made informal notes on how individual 
subjects went about scanning the array. After looking first at the 
standard, some children proceeded around the array, moving from one face 
to another without further recourse to the standard. Others looked from 
standard to one compprison face, and back to the standard again before 
looking at another compprison face. The informal observations suggest 
that it was those children who mide frequent reference to the standard 
who were more likely to choose a perfect match, or at least a two-- 
attribute match. Moorever, children who did not refer to the standard 
while searching for a first choice as match to it often did not even
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TABLE 7 ^^^periment 1)
Number of attributes correctly matched in First Choices
NO. OF ATTRIBUTES 
CORRECT
GROUP I GROUP II 
(n = 9)
ALL SUBJECTS 
(N = 18)(n 3=
Frame
9)
UnFr. Frame • UnFr. .Frame UnFr.
(SEM) THREE 40 30 23 19 , 63 49
(SM/SE/EM) TWO 25 35 30 40 55 75
(S/M/E) ONE 6 7 15 13 21 20
(Zero) NONE 1I1
0 4 0 : 5 0
Total responses
i
J 72 72 72 72
i
| 144
i
144
TABLE 8 (Experiment 1)
Number of attributes correctly matched in All Choices
NO. OF ATTRIBUTES 
CORRECT
GROUP I GROUP II ALL - 'SUBJECTS
Fr^me UnFr. Frame UnFr. .Frame UriFr.
(SEM) THREE 59 ' 57 44
""" i
37 103 94
(SM/SE/EM) TWO 70 76 72 76 142?
152
(S/M/E) ONE 22 20 41 39 63 59
(Zero) NONE 5 4 11 7 l 16 11
Total responses 156 157 168 159 324 316
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Unframed stimuli that provoked more confusion errors (and perhaps carried
over for Group II subjects to influence their later performance with the 
Framed stimulus set) *
Some brief comments on Taylor’s other hypotheses are in order here. 
Tables 7 and 8 confirm that, of those choices that were not perfect 
matches, a greater number shared two attributes with the standard than 
shared just one attribute with it (and there were commaaraively few com­
plete mismaaches). It appears that the children did indeed operate on 
the basis of degree of similarity as well as kind (in Tayyor’s words, 
order) of similarity.
Also in keeping with Taylor’s results, the younger chil^^en in the 
present sample attained fewer correct mmtches than the older. This is 
apparent from Table 9 (for first responses only; the picture is the 
same when mjH^i’ple responses are included); the entire samppe of 18 
subjects, cutting across the original groups, was simply divided into 
the nine younger (ages 3;7 - 4;2, mean 3;11 years) and the nine older 
(ages 4;4 - 5;0, mean 4;8)**
/continued/ return to it when asked for further choices to the same
standard; their gaze moved on around the array, restarting from the pre­
ceding choice face. Thus in m^H^'iple responses to a single standard, 
such a child was likely to choose a face (horizontally, vertically or 
diagonally) adjacent to his preceding choice. The relationship between 
mm Itching performance and visual search patterns in tasks requiring the 
scanning of an array clearly deserves further investigation.
This explanation is preferred to the alternative that Group II and Group I 
subjects gemuLtely difTerecl in ability, since Unframed stmuLi again gener­
ated more errors than did Framed in Experiment 3 (see pp. 85, 96-7). But 
some independent measures of the children’s IQ would have been helpful here
There was little difference between ages in overall frequency of muutiple 
responding. Man choices per standard ranged from 2.1 to 2.3 across the 
subgroups of age x stimulus set. This response rate includes both extra 
choices made on the Expprimenttr's prompting and extra choices offered 
spontaneously -- the former outnumbered the latter. The rate is consider­
ably lower than that reported by Tayyor. His two youngest subject groups 
(of similar ages to the present samppe) offered 5.0 and 3.5 choices per 
standard — and that spontaneously alone.
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TABLE 9 (Experiment 1)
Number of attributes correctly matched by Younger and 
Older subjects (First Choices only; Subject Groups I and II 
combined)*
NO. OF ATTRIBUTES 
CORRECT
FRAMED UNFRAMED
YOUNGER OLDER YOUNGER OLDER
THREE 24 39 17 32
TWO 31 24 44 31
ONE 14 7 11 9
ZERO 3 2 0 0
Total responses 72 72 72 72
*Both of the original subject groups are combined here. 
The Younger subjects are 5 from the original Group I and 
4 from Group II; the Older are 4 from Group I and 5 from 
Group II.
TABLE 10 (Experiment 1) '
Number of correct matches of each separate attribute by 
Younger and Older subjects (First Choices only; Subject 
Groups I and II combined)
ATTRIBUTE
MATCHED
FRAMED UNFRAMED
YOUNGER OLDER YOUNGER OLDER
SHAPE 54 64 63 59
MOUTH 52 58 50 61
EYES 42 50 37 47
Total matches
i_________________
148 172 150 167
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Desppte the difference between age groups in numbers of attributes 
correctly matched, age does not appear to have affected the response 
patterns in terms of kind of attribute(s) correctly matched -- see 
Table 10 (again for first responses only, since subsequent choices 
followed the same pattern).
With regard to his "ordering hypothesis" (see p. 32), Taylor found 
a considerable degree of consistency within individuals, and was able to 
classify his subjects according to order of similarity (= confusion 
errors) among the attributes. In the present experiment, response 
patterns of individual subjects proved not particularly illuminating.
They are presented and compared with Tay^r's findings in Appendix 2.1.
One final point needs to be made about the children's responses in 
Experiment 1. Frequency of correct matching differed not only among the 
three attributes, but also among the eight faces themselves. Table 11 
shows the number of times each face was correctly chosen as match to Its 
standard in first responses. (The eight faces are numbered 1 to 8; 
which number apples to which face is given on p. 37, dupHcated in 
Appendix 1, Figure 1. The total number of times any face can be chosen 
correctly is of course 18, the number of subjects.)
Faces 5,6,7 and 8 were correctly matched the most often with both 
stimulus sets, accounting between them for twice as many correct matches 
as faces 1 to 4. The difference in correct maaches between these two 
groups of faces, 1 to 4 versus 5 to 8, reached significance when tjtests 
for matched pairs were apppied (for Framed stimuH, t, = 5.531, p < 0.001; 
for Unframed, £ = 2.496, p < 0.05; two-tailed values with df = 17 in 
both cases). But Table 11 should be viewed alongside Table 12, which 
shows the number of times each face was chosen wFiether it was a correct
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TABLE 11 (Experiment 1)
Number of times each face in the array was correctly matched 
to its standard (First Choices only)
1
STIMULUS FACE NUMBER
2 3 4 5 6 7
RANK OF FACES 
BY
"CORRECTNESS"8
No. correct matches 
when Framed
10 8 14 13 7, 8, 5, 64 4 6 4
No. correct matches
when Unframed
5, 8, 6 & 76 3 4 5 9 7 7 8
Total correct 
matches per face
10 7 10 9 19 15 21 21 7 &8, 5, 6
total for 
Faces 1-4
= 36
total for 
Faces 5-8
= 76
TABLE 12 1)
Number of times each face in the array was chosen, correctly 
or incorrectly (First Choices only)
STIMULUS FACE NUMBER
12345678
RANK OF FACES
BY FREQUENCY 
OF CHOICE
No. choices* 
When Framed
No. choices* 
when Unframed
7 11 17 11 21 23 33 21
14 9 19 16 22 20 21 23
7, 6, 5 & 8
8, 5, 7, 6
Total no. choices 
per Face
21 20 36 27 43 43 54 44
total for 
Faces 1-4
= 104
total for 
Faces 5-8
= 184
*Out of a total of 144 theoretically-possible occasions per cell
- 59 -
match or not. Clearly, it is these same faces, 5 to 8, that were chosen 
the mast often -- and again, significantly more than faces 1 to 4 (for 
Framed stimuH , _t - 3.878, p < 0.002; for Unframed, = 2.122, p < 0.05;
two-tailed with df = 17). Presumabby, then, the larger proportion of 
correct matches for faces 5,6,7 and 8 is pretty well accounted for by 
their higher frequency of selection to any standard. Since it does not 
bear directly upon the main issues of the present investigation, further 
discussion of this finding and the results of a supplementary test for 
preferences among the eight faces are removed to Appendix 2, Section II.
Sumrmry and conclusions
The results of Experiment 1 broadly support Taayor’s general con­
clusions. The children did make confusion errors, but by no means 
randomly. For one thing, about 80% of their choices were either perfect 
mmtches or two-attribute ^^atches (87% for older subjects with Framed 
stimuU). So these preschool children muut have had a reasonably well 
developed understanding of sammonses, for they were clearly basing their 
decisions to a considerable extent on degree of physical similarity.
It is equaHy clear that their decisions rested on kind as well as 
on number of shared attributes. O^verH, Shape was correctly matched in 
about 80% of first responses, Mouth in about 75%, and Eyes in only about 
60%. That is, the confusion errors were consistently (and significantly) 
biassed towards Eyes. As Tayyor notes, such a systematic tendency to 
overlook one particular attribute argues against the view that young 
children simply have an ‘'immeturn" understanding of what "just the same" 
means. Rather, their confusion errors stem either from an inability to 
discern a particular feature of difference, or from a deliberate disregard 
for it.
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The present results confirm Taylor's also in that the attribute 
most often correctly matched was Shape. They disagree, though, over the 
internal attributes: for Taylor's subbects, Mouth ranked poorest, 
whereas in the present case Mouth was correct almost as often as Shape. 
This discrepancy is especially apparent in the compprison of results for 
individual subjects (as opposed to pooled responses), given in Table A2-1 
of Appendix 2. For those of the present subjects who could be classified 
with respect to winch attribute predominated in matches, the moot common 
order was the one in winch Mouth was correctly matched above all else; 
so the numbers of Shape matches must have been made up by unclassified 
subjects, who showed inconsistent or minimaa-error patterns.
The results with the Unframed stimuli, however, contradict Waaes's 
claim. Were internal features were expected to be correctly matched 
more often than Shape, the reverse actually obtained. Both Framed and 
Unframed faces elicited remarkably similar patterns of confusion errors,
in fact.
The starting hypothesis was thus not substantiated. The assumption 
that the differential maacl^ng-patterns observed between Taylor and Wales 
stemmed from Wa^s's omission of Tayyor's square frame around the stimuli 
proves to have been unfounded. Whht then could account for their con­
tradictory findings?
There was in fact a second major, methodooogical difference between 
Tayyor's and IWIis's procedures. The present Experiment 1 followed 
Tay^r's matching-from-sample task. Wa^s, in cont^i^^^-t, used the pair- 
compprison method: only two stimuli were presented at a time, and the
children had to judge whether the two were the same or not. There are
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several reasons for supposing that the two methods might elicit different 
sorts of behaviour (al-tlic^L^gh it is not clear a priori what specific dif­
ferences in responses might be expected):
(1) In matcning-from-sfmple, SSp entiee ntimulus met is on view 
all the time. Cn pair-comparison, only two stimuli are present on any 
trial. Both Taylor and Wales (1970; also Taylor, 1973) and others (e.g., 
Garnnr, 1966; Tversky 1977) have em^^asssed the importance for sameness 
judgments of the subject's awareness of the physical structure of the 
stimulus set, and in particular of the structural relations among stimuli. 
Cf the child is to use such structu^a-relational information, in the 
pair-comparison situation he has to hold in memmry previously-presented 
pairs and build up an internal cognitive construction of the stimulus set 
piece by piece over the course of several trials -- obviously a complex 
task for a young child. Cn matching-arom-sample, he has all the necessary 
information in front of him and need not rely on memory nor on the 
internal construction process. (Cf. Over & Ovvr's [l967^ finding of 
fewer confusion errors in sa^nnss judgments under mm^ing-from-sample 
than under pair-comparison type conditions.)
(2) Matching-from-sarnFme guises a ms^Sis^SucSolce decision; ion 
decision is a far simper, two-way one in pair-comparison. This carries 
with it at least two Vmplications for task performance:
(a) Visual scanning requirements. We saw earlier that young children 
may use vmmsture visual scanning strategies when inspecting stimulus 
figures. As Tayyor (1973) it is possible that in maaching-from-
samp^ the child may fail to search the entire array before making his 
choice. (For studies of the order in which children inspect menders 
of an array of stimuH, see Gootschalk et a., 1964; Santostsaano & 
Paley, 1964; El kind & Weiss, 1967; see also pp. 53 & 55, footnote.)
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Thus he may stop at the first stimulus encountered that is something 
like the standard. This type of visual search behaviour does not 
operate in pair-comparison.
(b) Response requiremenns. The kind of response required in matching- 
from-sample could be called an "active" one: searching the array for 
the correct match and then pointing to it. Not only is the search 
component absent in pair-comparison, but the required response is a 
more "passive" one: merely answering "yes" (they are the same) or "no" 
(they are not), without active stimulus selection. Tin's introduces a 
potential sub-problem: as Taylor commons, young children are reputed 
to exhibit a bias towards answering "yes" in such contexts, Wa^e^ceas the 
pair-comparison format in this instance requires the answer "no" con­
siderably mom often than "yes" for correct performance.
If it is indeed the case that the Taylor/Wales discrepancies can 
be explained on methodological grounds, then wMch of the differences 
between the two types of task is the critical one?
That the two types of task do indeed yield different results is 
supported to some extent by Tayyor's work. After the matching-from- 
samppe task, he gave some of the original subjects a pair-comparison 
task with the same set of schemaaic faces (1973, Experiment IV). To 
summaiise his findings:
(1) Numbers of ettoibutes bneijse(^. The childreh ndw confuw ed 
stimuli that actually differed in two attributes as often as, if not more 
often than, those differing in just one attribute, and a relatively high 
proportion of compete mismatches were judged to be the same. (This 
could perhaps be accounted for by a bias towards "yes" The
finding agrees with that of Over and Over (1967): pair-comparison seems
to be a harder task for young chi1dren than mftching-from-safflu.
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(2) Kind of attribute(s) confused. Tayltr's regular pattern of 
Shape-correct tnt Eyrs-confuset, observed under htt
distppetred (see his Table XXIII). Now, for pairs jutget to be the ftme 
but which actually shtret only one attribute, the errors were tbgut 
equally distributed tmong the tttributes. For pairs tctuallr shtring two 
tttributes, the tendency wts for the greatest numbers of confusions to 
occur over Eyes, with Mouth next, tnt Slupe more likely thtn the other 
fettures to be correctly matched. Compared with the matching-from-s<mple 
response patterns, wlihle Shtpe was tgtin the tttribute moot often cor­
rectly judged, the order wts reversed for Eyes md Mouth. In the pair- 
compprison datt, howevvr, error proportions were relttively high over til 
tttributes, tnd in genertl there wts no retlly cletr order tmong them.
In my ctse, these dad still do not correspond with hade's
finding of interntl fetture matching tnd Shtpe confusions. In terms of
the next resetrch step, two possibblities were considered. One wts to
tttempt ptir-comptrison with both Frtmed tnt Unfrtmed stimuli. The
second was to try compptison not within pairs but within triads of
stimuH. In the lttter method, known ts the three-choice-odtity
problem, three unidentictl stimuli me presented on t tritl, from which
the child is tsked to choose two thtt resemble etch other (e.g., "Whhch 
*
two go best together?"). Wie the child's responses in such t ttsk 
tell little tbout his tbility to judge stmeness in the sense of perfect 
identity (since no tritd conttins m identical pair), they should revetl 
the basis on winch his judgments tre made, i.e., winch tttributes he 
matches tnd confuses.
*
For the stke of brevity, this method will here be ctlled simply the 
tritds ttsk.
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Triadic presentation resembles pair-comparison in that only a part 
of the stimulus set is available at any one time. But unlike pair- 
comppaison, the required response involves some degree of visual search 
among stimulu and "active", multiple-choice selection. The method of 
triads, then, can help to tease out which of the differences between 
pair-comparison and matching-from-sample might be impprtant. The ques­
tion is whether the response patterns that emerge with the triads method 
will correspond with those of the matching-from-sample task, or those of 
the pair-comparison.
EXPERIMENT 2
Triads
Mateelals
The stimuli were the cards that were used as "standards" in 
Experiment 1: two sets each of eight schematic faces, one set Framed 
and one cut out and Unframed.
In his pair-comparison task, Wales presented the stimuli not on a 
flat surface but held up by hand. Pilot tests with 12 children revealed 
no obvious differences in responses whether the Unframed faces were held 
up, or presented flat on the matt grey background of Experiment 1, or on 
whi‘te or muni-coloured backing sheets. The matt grey background was 
therefore retained for the Unframed set in Experiment 2. In each triad 
with the Framed stimu^, the three square cards were laid in a horizontal 
row, nearer sides touching. With the Unframed set, the three faces were 
separated by the same distance as in the Framed triads, but were displayed 
against the grey background and with no surrounding frames.
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A total of 56 triads, each of three unidentical stimuli, is gener­
ated from the eight stimuli per set. Each subject performed the task in 
two sessions of 28 trials each (both with the same stimulus set), 
separated by one to two weeks. To determine the order of presentation, 
each triad was randomly assigned a number from 1 to 56. Two response 
sheets were compiled for each subject, one listing triads 1 to 28, the 
other triads 29 to 56. Half the subjects received triads 1 - 28 in their 
first test session; the other half received triads 29 - 56 first.
Within each response sheet, the order of the trials was randomised, a 
different order used for each subject. Over the course of the 56 triads, 
each of the eight faces appeared 21 times -- seven times in each location 
within the triad, left, centre or right. With this proviso, the positions 
of the stimuli in each triad were determined randomly, but were constant 
over all subjects.
For practice, the set of five "stick figures" used in Experiment 1 
was retained, but now supplemented by four identical isosceles triangles 
outlined in black ink on unframed square cards. Two of these cards were 
white and two pink. (These additional cards were supplied by Wales; he 
and Taylor had used them as stimuli in previous research.)
Subjects
*
From an initial sample of 44 children, 36 were retained as subjects. 
Their backgrounds were various. Permanently resident in St. Andrews were
From the original sample, eight subjects were dropped: four because they 
did not complete the task; two because they responded apparently at 
random and gave idiosyncratic reasons for their responses; and one 
because it was discovered that English was not his first language. One 
final subject, chosen at random, was dropped from the Unframed Group in 
order to balance the numbers in the two subject groups.
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nine in attendance at a playgroup, 18 in the first class of a school, and 
five children of lecturers in psychology at the university. A further 
four came from Glasgow families on holiday in St. Andrews, who volunteered 
in response to an advertisement. The subjects were assigned to two 
groups, counterbalancing age and sex as far as possible. Both groups 
contained ten boys and eight girls. The Framed Group, age range 3;5 to 
7;0 years (mean 5;5), received only the Framed set of stimuli; the 
Unframed Group, ages 3;4 to 7;2 (mean 5;5), received only the Unframed set
Procedure
As before, all children were taken individually, invited to come 
and look at some pictures. 1n the playgroup, a corner of the hall was 
sectioned off for the purpose. 1n the schooo, subjects were taken to the 
vacant staff room. Lecturers' children were seen either in their own 
homes or in the Urn'vvrsity Psychological and the four Glasgow
children were brought to the Expprimenner's home. With the exception of 
three of the children tested in their own homee, - during the task the 
child and the Expprimenter sat side by side on chairs and stimuli were 
placed on a table in front of the child. For the remaking three, child 
and Experimenter sat together on the floor and the stimuli were laid on 
the floor.
On each trial, the three ate stimuli were laid out, and the
child was asked, "Which two look most the same?".* After making his
* Although the wording of this question sounds strange to adut ears, the 
children appeared to have no difficulty with it. Pilot work had deter­
mined that other forms (e.g., "Which two go together best?") elicited 
responses based not on shared visual features but on, e.g., position or 
some idiosyncratic or seemingly random basis. This was evident from the 
children's reasons for their choices: "Because this one's near", 
"Because he just went for a walk", etc.
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choice, he was asked, "How are they the same?" (and occasionally, "Can 
you see anything about them that’s not the same?"). The Experimenter 
avoided using the word "face". The pair chosen from the triad was 
recorded, along with the child’s comner^lts in reply to the further ques­
tions about their sammness/difference. (Those conmmnts will be discussed 
in Part 4.)
The first test session was preceded by at least five practice 
trials, using three triads from the set of stick figures and two with the 
triangles. On the first trial with the stick figures, two of the stimuli 
were identical and the third different. Subsequent practice triads con­
tained no identical pairs. A stick-figure triad might then be grouped as, 
say, two upright (standing, running) and one lying down, while the 
triangles varied in colour of card and orientation of triangle. As in 
test trials, the child was askee for the two most the shee ame anw oh ey 
were the taim. Add^i'cnony, to emsm ttha he uhe eredno/ thd thsk an d 
was aware of possible alternative bases of choice, he was asked (a) what 
each of the three pictures showed, (b) how the chosen two differed from 
each other, and (c) how the other two possible pairs in the triad were 
the same and different. The children performed well in practice, although 
some — especially the younger ones -- were initially hesitant to give 
verbal descriptions and reasons. In these cases, the Expprimenter 
prompted until the child answered himsero, and extra practice trials were 
sometimes given, up to a total of seven. Before the second test sns/ioe, 
the child received just four practice trials, two each with the stick 
figures and triangles.
During the test sessions, nn feedback was gwas n, veny fug ufne
encouragement. A single session lasted for about 20 minuues.
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E^F^^-^l^^JCions
The experiment was of the "let's see what hlepens" type; no 
specific directiontl hypotheses were proposed. The primtry concern wts 
which of the three tttributes -- Shape, Eyes, Mouth or configurttions of 
them -- would be moot often shtred (matched) in the ftce pairs chosen from 
the tritts. Mo’e specifictlly, the question wts which of three main 
directions the trit^ds results would follow:
(t) Response patterns for both stimulus sets resembbing thtt of the 
matchng-from-stmple ttsk: There would be more choices in the cttegories 
denoting Shtpe matches thm in those denoting Eyes or Mouth matches.
(b) Patterns for both stimulus sets resembbing thtt of hake's pair- 
compprison ttsk: There would be more choices involving matches of 
interntl fettures thtn of Shape.
(c) Patterns differing between the two stimulus sets: Frtmed stimuli 
would produce matnly Shtpe matches (cf. Tayldr/matching-frdm-sampee-, 
wile Unfrtmed stimuli would produce internae fetture matches (cf. hates/ 
ptir-comparison).
There is, of course, mother possibility: thtt the responses would be 
tbout equaHy distributed tmong the three pttributes, i.e., thtt the 
triads results would paranel those of Taylor's pair-comparison ttsk.
RESULTS
The children's responses were first examined in terms of the 
cttegories thtt were used to cltssify the matching-from-sample choices 
in Experiment 1: SM, SE, EM, S, M, E tnd Zero, denoting which (tnt how 
many) tttributes were shtred in the chosen pair. Since no tri^d con- 
tai■net tny tctually identictl pair, the former categdry SEM, sttnding 
for t perfect match in til three tttributes, was no longer appeictble.
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Table 13 sumiarises the results, comparing the response distributions for 
Framed and Urframed stimuH. In each category, the mean number of 
choices per subject was calculated, for the two subject groups separately 
(n = 18 in each). The maximum number of choices per subject that could 
fall into any one category was 24, out of the total of 56 face pairs 
selected by the child. The left side of Tabbe 13 presents these means.
On the right, the same data are expressed as percentages of all choices, 
for ease of commprrson with the results of the matching-from-sample task 
given in Tables 1 and 2 (pp. 42 and 45).
It is clear that the patterns of responses in the triads task 
incline towards the third one of the possible directions they were 
expected to take. That is, they move in the direction originally pre­
dicted, but not actually found, for the matching-from-sample data (see 
pp. 40-41). To recap: in the Framed condition, most responses were 
expected to fall in Categories SM, SE and S; in the Unframmd, there 
should be a shift away from these Shape match categories towards the 
internal feature ones, EM, M and E. Now, in the triads task, there is a 
striking cross-over effect (marked in Table 13) over the Framed and 
Unframed condRions between the categories SE (Shape + Eyes the same) and 
EM (Eyes + Mouth samm); and between the single-attribute-shared cate­
gories Shape and Mouth. It appears that where the subjects of the Framed 
Group chose primanly Shape mmtches with Mouth second, the Unframed Group 
chose Mouth ma itches first and Shape next. Both groups, then, chose 
mmtches of Shape + Mouth (SM) about equally often (on at least 70% of the 
24 trials per subject in winch a SM match was possible), and single 
mmtches of Eyes equally infrequently.
The cross-over between Shape and Mouth is confirmed if the responses
are pooled across categories to give simply the total numbbrs of ma itches
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TABLE 13 (Experiment 2)
Distribution of responses according to attribute(s) matching
in the chosen face-pairs
ATTRIBUTES
SHARED
MEANS PER SUBJECT
(max. poss. 
per cell = 24)
FRAMED UNFRAMED
................. ■ ' - u
PER CENT OF ALL CHOICES
(based on a total of 
1008 responses)
FRAMED UNFRAMED
t- C SMtwo C
attributes < SE 
matched (
r sone \
attribute < M 
matched ) £
Zero
16.8 18.5 
13.8>^^ 7.2
9. ■ 0-^.^ 4.9
4. 7 9.6
3.0 1.6
0.8 0.4
30.1 33.0 
24.7^^12.8
14.1 24. 7
16.1 8.8
8.3 17.1
5.4 2.9
1.4 0.7
- 71
TABLE 14 (Experiment 2)
Per cent matches of each attribute overall
ATTRIBUTE
SHARED
FRAMED UNFRAMED
SHAPE 70.8 54.7
MOUTH 52.5 74.8
EYES 44.2 40.4
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of Shape, of Mouth and of Eyes. Table 14 presents these data. As with 
the corresponding matching-from-sample results in Tables 3 and 4, the 
new triads data are expressed as percentages of the total number of times 
an attribute could possibly be matched. Now, a child may match a given 
attribute 56 times (i.e., on every trial); for each attribute, the 
maximum number of matches possible is thus 1008 within each group of 
18 subjects.
The percentages in the triads data appear lower than those for the 
^^I^ching-i^r^c^m-sam^lie. This is because the responses are no longer inde­
pendent from each other across the attribute-categories. In maachhng- 
from-samppe, it is possible for a child (one who achieves perfect matches 
throughout) to obtain 100% for each of Shape, Mouth and Eyes maaches.
With the triads format, perfect matches are not possible; a child can 
match 100% of the time on one attribute, but if he does so, the maximum 
he can achieve on the other two attributes is 66.7% each. Because of 
this interdependence among the attributes, the kind of analysis of vari­
ance performed on the matching-from-sample data of Experiment 1 could not 
be appMed here. Instead, a series of t-tests was conducted — though it 
should be recognised that these are still not independent from each 
other, in that a significant value in one test necessarily entails a con­
verse difference elsewhere. Since the expected directions of any dif­
ferences were left open at the outset, all tests were two-tailed.
Little of interest emerged from comparisons between pairs of attri­
butes (by tbtests for matched pairs) within the Framed and Unframed con­
ditions separately. The likely reason is that most of the choice pairs 
(about 70%) shared two attributes. In neither condition was there a 
difference between Shape and Mouth in numbers of matches. With the
Framed stimuli, Eyes and Shape matches differed significantly (t = 2,820,
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df 17, p < 0.02); similarly, the Unframed stimuli produced a significant 
difference between Eyes and Mouth (t = 4.304, df 17, p < 0.002). This 
outcome simply restates the finding that Eyes matches occurred relatively 
infrequently with either stimulus set, while Shape and Mouth were both 
matched fairly often throughout.
Comparison of the matches of each attribute between the Framed and 
Unframed conditions revealed one significant outcome: a difference in 
the frequency of Mouth matches (t. ~ 2.758, df 34, p <0.01). Thus the 
cross-over effect appearing in Tables 13 and 14 is to some extent con­
firmed. This lends support to the claim that (at least with the method 
of triads) omission of the frame around the faces creates a shift towards 
an internal feature as the basis of matching.
In contrast with the matching-from-sample results, there was almost 
no difference between younger and older children in the number of attri­
butes matched per choice in the triads task. As noted earlier, two- 
attribute matches were chosen about two-thirds of the time or more, by 
all subjects. The reason is probably that most children, regardless of 
age, clearly made their choices on the basis of one particular attribute, 
consistently matching that attribute above the other two throughout the 
task. For example, suppose a child strictly chooses pairs that share 
Mouth. Then his responses will be about equally distributed among the 
three categories SM, EM and M; i.e., he must choose twice as many two- 
attribute matches as one-attribute matches even if he is not aware that 
Shape or Eyes is shared as well as Mouth. Given the tendencies, noted 
earlier, (a) generally to choose two-attribute matches over single-
* However, all but one of the complete mismatch pairs were chosen by the 
younger half of the sample. But since there was a total of only 21 mis­
matches in all (1% of the responses), this finding is of negligible size.
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attribute matcheswkere possible, and (b) to choose the SM configuration 
specifically, then the proportion of single-attribute matches may be 
further reduced. So a strict Mott^-n^aati^hr^'s total of 56 responses could 
be distributed as 24 SM matches, 16 EM matches and 16 M ma itches (Mouth 
being matched on every trial, and Eyes or Shape only incidentally).
In fact, 13 of the 36 subjects produced just such a completely 
strict pattern. Relaxing the strictness criterion to allow a 10% devia­
tion from the ’’dominant" attribute (i.e., to include subjects who matched 
by their dominant attribute on at least 50 trials) revealed a further 11 
clear matching patterns. Table 15 presents the numbers of subjects who 
produced clear patterns, by stimulus condition and dominant attribute 
matched.* From this table, the Mouth- and E^e^^s-^^atc^^rs were then col­
lapsed into a single subgroup to yield a 2 x 2 contingency table —
Framed versus Unframed, and mmtchers of Shape versus matchers of internal 
features — on which a Fisher test was performed. The null hypothesis 
can be rejected at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). Thus the two stimulus 
conditions produced significantly different matching patterns: most 
classifiable subjects in the Framed Group chose by Shape, while most in 
the Unframed Group chose by an internal feature, Mouth.
Notice that the children's matching patterns were not affected by 
the division of the task into two separate sessions. The mixed pattern 
of the inconsistent subjects was not due to their switching from one
Six children in each stimulus condemn were inconsistent. None came 
near the 50-trial criterion; the most achieved on any one attribute was 
44 matches. There seems to be a rather nice dichotomy here: children 
who matched the same attribute throughout were clearly consistent, whUe 
children who showed a mixed pattern were clearly inconsistent. Note that 
this rate of 33% subjects '"^8551^3^6" agrees with that observed in 
Experiment 1 (see Appendix 2.1).
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TABLE 15 (ExperiLment 2)
Distribution of subjects among classes according to 
their "dominant attribute" matching patterns
CLASS OF
SUBJECT
FRAMED GROUP
(n = 18)
UNFRAMED
( n = 18)
SHAPE-MATCHERS 9 3
MOUTH-MATCHERS 3 8
EYES-MATCHERS 0 1
MIXED-MATCHERS 6 6
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attribute to another between the two sessions. Only one child clearly 
switched from one attribute to another; he did so halt-way through the 
first session, and continued ma itching the second attribute in M’s later 
session.
In comparison with the matching-from-sample results, the clarity of 
the response distributions found here — particularly when individual 
subjects' ma Itching patterns are examined — suggests that the triads 
design may be especially suitable when the main concern is the kind of 
attributes matched, rather than the number of attributes. On the basis 
of this experiment, systematic response patterns seem more likely to 
emerge with the triads -- and when they do, they are readily spotted.
Given a subject who consistently matches one particular attribute on most 
trials, it can also easily be seen which (if either) of the other two 
attributes he matches secondarily, for the following reason. Consider a 
strict Moouh-matcher again. Os eight trials out of the 56, all three 
faces share the same level of Month. (This happens equady, on different 
sets of eight trials, for the other two attribut^^.) If the child con­
sistently chooses the EM configuration on these trials, we have determined 
that he ma Itches Eyes second to Mouth and overlooks Shape. Is practice, 
what usually happened on such trials was that the child initially pointed 
to all three faces as the same. The Experimenter then asked, "Can you 
find two that look more the same than the others?"; a pair was usually 
readily selected in response. This hints that, in at least some cases, 
the non-dominant attributes were being deliberately ignored but could be 
brought into play when "necessary".
Another situation arose in which the Expprimenter had to press for 
choices of a single pair. Two of the older subjects (one aged 6;4 years, 
from the Framed Group, and one of 7;2 in the Unframed) had difficulty
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in deciding which two faces to choose. Often they made a first choice on 
the basis of a particular attribute, but then reconsidered it. When this 
happened, they proceeded to give extremely detailed descriptions of the 
ways in which all three possible pairs in the triad were the same and 
different. If more than one pair shared two attributes, they resisted 
making a final choice (sometimes becoming quite upset) until the Experi­
menter emphasised that they should choose the two that looked more the 
same than the others. (The final choice was the one taken for the 
response data in such instances.) Over the course of the task, these 
two children switched between choosing on the basis of one particular 
attribute and choosing on the basis of number of attributes shared, thus 
making a relatively high proportion of two-attribute matches. Six adults 
given this triads task with the Framed stimuli responded on the basis of 
number of shared attributes, and also refused when this system yielded 
more than one pair in a triad as possible answers (e.g., when more than 
one pair had two attributes in common). When prompted, they would then 
choose by kind of attribute (the favourites among the adults again being 
Shape and/or Mouth shared). It seems, then, as if the two children were 
in transition between the childlike pattern of matching a particular 
dominant attribute and the adultlike comparison of numbers of shared 
attributes. The impression from these children's comments was that they 
became upset because they could see both ways of responding and did not 
know which was the "correct" one in terms of the Experimenter's expecta­
tions; only constant encouragement would induce them to proceed. Given 
the ages of these children, it is tempting to speculate on a possible 
association between their behaviour in this task and the supposed onset 
of the Piagetian stage of concrete operations. This could be an inter­
esting avenue for further research.
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Summary and conclusions
In the matciing-from-samp^e task of Experiment 1, the child^r^^n 
behaved the same way whether the stimuli had a surrounding frame or not: 
in both conditions, they matched primarriy on the basis of Shape, with 
Mouth next. Now, in the triads task, a difference has begun to emerge. 
Framed stimuli were again chosen mootly by Shape, with Mouth next; but 
Unframed stimuli were matched more according to form of Mouih, with Shape 
next. We are brought full circle back to tie initial hypothesis that tie 
presence of a surrounding frame would lead to matches based on the outer 
Shape of the faces, whi‘le in the absence of the frame the subjects' 
imtching behaviour would be determined by the internal features Mouth 
and/or Eyes. But the original notion of what underlay the discrepancy 
in the Taylor and WIiis findings is shown to have been too simpHstic.
It is not just that matches of the Unframed faces were chosen on the 
basis of an internal feature -- this only happened in the context of 
triadic compparson.
In the introduction to Experiment 2 (pp. 61-f-f), some of the differ­
ences among the three methods, maaching-from-sample, pair-comparison and 
triads, were discussed in terms of the nature of the stimulus array and 
the sorts of behaviours they call for. Maaching-from-sample and triads 
tasks, recaH, are alike in that an active selection response is required, 
based on a judgment among multiple alternatives. They differ in that the 
entire stimulus set is on display throughout the matciing-from-sample 
task, whi’le only a subset is available at any one time in the triads.
Tins suggests that it may be the stimulus array, and concoimtantly the
nature or extent of the visual search behaviour involved, that is
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important in determining whether or not the Unframed stimuli elicit 
matching of internal features.
Since Wales actually employed a pair-comparison rather than a 
triads format, the next step in the attempt to account for the differ­
ential response patterns observed by Taylor and Waaes was obvious: to 
present the Framed and Unframed faces for pair-comparison.
EXPERIMENT 3
Pair-comparison
Matteials
The eight Framed and eight Unframed stimuli of the triads task were 
used again. Two further matching sets were constructed, since identical 
pairs were now required (unlike in the triads task). Stimuli were pre­
sented side by side. For those with frames, the inner edges of the two 
square cards touched each other. Unframed pairs were displayed the same 
distance apart as the Framed faces, but were laid on the grey backing 
sheet as previously. Additional practice stimuli were the stick figures 
and triangles used in the triads task.
subjects
Sixty-four subjects were tested in all. The two (ages 3*2
and 3;5 years) were subsequently rejected, one because he answered that 
the two faces were not the same on every trial even when they were iden­
tical, and one because he answered "same" throughout. This left 62
Presumably, these two youngest subjects failed to understand the task or 
the instructions. They were the only seemingly age-related failures in 
the entire series of experiments. Perhaps other kinds of tasks are 
needed to probe very young children’s notions of sameness -- although sub­
jects of just over three years old managed pair-comparison in Experiment 8
- 80 -
subjects, drawn from a variety of sources: 13 from a playgroup in St. 
Andrews and 10 from one in Oxford; 13 from the first class of a primary 
school in St. Andrews and 26 from one in Leuchars. They were assignnd to 
two groups of 31, counterbalancing age, sex and source as far as possible 
The Framed Group contained 18 boys and 13 girls, age range 4;0 to 6; 11 
years (mean 5;3); they received only the Framed stimuli. The Unframed 
Group, receiving only Unframed stimu^*, contained 16 boys and 15 girls, 
ages 3;9 to 6;11 years (mean 5;2).
Procedure
Subjects were again invited one at a time to come and look at some 
pictures. In the playgroups, a table and chairs were set up in a corner; 
in the schools, a separate room was made available and similarly equipped 
As usual, child and Experimenter sat side by side and stimulus pairs were 
laid on the table in front of the child.
A single set of eight faces generated 36 possible pairs: eight 
identical matches and 28 unidenttcal. A different random order of pre­
sentation of the 36 trials was given to each subject. Within pairs, 
stimulus positions were also randomised over subjects, with the proviso 
that each face appear on the left and on the right equaHy often over 
the course of the task.
On each trial, a pair was presented and the child was asked, "Are 
these two (pictures) the same or not the same?". "Not the same" was used 
rather than "different" in view of the possibility that young childdrn’s 
sense of the meaning of "different" may be poorly developed, especially 
in relation to their unddrstanding of "same" (e.g., Donaadson & Maaes, 
1970; Webb et al., 1974). The Experimenter also avoided using the word
"face". On some trials (arbitrarily selected and differing across
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subjects), the child was also asked, "How are they the same?" and/or "How 
are they not the same?". In the triads task, it had been attempted to 
question the children in this way on every trial. Since it considerably 
lengthened the session and caused atten^'m-wandering in the crucial 
decision part of the trials, however, such questioning was now limited. 
Some children nevertheless offered the information spontaneously on other 
trials. The subject’s decisions and comner^l;s about sameness-difference 
were recorded.
Five preliminary practice trials proved sufficient for all children 
except the youngest two who were later dropped from the sample. Two of 
these trials used the stick figures -- one identical and one unidentical 
pair. Three used the triangles: One identical pair, one differing in 
colour of card, and one differing in both colour and orientation of the 
triangle. Throughout practice, the child was pressed for descriptions of 
the stimuli and reasons for his decision, until the Experimenter was 
satisfied that he understood the task and was aware of the various
relevant stimulus features.
The task was performed in a single session, lasting for about 15 
minutes. Frequent encouragement was given, but no feedback as to 
(incorrectness of responses.
Predictions
The eight identical-pair trials are of little interest here save as 
a check on the child’s general understanding of the task and instruc­
tions. There is no reason to expect incorrect judgments on these trials 
unless very occasionally (e.g., through temporary attention-1 apse), and 
correct judgments tell nothing about the main present concern -- which 
attribute(s) the child correctly and wrongly matches. The focus will 
thus be on the 28 unidentical pairs.
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In view of the triads results, the pair-comparison method, which 
likewise presents only a part of the stimulus set at a time, may be 
expected again to produce matches of an internal feature with the 
Unframed stimuli -- as Wales reported. From Experiments 1 and 2, there 
is also no a priori reason to suppose that the Framed set should not con­
tinue to elicit decisions based primarily on Shape. But Taylor's 
finding in his pair-comparison task (1973, Experiment IV) of no clear 
pattern among the attributes casts some doubt after all on what to expect, 
at least with the Framed stimuli. Perhaps the general supposed tendency 
of young children in such situations to answer "yes" (they are the same) 
even in the face of the large proportion of "no" responses required for 
correct performance could counteract any effect of attributes.
Wile the possibility was recognised that confusions might turn out 
to be about equally distributed over the three attributes (as Taylor 
found), directional predictions were nonetheeess made: for correct judg­
ments of Mouth and/or Eyes and confusions of Shape by the Unframed Group; 
and conversely, for correct judgments of Shape and confusions of internal 
features by the Framed Group.
RESULTS
First, the "control" trials in which both stimuli were identical. 
Only one subject in the Framed Group and three in the Unframed made 
errors here -- one each. Ths total is so minute that these trials can
be safely ignored.
Secondly, six subjects in each group made correct judgments on 
every trial. In the Framed Group, the youngest of these was aged 4;2 
years, then one of 5;10 and the others over six years. Correct subjects
in the Unframed group were one of 4;10 years, then four spread over age
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five, and one of 6;10, It is possible, then, for some children to per­
form perfectly well on this task at a quite early aae, and yet for others 
of nearly seven years to make errors. Since it is errors that produce 
the response patterns of interest here, the 12 entirely correct subjects 
are excluded from the following discussion unless otherwise noted. This 
leaves 25 error-producing subjects in each condition.
As before, the main concern is which attribute(s) the child does 
and does not detect/use as the baeis of s ameeesSs The fin^c^-^ngs in the 
first two experiments were oouCe d areeely i n term s f f correct matches. 
With the pair-comparison format, however, the comeprabee information is 
obtained by looking not at correct judgments but at incorrect ones. This 
is because of the nature of the response required for correct performance 
on all 28 critical trials: the answer "not the same". Suppose, for 
exai^e, that a child makes correct ("not the same") judgments of all 
pairs actually sharing SE, E or S, and also makes wrong ("same") judg­
ments of all pairs actually sharing just SM, EM or M. From his error 
distribution (SM, EM, M) we can see at a glance that Mouth is what he 
notices or uses, since it is the only attribute common to all his error 
categories, and that any concomitant Shape or Eyes matches are merely 
incidental — he is, in the terminology developed in the discussion of 
Experiment 2, a "strict MosOh-meacher". Thi's is not so immeeiate^y 
obvious from his correct judgmmts.
Throughout the discussion of the pair-comparison results, then, 
expressions like "the subjects judged by MosOh", "Mouth was correctly 
miaLc^^d", etc., are synonymous with "the subjects made errors on trials 
in winch the pair shared the same Mouth". For the sake of clarity, the 
terms "error" and "confusion" are here distinguished: error refers to
trials or face-pairs eliclt'ing a wrong lsiims" response; confusion refers
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to an actually differing attribute that is wrongly treated as the same. 
Thus a child who makes errors on Mouuh-sharing pairs judges predominnntly 
by Mouth and confuses
Let us now look at the distribution of error-responses over the
famiiiar attribute categories: SM, SE, EM, S, M, E and Zero. Table 16 
presents this. A child can make a maximum of four errors in any one 
category. Since we are dealing with 25 subjects in each group, the 
maximum number of errors possible per cell is 100. The figures given 
in the left half of Table 16 can thus be read equaaiy as simply the total 
numbers of errors actually made, or as the percentage of times an error 
was made when it was possible to do so, for each response category. On 
the right side of the table, the same data are expressed in terms of the 
proportion falling to each category of all errors actually made per sub­
ject group, for compprisue with the results of the matching-from-sample 
task given in Tabbes 1 and 2 (pp. 42 and 45) and of the triads task in 
T^I^Is 13 (p. 70).
TaMe 17 shows the results when the categories are collapsed, as 
previously, into simply all correct judgments of Shape, of Mouth and of 
Eyes. The table is divided into two parts. On thn left, the data from 
Tabbe 16 have simply been recast, as follows. The basis is which attri­
butes arn actually shared in face pairs that were wrongly judged to be 
the same. In Table 16, a maximum of four such errors per subject was 
possible in each response category. The new collapsed categories each 
sum across three of thn former ones: Shape = SM + SE + S; Mouth = SM + 
EM + M; Eyes = SE + EM+ E. The maximum wrong judgments per subject now 
is thus 12 per category. For nxamppe, in Tabbe 16 terms, a strict 
Shape-maacher's responses would appear as 4 SM, 4 SE and 4 S. Now, they 
would bn distributed as 12 S, 4 M and 4 E. In each stimulus condition.
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TABLE 16 (Experiment 3)
Distribution of responses ( errors) according- to attribute(s) 
shared in face-pairs wrongly judged to be the seme*
ATTRIBUTE ES) 
SHARED
TOTAL ERRORS 
PER CELL
FRAMED
(n = 25)
UNFRAMED 
(n = 25)
PER CENT OF ALL
ACTUAL ERRORS
FRAMED 
(n = 25)
UNFRAMED
(n = 25)
two r sm
attributes < SE
correct C EM
one
attribute
correct
62
37
36
15
15
8
Zero
64
17
76
6
51
9
0
35:6
21.3
20.7
8.6
8.6
4.6
0.6
28.7
7.6 
34.1
2.7
22.9
4.0
0
Total no. of 
errors made
(max. poss. —700):
174 223
L^i^centages above 
calculated on basis of
error totals:
174 223
*Correct "not the same" judgments of non-identical face-pairs 
are not of interest here; hence the data in this table represent 
errors. The table shows what attributes were actually shared 
(correctly matched) when wrong "same" responses given, in
order to show what formed the basis of sameness judgments.
By inversion, the confused attributes are arrived at; e.g. , the 
high proportion of SM errors (Shape & Mouth shared) indicates 
a high proportion of Eyes confusions.
(Experiment 3)
Per cent correct judgments of each attribute when errors were possible
TABLE 17
ATTRIBUTE
CORRECTLY
JUDGED
For correctly-matched attributes 
in pairs receiving wrong 
"same" judgments
•For correctly-discriminated 
attributes in pairs receiving 
correct "not the same" judgments
FRAMED 
GROUP 
(n 3 25)
UNFRAMED
GROUP
(n = 25)
FRAMED 
GROUP 
(n = 31)*
UNFRAMED
GROUP 
(n = 31) *
SHAPE 38.0 29.0 87.9 72.6
MOUTH 37.7 63.7 87.7 93.6
EYES 27.0 34.0 81.3 75.6
percentages based 
on a total possible 
for each cell of:
300 300 496 496
*The two columns on the right-hand side include the six subjects per Group 
who were correct on every trial. These entirely correct subjects have been 
omitted until now.
co
CD
i
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the maximum possible number of entries per attribute is thus 300 (25 sub­
jects x 12 entries). The left side of Table 17 expresses the data as the 
percentage actual entries per attribute out of the 300 possible.
These figures, however, are not readily compprable with the cor­
responding matching-from-sample data presented in Tabbes 3 and 4 (pp. 47­
48) nor the triads data in Table 14 (p. 71). To facilitate this cross­
reference, the right side of Tabbe 17 “inverts" the data. Since the 
results from the first two experiments used correct matches, not errors, 
the basis now is which attributes actually differ in face pairs that were 
correctly judged to be not the same. The strict Shape-maacher, for 
instance, is correct on all pairs differing in S, SE, SM and SEM (cor­
responding to the former shared-attributes-categories EM, M, E and Zero, 
respectively). Thus each new attribute category now sums across four of 
the former ones, and the maximum possible entries for each attribute is 
16 per subject. Now, also, the 12 subjects who were entirely correct 
need to be included, bringing the maximum possible per attribute within 
a stimulus condition to 496 (31 subjects x 16 categories). Ths formed 
the denominator for the percentages shown on the right side of TaMe 17.
Whoever way the data are represented, the outcome is much the 
same. The Framed Group made correct judgments of Shape and Mouth equally 
often, and of Eyes less often. The Urframed Group clearly judged pre­
dominantly by Mouth and confused Shape and Eyes both.
Statistical tests confirmed these apparent patterns. Analysis of 
variance could be performed since, unike in the triads data, entries in 
one attribute category did not affect those in another — a child could 
in theory contribute m^xii^aHy to all categories independenny. The 
method employed was the two-factor ma^sis with repeated measures on one
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factor (Winer, 1971, pp. 514ff). Each subject was observed under all 
levels of Factor B (three attribute categories, Shape, Mouth, Eyes) but 
under only one level of Factor A (two stimulus sets, Framed, Unframed). 
Subjects were thus crossed with Factor B but nested under Factor A. The 
results are sumnarised in Table 18. Wile there was no broad difference 
in responses between the Framed and Unframed Groups, the effect of attri­
butes was marked (F = 13.160, df 2, 96, p < 0.001). The stimulus con­
dition x attributes interaction effect was also highly significant (F = 
7.049, df 2, 96, p < 0.005). That is, the two groups of subjects made 
roughly equal amounts of errors overan, but their responses were dis­
tributed differently among the three attributes.
The nature of these differences was further examined by series of 
first on pairs of attributes within each stimulus condition
(df = 24 for these maached-pairs tests). For the Framed set, there was ■ 
no difference between Shape and Mouth responses, but Shape was matched 
significantly more often than Eyes j = 2.205, p< 0.025; both tests 
were one-tailed, since it was predicted at the outset that Shape would 
predominate over both of the internal features with Framed stimuH). The 
test between Mouth and Eyes just failed to reach significance (t_= 2.037, 
p > 0.05) at the two-tailed level (no directional difference was pre­
dicted). For the Unframed set, judgments were based on Mouth far more 
often than on Shape, as predicted (t_= 5.793, p < 0.001, one-tailed); 
but Eyes and Shape responses did not differ (one-tailed). There was also 
a marked difference between Mouth and Eyes (t. = 4.101, p < 0.002, two­
tailed level since no direction was specified).
Seconddy, jbt^^^ts were performed on each attribute category between 
the two stimulus conditions. Since directions of expected differences 
were specified at the outset, all p-values here are for one-tailed levels
TABLE 18 (Experiment 3)
Summary of analysis of variance on distribution of responses 
among the attributes Shape, Mouth, Eyes
SOURCE SS df MS F £
Between Subj. 619.04 49
A (stimulus set) 34.56 1 34.56 2.833 (1,48) >0.1
Subj. within groups 584.48 48 12.18
Within Subj. 987.33 100
B (attributes) 190.49 2 95.25 13.160 (2,96) <0.001
AB interaction 102.04 2 51w02 7.049 (2,96) < 0.005
BxSubj. within 694.80 96 7.24
groups
co
VC
i
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df = 60. In Shape maaches, the Framed Group far outdid the Unframed 
(t. = 7.023, p < 0.001). For both Mouth and Eyes the differences just 
reached significance (t = 2.038 and 2.249 respectively, p < 0.05 for 
both), the Un •framed Group making more matches here, as expected.
The patterns within each stimulus condition and the differences 
between the two are highlighted when we look at individual subjects 
instead of pooled responses, as Table 19 shows. The following criteria 
were established for classification of subjects.
(1) One-attrneute matceerSa Keeping to nhe oen^inolomi inogoduntd 
for the triads results, strict m^hers of one particular, dominant 
attribute were those who made a total of exactly 12 errors, i.e., made a 
false "same" judgment on all face pairs in which that attribute was 
shared, but on no other trial. Thus, as already noted, the pattern for a 
strict Shape-matcher was 4 SM, 4 SE, 4 S (summing to 12 S, 4M, 4 E in 
the collapsed categories). In the Framed Group, two subjects produced 
such strict distributions, one matching Mouth, the other Shape. In the 
Un-framed Group, there were five strict Mouth-mrachers.
To include subjects whose patterns were obviously robust but not 
100% strict, the criterion was relaxed. To be classed as a clear one- 
attribute matcher, the subject had to make at least 10 errors involving 
mtches of the dominant attribute; also, one error was permitted on a 
face pair that did not share the dominant attribute. The top three rows 
of TaMe 19, excluding the figures added in parentheses, show the 
numbers of subjects who met these requirements. The "least strict" 
pattern admitted here was one of 4 SM, 4 SE, 2 S, 1 EM (- 10 S, 5 M, 5 E 
in the collapsed categories) -- still a clear Shapp-^racher.
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Additionally, however, there were several subjects who fell short 
of the above criteria but who nonetheless obviously matched one partic­
ular attribute over the others. Since their failure to attain the status 
of "clear matcher" resided in smaH number of errors rather than in mixed 
matching pattern, they were treated separately from those who were 
unnlassified because of inconsistency. A subject was called a weak one- 
attribute matcher if: there were at least eight entries (out of the 
pD^^^ble 12) over the three appropriate domiiinnttaatribute-shared cate­
gories and no more than one outside them; and at least two entries 
appeared in each of the dominant attribute categories; and in total the 
dominant attribute was ma Itched at least twice as often as either of the 
others. In Table 19, these subjects have been added in parentheses 
beside the clear one-attribute maachers. For all five weak maachers.
Mouth was the dominant attribute (typical patterns Iteing 2 SM, 3 EM, 3 M 
and 3 SM, 4 EM, 2 M, 1 Zero). Their bias towards Mouth was considered 
strong enough to justify this treatment.
(2) Twe-antributc matchers. Several subjects matched by two 
attributes simultaneously; neither alone was sufficient, but the presence 
of matches of both together invariably elicited a wrong "same" judgment.
A strict two-attribute matcher was therefore one who made exactly four 
errors, all falling in a single two-attribute category (i.e., scoring 
just 4 SM, or just 4 SE, or just 4 EM). For present purppses, a subject 
was not excluded if he made only one other error outside that category; 
but within the category, all four errors had to occur.
(3) Untlans^fied subjects were:
(a) those who made too few errors to allow a clear pattern to be seen. 
With the exception of the clear two-attribute matchers just described,
any child making seven or fewer errors was treated as unclassifinb^c.
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TABLE 19 (Experiment 3)
Distribution of subjects among classes according to their 
dominant attribute matching patterns (see text for explanation)
CLASS OF SUBJECT BY 
ATTRIBUTE(S) MATCHED
FRAMED GROUP 
(n = 31)
UNFRAMED GROUP 
(n = 31)
one-
attribute
matchers
SHAPE
MOUTH
EYES
3
2 (+2)* 
2
1
9 (43)* 
2
two-
attribute
matchers
SHAPE & MOUTH 
SHAPE & EYES 
MOUTH & EYES
0
0
3
5
2
0
unclassif iable 
because no 
dominant
attribute
INCONSISTENT
TOO FEW ERRORS
ALL CORRECT
1
8
6
2
5
6
*Additional in brackets are the "weak - Mouth-matchers
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(b) those who were inconsistent. Three subjects made 11 or more errors 
but not exhibiting any donmnnant-atribute pattern.
(c) those who were all correct. To compete the subject groups, the 
six children in each who made correct judgments on all 28 trials were
added.
The top two rows isolated from Tabbe 19 form a 2 x 2 contingency 
table (Shape- versus Moutt-mratCees, Framed versus Urframed stimuli) on 
winch a Fisher test was performed. The alternative to the null hypoth­
esis was the original, directional prediction that the two stimulus con­
ditions would elicit different response distributions, with the Framed 
Group matching predominantly Shape and the Urframed matching an internal 
feature. Whether or not the weak Mooth-mracheos were omitted, no signif­
icant difference obtained at the uae-tailed level. Nothing would be 
gained by iacuoporating Eyes-matchers since these would simply further 
reduce the difference between the two groups.
It is clear from the various statistical presentations that only 
part of the predictions made at the start of Experiment 3 were confirmed. 
As expected both from the present triads results and from Waaes's earlier 
pair-comparison finding with Unnamed stimuli, subjects given a pair- 
comrprisua task with Unframed faces made sameness judgments primarily on 
the basis of a shared internal feature (Mouth). for the first
time in the present series of experiments, Eyes were not the most fre­
quently confused attribute -- the Unframed Group confused Shape moot, 
thus strengthening their tendency towards internal feature mcitching.
The Framed Group did not behave as expected from the triads results; 
that is. Shape no longer predominated outright over the internal features. 
The Framed Group pattern tended, rather, to agree with Taylor's
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corresponding results. As noted in the introduction to Experiment 2, the 
clear distributional bias found by Taylor in matching-from-sample, of 
Shape mot often correct and Mouth least, disappeared almost completely 
in his pair-comparison task. In the present pair-comparison task, either 
Muth matching was as common as Shape notching or, indeed, for several 
subjects it was only the Shape-plus-Mouth combbnation that counted. In 
contrast with Taylor's finding, howeevr, Eyes matches were still signif­
icantly less frequent.
But this apparent contradiction is likely explained by the fact that 
in pair-comparison Tay^r's oldest subject was 5;7 years, while the pre­
sent samppe extended to 6;11. To examine this possibblity, the present 
subjects were divided on a post-hoc basis into the 16 younger and 15 older 
in each condition, the upper limit of the younger subgroups being 5;2 
years. From Tabbe 20, it is evident that the younger subjects in the 
Framed conddtion made about equal numbers of matches of all attributes, 
i.e., behaved just as did their peers in Tay^r's experiment. It was the 
older children who exhibited a dominance of Shape and/or Mouth. For the 
Unframed Group, no such difference in the response distributions of the 
two age groups only a general difference in error frequency.
With regard to this last point, however, there was a marked depar­
ture from Tayyor both in the overall frequency of errors observed and in 
the numbers of attributes confused. Taybr's overall error frequencies 
have been added to Tabbe 20; his subjects produced a far higher error 
rate than did the present ones. In fact, both his groups tended to make
There is a possible explanation for the difference in overall error fre­
quencies between the two experiments. Where subjects in the present 
pair-comparison task were asked, "Are these two (pictures) the same or not 
the same?", Tayyor asked his, "Is this the same as ■this?" (pointing to 
the stimuli). In the former question, the negative is expUcitly stated
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TABLE 20 (Experiment 3)
Distribution of responses according to attribute(s) shared 
in face-pairs wrongly judged to be the same, by Younger 
and Older subjects (cf. Taylor, 1973, Table XXIII).
ATTRIBUTE(S)
SHARED
FRAMED UNFRAMED
Younger 
(n = 14)*
. Older 
(n = 11)*
Younger 
(n = 15)*
Older 
(n = 10)*
two r SM • 27 35 45 19
attributes < SE 28 9 12 5
correct I EM 21 15 44 32
one t S 8 7 6 0
attribute < M 7 8 38 13
correct I E 8 0 4 5
Zero 0 1 0 0
Total no. errors 99 75 149 74
% error rate 22.1% 17.9% 33.3% 17.6%
Taylor
error
's % 
rate
Group V
5 7.1%
Group TV
30.0%
* These n‘s exclude the 12 subjects who were all correct. In total, there 
were 16 subjects in each Younger Group and 15 in each Older Group. **
** Calculated on the basis of information presented in Taylor (1973).
His Group V had 10 subjects, aged 3;10 - 4;8, mean 4;2 years;
his Group IV had 13 subjects, aged 4;3 - 5;7, mean 4;10.
In the present sample, the ages were:
Younnor: Framed — 4;0 - 5;2, mean 4;7. Unframed — 3;9 - 5;2, mean 4;6-.
Oder: Framed — 5;3 - 6-11, mean 6;0. Unframed -- 5;2 - 6;11, mean 6;0.
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more errors on pairs sharing only one attribute than on pairs sharing 
two. Almost 50% of all his errors fell to two-attribute differences, as 
against almost 40% to pairs differing by one attribute. The correspon­
ding figures for the present pair-comparison results with the Framed 
stimuli were 23% for two-attribute differences and 77% for one-attribute 
differences (with no effect of age). Further, whereas Taylor's two 
subject groups made surprisingly high proportions of errors (12 and 14%) 
on pairs actually differing in all three attributes, only one wrong 
"same" response to a Zero pair was produced in the whole of the present 
experiment. As in the matching-from-sample and triads tasks, then, the 
present subjects clearly took into account degree as well as kind of 
actual similarity. (Had they been using purely the kind of attribute 
shared, their errors would have been distributed as 33% on two-attribute 
differences and 67% on one-attribute differences.)
Remaining for a moment with the proportion of errors to correct 
judgments, notice that overall the Unframed stimuli elicited slightly 
fewer correct judgments than the Framed (although not significantly so, 
according to the analysis of variance summarised in Table 18). This 
accords with the observation in the matching-from-sample task of Experi­
ment 1 that the Unframed Set received fewer complete SEM matches than 
the Framed. The agreement lends some support to the earlier suggestion 
that there may be something about the Unframed faces that makes fully
/continued/ as an alternative to the "same" judgment. Indeed, the fear 
had been that the children might reply "not the same", showing a recency- 
of-mention effect; but pilot tests revealed no such tendency. Taylor's 
question form, on the other hand, could well lead the children -- who were 
young enough to be not yet fully conversant with the niceties of language 
to guess that the answer "yes" (they are the same) was expected. While 
this could have operated to produce Taylor's generally high error rate, 
however, it is unclear how it could explain his finding of a greater 
number of errors on pairs differing by two attributes than on pairs dif­
fering by only one attribute.
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correct matching performance less likely with them. To put it another 
way, the child given Unframed stimuli seems more likely to adhere to a 
single dominant attribute and consistently overlook the others.
Summary and conclusions
The series of experiments reported here began with the assummpion, 
based on extensive evidence from other sources, that young children make 
confusion errors when they choose or compare visual stimuli for sammness. 
That confusions would occur was taken for granted here. The question was 
what kinds occur -- whether regular patterns can be discerned of system­
atic correct matching of certain stimulus features and con-fusions of 
others; and if so, what perceptual/cognitive factors might explain them.
Speeifically, the present programme was stimulated by prior contra­
dictory observations as to which attribute(s) children took as the basis 
of sameness among schematic faces that could vary in Shape, Eyes and 
Mouth. Taylor (1973) found that Shape was the mmst often correctly 
matched attribute, whereas WIiss reported (pers. comm, 1974) confusions 
of Shape and better performance with the internal features. The starting 
objective, then, was to attempt to account for these differential results, 
as a means to shedding more light on the nature and process of children's 
sameness judgments and confusion errors.
One specific perceptual factor immeiaaely presented itself as a 
candidate. The mmst salient difference between the two experiments 
seemed, initially, to lie in the fact that in Taylor's stimulus set each 
face was surrounded by a square frame, while in Waaes's the frames were 
missing and instead each face was cut out around its elliptical head- 
shape. On a number of grounds, it was reasonable to suppose that such an 
external perceptual feature should affect winch part of the stimulus was
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was noticed or used. That the presence of a surrounding frame would 
elicit correct judgments of the outer Shape of the faces more than of the 
internal face features, while its absence would lead instead to correct 
performance on internal features rather than on Shape, thus seemed the 
obvious first prediction to test. It was falsely supposed, however, that 
presence/absence of a frame was the sole major difference between 
Taylor's and Wales's procedures. Subsequently, it emerged that, whereas 
Taylor had employed the framed faces in a maaching-from-saopOe task, 
lW^es presented his unframed set for pair-comparison.
Over the course of the first three experiments of the present study, 
then, both the perceptual and methodological factors were examined for 
their relative contributions to frequency and distribution of correct 
decisions and confusions among the three stimulus attributes. Throeghiue., 
two identical sets of eight schematic faces were used, one Framed (like 
Taylor’s) and one Unframed (like Wa'lee's). Three types of task were 
administered: motching-froo-saople (like Tatler's), triads (novel) and 
pair-comparison (used by both Wa^s and Tay^r). They were selected to 
vary amount of the total stimulus set available at a time, type of visual 
search behaviour involved, type of decision and response required, in an 
attempt to untangle which particular aspects of the ^^e^l^c^dc^ol^^ical dif­
ferences might be important. Table 21 indicates where the comnonalRies 
and differences in these task variables lie among the three methods.
Under each method, the findings are suomoaised for the two stimulus con­
ditions separately. The corresponding findings of Taylor (Framed only) 
and Waaes (Unframed only) have been added in parentheses where approppiate
An interaction between the task and stimulus variables is evident. 
With the Framed faces, Shape predominated as the basis of sameness in
matching-from-sampOe and triads, but not in pair-compptison. Thhs
TABLE 21
Summary of experimental manipulations and corresponding results for Experiments 1, 2 and 3.
TYPE OF TASK
TASK VARIABLES MATCHING-FROM-SAMPLE TRIADS PAIR-COMPARISON
Amount of 
stimulus 
set on view
all
part
'f
Visual search/ 
Decision basis
scan array & compare 
multiple pairs
Response type
compare single pair
active stimulus 
selection
STIMULUS VARIABLES
passive verbal 
yes/no answer
RESULTS (Attributes ranked according to correctness of judgments)*
Framed (cf. Taylor) 
Unframed (cf. Wales)
S>M>E (S>E>M) 
S^M>E
S>M>E
M>S>E
S = M>E (S = M-E) 
M>E = S (M?E>S)
* Entries in parentheses were the patterns observed by Taylor or Wales
Key: ">" — "is correctly judged more often than"; " = " -- "is correctly judged as often as"; 
"9" -- order-relationship between the attributes is unknown
i
LDKO
I
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suggests that active, multiple-choice stimulus selection is a necessary 
task component for the frame to produce a bias towards Shape matches.
When the response required merely passive judgments of just two alter­
natives, the distribution of correct matches among the three attributes 
levelled out. But whether all or just part of the stimulus set was on 
display at a time seems to have been irrelevant.
Against this, for the Unframed stimuli to produce decisions based 
on matches of an internal feature, the crucial requirement is apparently 
that only a few stimuli be on view. Provision of the entire stimulus 
array in fact led to a near reversal , from Mouth-based to Shape-based 
responses. And in contrast with the Framed condition, the type of 
response involved now made only a slight difference.
Notice, however, that independently of the task x stimulus set 
interaction, the matching-from-sample format elicited a Shape bias 
regardless of presence/absence of frame; and also that the pair- 
comparison format, relative to the other methods, does seem to have 
generally shifted the basis of responding further towards internal 
features with both stimulus sets. It is possible that the type of array 
in which the stimuli were displayed in the matching-from-sample task made 
Shape generally more salient, overriding any differential effect of the 
Framed/Unframed condition; and conversely, that the pair-comparison 
display tended to lead to a focus on internal features, counteracting 
the influence of the frame.
With regard to his two sets of results, Taylor remarked on the 
perfect achievement of correct "same" judgments on actually identical 
pairs in pair-comparison, contrasting with matching-from-sample in which 
identical matches could be missed. He offered two explanations for this
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pair-comparison effect. One concerned the young chi1d*s possible bias 
towards "yes" answers, mjr^i^ioned earlier. Whiie this could also account 
for his own high error rate, the present finding of a rather low propor­
tion of false-positive responses argues against any major effect of such 
a bias in the pair-comparison replication (see also footnote on pp. 94 
and 96).
In addition to the "yes" bias, Taylor suggested that presentation 
of only two stimuli at a time highlights their relevant aspects, mr^i- 
mising effects of poor visual scanning and distraction that could happen 
with the large array. Again, such a possibility could explain the cor­
rect "same" judgments. But, aa Taylor himserf commentSs it is unclear 
how either factor could bb invvTved in the errroSs whhch hh found to 
occur slightly more frequently on pairs differing by two attributes than 
on single-difference pairs. Neither suggestion, without quaalfication, 
accounts successfully for the different response distributions obtained 
with Framed and Unframed stimuli in the present experiment, particularly
i
in view of the consistent bias towards Mouth in the Unframed condition. 
Wh'le both a "yes" bias and the not'lon that ppar-compprison display high­
lights the important aspects of the siimuli are intuitively plausible 
explanations, in practice they do not seem to play much of a role. We 
are left simply with the conclusion that, for some as yet unknown 
reason(s), the pais-comparisut method seems to create a general shift 
towards matching by an internal attribute. The triads task, in contrast, 
allowed the Framed Shape-dominance and Unframed Mouuh-dominance patterns 
to emerge at their mmst strongly differentiated levels.
There is little direct evidence from other sources on the effects of 
methodoUugy. The test requires holding stimulus set constant and varying 
the type of task. This has, howwver, been done with the Gibson sets of
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Tetter-Tike forms and their transformations, which have been used in
several studies.
In the original work (Gibson, Gibson, Pick & Osser, the task
was a kind of visual matching-from-sample in winch the standards and an
array of transformations were on view throughout (see earlier, pp. 20-21, 
for a sketch of this work). To recap on the main relevant results: 
topological transformations (such as gap-to-close) were the least likely 
to be con-fused, line-to-curve and rotation or reversal were next, and 
perspective transformations were frequently confused. The same pattern 
was found when the stimuli were real letters of the alphabet.
Subsequeetly, AnrePick (1965) used some of the Gibson stimuli with 
kindergarten-age children, in three types of task. The first copied the 
original visual matching-from-sample method and yielded much the same 
error pattern as before. The second and third tasks used the tactual 
mode in a pair-comparison format. In the second task, the two stimuli 
were received successively, whhle in the third they were received simul- 
taneou^ly. Now, line-to-curve transformations elicited more confusions 
than did rotation/reversal. But it is not clear whether it was the type 
of stimulus presentation (pairs instead of a large array) or the differ­
ence in mode of stimulus perception (tactual instead of visual) that 
produced this result. The latter seems probable — i.e., that line-to- 
curve variations became harder to distinguish by touch.
Pick was also testing for the children’s use of a criterial attri­
bute or, instead, their use of a prototype in these tasks. The 
from-sample results were taken to indicate that it was subjects given the 
opportunity to use criterial attributes who made the fewest errors, 
although there was some suggestion that a certain amount of prototype
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learning also occurred. In the tactual pair-comparison task with suc­
cessive stimulus presentation, there was no difference between the 
criteria] attribute and prototype conditions. But with simultaneous . 
pair-compprison, subjects given the chance to use criterial attributes 
were clearly superior, and the prototype group now made as many errors as 
control subjects whose pretraining had emphhaised neither criterial 
attributes nor prototypes. Thus it is possible that the memory component 
imposed by the second of Pick’s three tasks affected the child’s detec­
tion and/or use of stimulus features. (Cf. Over and Ovvr’s [19671 
finding that diagonal lines were more often confused under successive 
than under simultaneous pair-comparison cond^^ions, and that matching- 
from-sample gave the fewest errors.)
In all of the Gibson and Pick work, however, subjects were trained 
on the task. Whht was being measured was in essence transfer to new 
standards or to new transformation types. Schaller and Harr's (1974) 
again used the Gibson letter-like forms, but now in visual pair-comparison 
and without prior training. Despite the difference in task and training 
condRions, their response patterns showed a striking similarity to those 
of Gibson et al. (1962). One point of divergence, howwver, was in 
Schaller and Harris’s finding of an increase (instead of a decrease) in 
rotation/reversal errors with age — an observation that accords with some 
other experimenters’ findings with other types of stimuli (e.g., Williams 
et al., 1976). Schaaier and Ham's ascribe Gibson et al .’s observed 
reduction of errors here to the original researchers’ empHas's on pre­
training on reversals.
Outside the domain of letter-like forms, there is some evidence of 
a task effect from HeTe and Lipps (1974). Stimuli were a square, circle
or triangle, coloured orange, yellow or blue. Two types of task were
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administered. One was a triads matching task similar to the present one 
of Experiment 2, Hale and Lipps pointed out that the triads imthod 
forces a choice between the stimulus attributes, so that one attribute 
tends clearly to predominate in the children’s responses. To determine 
to what extent the children actually detected the non-dominant attribute 
as well, they next presented the same stimuli to the same subjects in a 
comppnmt--el^ction task. First, the child learned the spatial locations 
of stimuli in a triad. In this phase, the two stimulus attributes, 
shape and colour, were redundant with each other, e.g., the square was 
always yellow or the circle always blue. Those three stimuli were then 
turned face away from the child and the test phase, involving a sort of 
m^a^<^^i’ng-fr^c^m-sam^l^, began. The child received a stimulus composed of 
only one attribute — just a coloured card, or a plain card showing a 
geomeeric form. He had to point to the location in the original triad 
of the one matching the test card. He thus had the chance to show he 
could match either stimulus attribute equaHy weH.
Subjects were divided into two groups by age: roughly 3k to Ah 
years, and Ah to 6h years. In the first triads task, about two-thirds of 
the younger group matched by colour, whi’le almost all of the older sub­
jects matched instead by shape. The comppnnnt-selection task showed the 
same pattern as did the triads for the younger children, although there 
was some evidence that the non-dominant attribute of the triads was now 
matched slightly more often than previously. But increased matching of 
the previously non-dominant attribute was clear for the older subjects, 
many of whom now matched colour as often as they did shape.
There is, then3some evidence in the literature to support the pre­
sent finding that type of task can affect whi'ch stimulus attributes are
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nmot and least often confused, but the nature of the stimulus set and of 
the transformations applied to construct the distinguishing levels of an 
attribute are also clearly impootant. As already indicated, the range of 
discriminanda and to be found in reports on children's
performance in maacMng, classification and discrimination tasks is 
enormous. The suggestion here is that caution should be exercised in 
the interpretation of experimental results and compparsons across dif­
ferent studies.
At any rate, the objective established for the first part of the 
present study has now been attained: the contradictory findings of 
Taylor and Wa<as are accounted for. In decisions about the sameness of 
these schematic faces, the children's responses did indeed display a 
highly systematic ordering among the attributes. Whch particular 
attribute^) mil be correctly matched and which confused is governed 
not simply by whhther or not there is a frame around the face nor simply 
by the type of task. It depends on a rather comppex interaction between 
the framed/unframed factor and methodoCogical variables, each alone being 
a necessary but not sufficient condition to explain the differential
response distributions reported by Tay^r and Maaes.
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PART 3
DETECTION OR SELECTION OF STIMULUS ATTRIBUTES?
I. MANIPULATION OF OBJECTIVE VISUAL SALIENCY
The experiments in the preceding section have ascertained that both 
task context and presence/absence of an external visual frame affected 
children’s decisions about sameness among the first set of schematic 
faces, altering the distributions of matching responses across the three 
stimulus attributes. Some obvious further directions for investigating 
the perceptu^-cognitive factors at work here would have been to test the 
Framed-Unframed effect with new discriminanda (for instance, geomeeric 
forms) or to extend the methodological inquiry to cover, say, serial 
stimulus presentation, recognition, or discrimination-learning techniques 
Howweer, a fresh line of study was opened.
What prompted the shift of empphris was a concern that in the 
initial experiments the three stimulus attributes and their respective 
variants were, in purely physical terms, structured quite differently 
from each other. For one thing, the Shape and Eyes variants preserved 
the basic outline depicting those attributes, whhle it was the Mouth out­
line itself that varied. The two Shape ellipses Oiff^^i'^d in orientation; 
Eyes varied by colour contained within the circle outline; and Mooith, by 
a line-to-curve type transformation. In terms of the awunt of the 
stimulus card occupied, moreover, Shape could be regarded as a "large" 
feature that was perhaps more noticeable than the relatively smaller Eyes 
and Mooth.
Might it not then be that objective visual saliency ^^ff^^r^^d among 
the three attributes and their variants -- that they were not equaHy 
physically discriminate (and that, correspondingly, some entire faces
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were more physically salient than others)? If so, this clearly might 
affect which attribute is moot often correctly matched or confused -- and 
might interact with the already complex frame x task interaction.
There are essentially two ways of tackling the question of objective 
saliency. One involves experimental manipulations to vary the degree of 
discriminaaility of the stimulus attributes (e.g., by varying their rela­
tive sizes) and also both the degree and type of transformation employed 
in the construction of distinguishing levels within attributes. The 
other involves equating saliency across attributes and levels by equating 
their physical properties.
With the present, comppex stimulus forms, to follow the first 
method would be a formidable endeavour if adequate controls were to be 
incorporated. Although work has been done on physical stimulus discrim- 
inability, type of transformation, etc., it is hard to relate to the 
present situation. Not too surprisingly, heightening discrlminability by 
increasing the degree of physical difference between attributes and their 
variants leads to better matching or classification performance, even for 
aduuts (Imai & Garner, 1965; Garner & Felfoldy, 197(0).
With regard to type of physical difference, some work has already 
been mentioned in the methoddlogical discussion at the end of the pre­
ceding section. For instance, the research using letter-like forms and 
their transformations as stimuli (e.g., Gibson et al., 1962; Gibson,
1965, 1971; Pick, 1965) clearly shows that children can discriminate 
certain types of variant from the standard more readily than other types.
Schaaier and Haarr's (1974) extended the Gibson work to examine the 
effect of degree of transformation as well as kind. Thus, for the line- 
to-curve variants, a transformation of three lines to curves was presumed
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to be objectively more dis-rimitab^e than a transformation of two lines 
to curves; or, for perspective variants, increasing the angle of tilt 
was taken to increase objective discriminabbiity. Again as might be 
expected, children's confusion errors became fewer as degree of objective 
discriminabbiity increased, and the improvement with age was more marked 
for more saliently different figures.
In this kind of work, however, comparison among stimulus attributes 
does not enter, since it is the whole stimulus figure, as a global entity, 
that is treated as transformed. And as Schaaier and Harr's (1974) point 
out, it is impoosible here to compare degree of discriminabSi^ty across 
types of transformation. Returning to the sche^^a^ic faces emppoyed in 
the first experiments of the present series, suppose we double the diam­
eter of the Eyes circles. Are they now twice as discriminable as before? 
And how does this change ccpppte, phylicatly, with doubbing the length of 
the Mouth line?
A study by Hess and Pick (1974) comes closer to the present situa­
tion but still falls short of meeting its cn^p^^ei^i^s. Their stimuli 
were also schematic faces, consisting of two relevant attributes: eyes 
were ellipses of varying degrees, and mouth was an upward curve (as in a 
"smiie") varying in radius from nearly a straight line to a semicircle, 
whUe the circular head-shape was held constant and irrelevant. These 
authors attempted to equate discriminabbiity between eyes and mouth 
variants as follows.
First, children were presented with eyes forms and mouth forms 
separately and out of the face context, for pair-comparison. Frequency 
of confusion errors was taken as a measure of the discriminabbiity of a 
given pair of eyes variants or of a given pair of mocehs. Eyes and mouth
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pairs were thus independently rated over their respective ranges of 
variation from poorly to highly discriminable. This was intended to 
yield a way of comppring and equating eyes and mouth for degree of 
psychophysical discriminatin'ty.
The features were then combined to make up sets of schematic faces, 
again to be judged in pair-comparison. For half the face pairs, mouth 
varied but eyes were constant; for the rest, eyes varied and mouth was 
fixed. The error patterns showed that most children matched by eyes. 
Predictably, far more errors occurred on pairs previously rated as poorly 
discriminate than on highly discriminate pairs. But even with highly 
discriminate features, mouth was confused significantly more often than 
eyes. Hess and Pick concluded: "... the evidence suggests that changes 
in generally positive-appearing [i.e., curved up, 'smiling'J mouths are 
difficult to attend to white equivalent changes in eyes are somewhat more 
noticeable" (197-4, p. 1154, emphasis added).
Such a bold claim seems unwwrranted on the basis of their study. 
There is an obvious problem: we do not know that the changes in eyes 
were equivalent to the changes in ' From the first part of their
study, we know only that certain eyes variants were more discriminate 
than other eyes pairs, and that certain mouth variants were more discrim­
inate than other mouuhh. We cannot tell if the mot (least) discrimin­
ate eyes pairs were equaHy easy (difficult) as the moot (least) dis­
criminate mouth pairs. It could perhaps be argued that eyes differences 
were more salient than mouth since (a) there were two eyes but only one 
mouth, and (b) the ellipses of the eyes could be viewed as composed of 
two curves, one upper (curved down) and one lower (curved up), enclosing 
a solid area, whereas, mouth was just one one curve (always upwaars).
Wile Hess and Pick's speculation that the mouths were less differentiable
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because they tended to be classed together as all "smiling" is appealing 
(and will be returned to later), they failed in their intention to equate 
discriminabbiity across eyes and mouth, and their data do not justify 
their broad suggestion "that eyes are more important sources of informa­
tion for perception of faces than are mouths" (p. 1151,
This study illustrates some of the difficulties of experimental 
designs under winch discriminabsiity effects are examined by attempting 
systemattcally to maaipulate objective visual saliency of stimulus 
attributes. There is also a problem of interpretation in this sort of 
research, for it is often simply assumed that when a child correctly 
matches a particular feature he is deliberately attending to it rather 
than to another. The work of Eleanor Gibson and her colleagues generally 
begs the question of whether errors arise because the child intentionally 
selects certain stimulus features as "^r^iterial" and ignores others, or 
because certain types of transformation are more physically detectable 
than others. It seems to be taken for granted that correct performance 
on a particular kind of transformation reflects its "distinctiveness" as 
a criterion of difference. Tayyor and Wales (1970) also merely presumed 
that their observed uneven distributions of confusion errors among 
stimulus attributes were due to the subjects’ deliberate weighting of 
one attribute over another.
Haae and Lipps (1974) to some extent avoided this trap by their 
compprrson between triads and coimpnmt-sell^^tion tasks, since in the 
latter the child at least has the opportunity to show whether or not he 
has noticed and can use the non-dominant attribute when appropriate (see 
pp. 103-104 above). But in other cases it can be difficult to assess the 
effect of maaipulatinne of stimulus discriminaabiity, because of poten­
tial interactions between objective and subjective sa^ency. The Hess
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and Pick (1974) study nicely dempotSrates part of this problem -- it is 
one of circularity. That is, in the end, the only measure of salience 
and discriminabbiity that we have in this sort of research is a psycho­
logical rather than a physical one; it comes from the subjects' 
behaviour. Sahaa'ler and Harris state the di^pmma succinctly: "The only 
way to define equivalence across transformations is on the epplri-tl 
basis of responses to the transformations. To subsequently make asser­
tions about performance on the basis of equivalence thus defined wnuld 
be tautological" (1974, p. 230, footnote 4). Yet this is indeed wiat has 
been done in some of the so-called psychophysical studies of similarity.
The problem, wlhle evident, is yet etorppduiy difficult to over­
come. Subjects' responses are influenced by both subjective and objective 
percep■tuat-cogni•tive factors, but how do we separate out the two? As 
Gregson notes, psychommeric theory generaaly fails to represent the full 
complexity of similariSyjUdggment behaviours Se-aeie it lacks the 
capacity to handle the "nontitear comPbntticts of measures of physical 
attributes" that such psychological behaviours incorporate (1975, pp. 
196-197). In other words, people — be they children or adults — do not 
always behave in ways that reflect simply the physical ccpppcitlon of 
the stimu^. They may subjectively assign differential importance, or 
"weights", to the various stimulus attributes, whose physical ^^c^f^^r^r:ies 
may or may not bear on the weightings (see also Goodman, 1970).
Evidence for the operation of such subjective factors in practice 
comes from, e.g., Reed (1970). Using stimulus categories consisting of 
exempts from s set of scheppaic faces, Reed examined how
adaHs go about classifying the faces, and tested various proposed models 
of classification strategy. Noddes incorporating a weighting component
gave the best fit to subjects' a-tetl responses, with the Weeghted
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Prototype mode! generaaly superior to the Weighted Average Distance model. 
That is, when matching Brunswik faces, it appeared that most subjects 
formed a notion of "the prototypical category member" and classified test 
stimuli according to their match with the abstract prototype. Thus sub­
jects may use stimulus aspects that are not structurally specified, such 
as relationships among stimulus attributes, goodness of form, etc.
Tversky (1977) extended this line of research both theoretically 
and empirically in his cogent review of a series of studies on sirniiarity- 
dissimilarity judgments by adults and of various possible models to 
account for them. He, too, argued that stimuli cannot always be defined 
by their physical comppnents -- "more global properties (e.g., symietry, 
connectedness) should also be introduced" (1977, p. 331). In Tversky's 
theoretical framework (called the contrast model -- see further Gati and 
Tversky, 1982)) both features common to members of a stimulus set and 
distinguishing features unique to a member are important; perceived 
similarity is conceived as resting on a weighted difference between common 
and distinguishing features. This imppies that within a given stimulus 
set there are several possible ways of defining similarity relations 
among -- exactly how people partition a set is of course what is
01^^*031 ly determined.
Incorporated into the model is a measure of relative salience 
among stimulus features. By "salience", Tversky means a compound of both 
objectively- and subjectively-defined prof^ii^^nc^e, resting on such factors 
as intensity, frequency, famiiiarity, good form, and informational con­
tent. The objective (or, as Tversky calls them, intensive) factors are 
those "that increase intensity or signal-to-noise ratio", and are 
relatively context-independent. The subbe^t'ive, or "diagnootic factors 
refer to the classificatory significance of the features" (p. 342).
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The classificatory, or diagnootic, value of a feature is highly context- 
dependent, as Tversky nicely dnmonttrated. By the simple addition or 
substitution of a single member in a stimulus set (including a set of 
schematic faces), aduR subjects given the task of dividing the set into 
two groups were induced to alter their basis of classification, and also 
correspondingly to alter their judgments of similarity among the membbes.
So far in the present study, the discussion has avoided the issue 
of whether a confused stimulus attribute is confused because it is not 
detected, or because it is deliberately ignored. The former case has to 
do with objective ea^iency: confusions arise when one attribute is less 
noticeable than the others and is accidentally overlooked, or when the 
physical separation of its distinguishing levels is of a size or character 
that is not readily discriminable by young children. In the latter case, 
subjective saliency comes into play: attributes are weighted as to their 
importance for the task in hand, such that certain attributes become 
criterial and are correctly mmtched, while others are treated as irrele­
vant and aar coo^sd (or matcaed jujt by char-ican.
We hhae aal^^^c^y^ seen nhat, t/ith hhe schema-tla faces usee in the 
first three experiments, the observed patterns of differential correct 
matching ammon tth aatributts annd, by virtuu oo thdr dii^^Gl^^nn physical 
propeeries, be due to di-f^^r^nlt^^^i objects saliendies. Bbu thh resuRs, 
sketched above, of Reed (1972) and Tversky (1977) with other sche^^^ic 
face forms suggest that aduRs do rank features for their importance in 
similarity judgmenns, so this possibility cannot be excluded for children. 
The question needs to be decided nccerica^y.
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In view of the confounding of subjective and objective saliency 
effects in responses, and of the difficulties inherent in any experimental 
attempt to vary objective saliency, it was decided to follow the alter­
native approach: to hold objective saliency constant by equating the 
physical properties of the stimulus attributes. If all attributes are 
structurally identical and their distinguishing levels are all equally 
physically discriminate, and if the children then still match one partic­
ular attribute and confuse another, we can be more confident that their 
con-fusion errors are due to a deliberate weighting of one attribute over 
another.
Part 3 is devoted to this topic. A single set of schematic faces, 
now with newly defined attributes, is used over its three experiments. 
Because it is imppssible physica^^y to equate shape of head with internal 
features, Shape is now an irrelevant attribute; it is simply a constant 
circle throughout. The surrounding frame is therefore also dispensed 
with. It is only the internal features that are of interest now. In 
particular, an almost universal dominance of Mouth over Eyes emerged in 
the preceding experiments, which requires examinaaion, especially in the 
light of conflicting evidence from other sources. With a few exceptions 
(e.g., Ahrens, 1954), there is general consensus that, for infants and 
children, the upper, eyes part of the face (reaaistic or schemaaic) is 
more effect!*ve at eliciting gaze, smiling, correct matches, etc., than is 
the lower, mouth para (e.e., Fantn, 1958,.1961, 1963, 1966; Brooks & 
Goldstein, 1963; Goldsdetn & Mackenberg, ,919; Hess & Pick, 1974; 
Laangdel, 1978; Pcnmana , em. c omm 1 919 ). TTis suggests that the 
failure to match Eyes in the present study my have been an artifact of 
stimulus construction. A third internal feature, Nose, is now added to 
serve as a control — and because several subjects had remarked on its 
former absence ("It's not like a real face")!
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All three experiments in this section employ the pair-comparison 
format, which was preferred to matching-from-sample for greater ease of 
data analysis and greater clarity of response distributions and matching 
patterns (although Taylor, 1973, and Taylor & Waaes, 1970, would debate 
that superiority of pair-compprison). It was also considered preferable 
to the method of triads for, although the results are equaHy clear and 
readily analysable, with triads the test session is lengthier (allowing 
extraneous factors like inattention to influence responses) and comp^teTy 
correct responses are precluded. Pair-comparison admits of both correct 
"not the same" judgments and correct "same" ones (as well as errors in 
each), thereby providing further controls.
Since the stimuli and basic task format are constant over the three 
experiments, they are described first, and only specific variations in 
procedure will be nmetioned under the appropplate experiment heading.
Mattejals
The figures were drawn in black ink on wite card. The three 
internal features, Mouth (M), Eyes (E) and Nose (N), were all based on 
the M>ut;h of the faces in the first stimulus set, used in the preceding 
experiments. That is, the levels to be distinguished were formed from 
the same set of straight and curved lines across all attributes. Trial 
faces were drawn varying the length of line, angle of curvature and 
position of attributes. The final selection took into account comients 
offered by adults and children who were informany presented with a range 
of trial figures, but rested ultimately on the Exxpeimenner,s subjective 
decision. The chosen forms were intended to provide "reasonable" discrim- 
inability among levels of attributes along with controls on the structural 
design of the seimuli, whle preserving their "fa^eli*^^" quaHty.
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Once their physical properties were established, a template for the 
attributes was constructed to ensure faithful duplication. This took the
form of a small segment cut off a circle of radius 12 mm, such that the
chord of the segment was 2 cm long:
Each attribute had three levels: the chord of the segment gave the
"neutral" level (a 2-cm straight line) and its arc formed the two curved 
variants. For Eyes and Month, these were curved up and curved down, and 
for the Nose they were curved left and curved right.
These attributes were assembled to produce a set of schematic 
faces. Throughout the set, the outline of the head was a fixed circle of 
diameter 8,5 cm. In order to position the internal features, a basic 
model (shown in Figure 3, next page) was constructed, as follows. The 
circle representing the head was drawn, and its vertical diameter entered. 
Two horizontal chords were added, one cutting the diameter a quarter in 
from the top, the other a quarter up from the bottom. (The diameter and 
chords were guidelines and did not actually appear on com^peted stimuli; 
they are represented as dotted lines in Figure 3.) On the diameter, the 
central 2 cms was marked off as a vertical strip designating the location 
of the Nose. The central 2 cms of the lower chord was marked off for the 
MoiJth. The two Eyes were set along the upper chord, each 2-cm strip 
being equidistant from the circumference of the circle and its vertical 
diameter. In Figure 3, solid 2-cm bars show the positions of the attri­
butes in the neutral level. Dashed arcs represent the corresponding
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curve variants. For these, the arc of the attribute-template was placed 
over the same area as its neutral counterpart, such that the arc pro­
jected equally over either side of the location of the (now imaginary) 
2-cm strip.
Figure 3
Conntruction of the basic stimulus model for placing of Mouth, Eyes and
Nose in the second set of schematic faces (see text for explanation)
Combining the features in all permuuations (three attributes each 
with three levels) would produce a total of 27 possible faces -- an 
enormous stimulus set for a young child to cope with, and unnecessary for 
present purposes. To determine whether one attribute is noticed or used 
more than another, a subset of only six of these faces suffices. The 
actual stimulus set therefore connisted of just the six critical members:
(1) E and N neutral, M curved up (2) E and N nnu^!, M curved down
(3) M and N neutral, E curved down (4) M and N neural , E i3urv^u?d up
(5) M and E neutral, N curved right (6) M and E nnuutal, N curved left
- 11ft
Figure 4
Second stimulus set — used in Experiments 4, 5, 6 and 7. 
(The same three variants make up each of the attributes)
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These are perhaps best conceptualised as three stimulus pairs: one pair 
in winch Eyes and Nose are identical (neutral) and Mouth differs (curves); 
one in which Mouth and Nose are identical and Eyes differ; and one in 
which Mu 1th and Eyes are identical and Nose differs. This stimulus set 
is illustrated in scaled-down proportions in Figure 4 on the preceding 
page, with a number added to each face so that reference can be made to 
particular membbes. Tins diagram also appears in Appendix 1, Figure 3. 
Figure 4 of Appendix 1 shows the actual size of the stimuli. Replicas of 
these six faces were made so that identically-matching stimulus pairs 
could be produced. Each face was placed centrally on an 11.5-m square 
wlnte card (with no surrounding frame) which was then covered in washable 
transparent plastic film.
For preliminary practice trials, the triangles (two on white cards 
and two on pink) used in Experiments 2 and 3 were retained, and two new 
pairs were added. These were coloured figures drawn on whhte cards and 
differing in internal detail: two equaa-sized squares, one coloured re­
in the middle and the other blue; and two identical circles outlined in 
red, both with a long blue chord cutting across the lower right, but in 
the upper left one had a short blue chord whi’le the other had a blue zig­
zag line.
Stimulus presentation
The task was to be the conventional pair-comparison method similar 
to that emppoyed in Experiment 3 above. Were each of the six stimuli in 
the present set to be paired both with itself and with every other meimer, 
a total of 21 trials would obtain: six identical pairs and 15 distinct 
ones. For the purpose of determining whether or not children respond 
differentially to Mouth, Eyes and Nose, however, the test really rests on
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just three of those trials. These critical pairs have already been men­
tioned, in the description of the comppsition of the stimulus set (see 
foot of p. 117 and Figure 4). They are: faces 1 and 2, with only the 
Mouth differing; faces 3 and 4, with only the Eyes differing; and 
faces 5 and 6, with only the Nose differing. Since they involve differ­
ences of just one attribute at a time, these pairs should readily show 
whether or not a particular attribute predominates in the children's 
responses. A "strict Mooth-matcher", for example, will correctly judge 
faces 1 and 2 (M different) to be not the same, but will wrongly call 
pairs 34 and 56 (M identical) the same. An individual child may of 
course make an "accidental" slip on the odd occasion (e.g., through 
temporary lapse of attention); but if an error occurs on the same trial 
consistently across a number of children, it is clear that it is not the 
product of any such random or chance factor. All other unidentical pairs 
differ in two attributes (i.e., ME, or MN, or EN). Since, in the present 
study, two-attribute differences have been associated with commaarai^ely 
few wrong "same" answers, these pairs are of less value than the single­
difference ones. (Notice that no commute mismatches — pairs differing 
in all three attributes — are possible with this stimulus set.)
On the above grounds, and reasoning that with young children it is 
best to keep the test session brief, not all of the 21 possible pairs 
were used. Every subject received all six of the identical-match pairs, 
and all three of the critical pairs differing in a single attribute. Of 
the remaining 12 pairs (differing by two attributes), each child received 
only three. Thus the session contained 12 test trials in all, six 
identical pairs (expecting the answer "same", for correct performance), 
and six unidentical ones (expecting the answer "not the same"). This 
arrangement had the advantage of counteracting the usual pair-comparison
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problem whereby negative responses are expected more often than positive, 
possibly resulting in a bias towards false-positive answers in the more 
typical version of the task employing all possible unidentical pairs.
Response sheets were drawn up, one per subject, listing the 12 
trials. The order of trials and positions of stimuli within the pairs 
were randomised across subjects. The three pairs differing in two attri­
butes varied across subjects, taken at random from the 12 such possible 
pairs.
A further stimulus presentation variable was introduced in the 
three experiments in this section. Within each attribute, the two curved 
variants constituted mirror-image reversals of each other — up-down 
reversals for Mouth and Eyes, and left-right reversal for Nose. We saw 
earlier (pp. 8-9) that infants and young children frequently fail to dis­
criminate reversals that are presented side by side as true left-right 
mirror images, but are reasonably successful when those reversals are 
aligned one above the other so that they no longer form mirror images. 
Similarly, reversals that are up-down mirror images displayed in up-down 
alignment tend to be confused more often than when they are shown side by 
side.
Given the physical structure of the present set of schematic faces, 
it is possible that such factors might intrude to interact with, or even 
override, any effects of responding differentially to the various attri­
butes themselves. If the faces were presented side by side, for instance, 
one might find the Nose (left-right reversal) to be confused more often 
than Mouth or Eyes simply because of the mirror-image x stimulus-alignment 
arrangement alone.
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For this reason, two conditions of stimulus presentation were 
applied in the pair-comparison tasks of Experiments 4, 5 and 6: the face 
pairs were displayed either in left-right (L-R) alignment or in up-down 
(U-D) alignment. In each experiment, half of the subjects received the 
L-R display on all trials, and the other half received the U-D display 
throughout. Be sides serving as a means of counteracting mirror-image 
effects that might mask or artificially exaggerate differential attribute 
selection, this design allows one to check on the occurrence of these 
mirror-image effects themselves. If they are of sufficient magnitude to 
override any differential detection or use of attributes, then the L-R 
condition will, as noted, produce more confusions of Nose than of Mouth 
or Eyes, while the U-D condition wil1 produce more confusions of Mouth 
and Eyes than of Nose.
Procedure
As before, children were taken individually to "look at some pic­
tures". Subjects in these three experiments came fr^om two kinds of 
sources: playgroup and nursery class. In the playgroups, a corner of 
the room containing bench or chairs and table was sectioned off. Nursery 
children either were tested in a similarly partitioned-off corner of the 
classroom, or were taken to a vacant staff-ooom equipped with low chairs 
and table.
The pair-comparison task was conducted much as in Experiment 3 
above. Chhld and Experimenter sat side by side. Stimulus pairs, in the 
order and p^^*itions previously determined and given on the individual 
response sheet, were laid on the table in front of the child, the nearer 
sides of the stimulus cards touching each other. The Expprimenter asked, 
"Are these two (pictures) the same or not the same?" on each trial, and
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recorded the child's response. In Experiments 4 and 5, the child was not
explicitly asked on test trials to explain how the pictures were the same 
or different, but any spontaneouuly-offered cownents were recorded. (The 
procedure of Experiment 6 differed in this and following respects and 
will be described later.) The test trials of Experiments 4 and 5 weer 
preceded by five trials with the practice stimuli -- three with the 
triangles and two with the coloured figures, in random order. During 
practice, unlike in the test itself, the child was urged to describe the 
two stimuli and to indicate s^^tci'fically points of identity and difference 
between them. The Experimenter intervened where necessary during prmttce 
to ensure that the child understood the task, but gave no feedback save 
general verbal encouragement during test trials. The session in Exppei- 
ments 4 and 5 lasted for about 10 minutes.
EXPERIMENT 4
Convvntional pair-comparison
Subjects
Forty children were tested, all performing satisfactorily on prac­
tice trials and all comF^pl^'ting the test session. Nineteen camn from a 
playgroup and 21 from two nursery classes in St. spanning a
variety of home backgrounds. They were assigned to two groups of 20, one 
to receive thn Left-Right stimulus presentation condition, the other the 
Up-Down condition. The two groups contained equal nummers of boys and 
girls, and agn was balanced as far as possible. In the L-R Group, ages 
ranged from 3;4 to 5;2 years with a mean of 4;6; in the U-D Group, the 
range was 3;5 to 5;2, mean 4;7 years.
Thn experimental procedure was exactly as described above.
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Expectations
This experiment was designed to determine whether or not the child­
ren would respond differentially to Mouth, Eyes and Nose now that their 
physical propeeties, and hence objective visual saliency, were equated -­
and if so, which of the attributes would predominate in correct matches 
and which would be the moot often confused. The principal question was 
thus open.
In reality, however, specific predictions could be considered 
possible, for the statement that the three attributes were equally phys­
ically salient is not strictly true. ThT rresoo is thht wbihe Mouth aan
Nose were depicted by a single line, ee it straight rr erveed, Eees eree
represented by two lines. Thou, it could be argued, in the critical test 
pair for Eyes (faces 3 and 4), there wewe tt-w distinguishing
whereas the critical Mouth and Nose pairs (11 and 56, rtcopeCiveCy) dii-
fetee "less". Mooreovr, the potentially confounding effects of mirror- 
image reversals should also be htked into account.
Whht to expect was hhercfutc unclear. The main possibilities con­
sidered were:
(1) If objective steiency is ^he moot important contributor to dif-cren- 
tite distributions of correct judgments and confusions among the attri­
butes, then judgments based on Eyes will predominate and Mouth and Nose 
will be more often confused.
(2) If mirror-image rcverote ef-ccto play a m^;jor role, Nose will be
cod-esed in the L-R condition but will be correctly matched in the U-D 
condition; tde vice vetot for Mouth and Eyes. F^ertger, if objective
otliency is also Smpoutiant, hgcd independently of the mitrur-imtge 
cf-ech, Eyes oguuee be consistently more often correctly eisc^imsdthee 
than Mouth under both L-R and U-D Higi-ment.
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(3) If children's judgments of sameness involve a large degree of sub­
jective weighting of attributes, then one attribute (not initially 
specified but to be empirically determined) will predominate irrespec­
tive of whether the stimuli are presented in L-R or U-D relation. But 
if the dominant attribute turns out to be Eyes, it will be unclear 
whether this is a result of objective saliency or subjective weighting 
factors and further tests wil be required.
RESULTS
First, consider the "control" trials that serve as a check on the 
general level of performance and understanding. These were of two types: 
those in which the pair was identical and should be judged as the same 
(six trials per subject), and those in winch the pair differed by two 
attributes and should be judged as not the same (three trials per subject)
Out of'the samppe of 40, only two boys wrongly called an identical 
pair different. From the L-R Group, one of 4;7 years made errors on 
faces 1 and 4 paired with themselves; and one of 3;5 years in the U-D
A
Group made an error on pair 55. Since these two children correctly 
judged both the remaining identical pairs and the pairs r^g in two
attributes, their errors were regarded as insignificant.
As to the two-attribute differences, errors were similarly rare.
Six subjects made a total of seven errors in all (out of 120 of this kind 
of error possible over the entire samppe). Two were contributed by
"t
The latter child spontaneously commented "they're funny" on this trial. 
After he had co^^peted his 12 trials, the Expprimenter re-presented pair 
55; he still insisted they were not the same "because they're funny".
It was as if he meant that face 5 was in some way peculiar in relation to 
the rest of the stimulus set. This will be returned to later (in the cor­
responding results of Experiment 5, and in Part 4).
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younger boys in the L-R Group, and the rest by U-D subjects of both sexes 
and a range of ages. No errors occurred for any pair differing in MN 
four were on EN differences and three on ME differences — the latter all 
involving the curved-up ("smiling”) Mouth (pairs 13 and 14). But the total 
number of errors was too few to allow conclusions about any systematic 
bias in their distribution. As expected, then, the children did generally 
answer correctly on trials involving two points of difference, and the 
limitation of these trials to three per subject instead of all 12 seems 
to have been justified.
Six subjects were entirely correct on their 12 trials. AH belonged
to the L-R Group, which suggests that horizOntal stimulus alignment may
have been somehow “easier" for the children to cope with than the vertical 
★
relation. EnUrely correct performance was not related to age, but only
one of these six children was ma^ -- and he was among the oldest subjects 
(5;1 years). Coupling this with the fact that six out of the eight sub­
jects who made errors on identical-match and two-aattribute difference 
trials were boys, the suggestion is that girls tended to perform better 
than boys. Thhs is the first hint in the present series of experiments of 
any noticeable sex-related difference in responses. But the numbers here 
were smaH and sex differences did not appear in later ex^^ri^^r^t^^, so it 
is probably a chance result.
★
Possibly the mirror-image reversal effect may have played some part here, 
although the left-right reversal of Nose should then have been highly 
confusable under Left-Right stimulus display, more so than under Up-Down 
display. The results of Experiment 5 also argue against any significant 
mirror-image effect. Note, additionally, that moot of these children 
were too young to have had much experience of reading and writing, i.e, 
specific training in left-to-right visual processing.
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Errors were considerably more frequent on the three critical htsseo 
involving a single-attribute distinction: pair 12 differing in M, pair 
34 differing in E, and pair 66 di--eridg in N. On hgcoc trials, each 
subject was assigned a score of 1 for a correct "not the same" answer and 
a score of 0 for a wrong "same" answer.
Ovve^l, the Mouth distinction was successfully discerned by 77% of 
the children. Eyes by 47% and Nose by 26%. The corresponding figures for 
the two stimulus display conditiuds separately (n = 20 per Group) are:
L-R cunditiod — 90% correct on Moorth, 66% on Eyes and 36% on Nose; U-D 
cond-ition — 66% correct on Mootth, 30% on Eyes and 16% on Nose. Thus the 
pattern of differential responding is essentially ^13^^ between the 
two display con<^,j'tions. although the U-D Group made a greater number of 
errors in general. This agrees with the earlier comneed, based on the 
finding of no entirely correct sessions under U-D alignment, that compar­
ison of stimuli in U-D relation seems to have been generany harder.
Cochran 2 hcsho (two-tailed) were conducted on these data, the 
alternative to the null hypatl^is being don-direchsontl since no predic­
tion was fonmuethcd in advance as to w^hch, if any, attribute would pre- 
domindte. The resulting values confirmed that the probbtilitsco of 
correct "not the same" judgments differed sigdi-icsnhly among the three 
ahtribehes (i.e., among the three critical face pairs). THs was true 
for both the pooled scores of the entire sample of 40 subjects (2 = 
23.786, p< 0.001) and for each stimulus display conditiud separately 
(L-R Group, 2. = 14.0, p < 0.001; U-D Group, 2 = 10.633, p < 0.01) (all 
with df = 2).
To examine more precisely where the differences resided. Binomial 
tests were apppied between pairs of attributes. For these, the data were
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expressed in the form of the number of subjects who were correct on one 
attribute but not the second (e.g., who scored M> E) compared against 
the number who were correct on the second but not the first (E> M). All 
tests were again two-tailed. For the pooled responses of the entire 
sample, all values reached significance: for Mouth vs Eyes, p = 0.002 
(N = 14, X = 1); for Mouth vs Nose, p < 0.002 (N = 25, x =2); and for 
Eyes vs Nooe, p = 0.05 (N = 17, x =4). Considering each stimulus con­
dition separately, the following reached significance: Mouth vs Eyes for 
U-D Group only (p = 0.016, N = 7, x = 0); Mouth vs Nose tor both groups 
(L-R Group, p < 0.002, N = 11, x = 0; U- D Group, p = 0.012, N = 14, x = 2)
The data on which the above computations were based are given in 
Table 22. Here, the numbers of correct responses per attribute are shown 
for subjects divided into age groups as well as by stimulus display con­
dition. Subjects had been assigned to age groups at the outset (in con­
trast with the preceding experiments, where age divisions were made on 
a post-hoc basis). Each subgroup contained five boys and five girls:
L-R condition, youn^e -- aage 3;1 to 4;9, mean 11; 1 years
older — aage 4;8 to 5*2, mean 4;11
U-D condition, yc—ngcrr — agee 3;5 to 4;8, mean 4;2
ol der — ag^e; 4;8 to 5;2, mean 4;11.
Overrll, the older children attained the greater number of correct 
responses on the Mo-Uh-Uifferisg pair. But the two age groups were about 
equal on Eyes responses, and the older children actually made fewer cor­
rect judgments of the Nose distinction than did the younger. In con­
trast with the preceding experiments, then, there was here no clear 
general pattern of improvement with age. (There were no apparent sex- 
related trends, so the earlier suggestion from the entirely correct sub­
jects and the two-attributes-different trials that girls m’gh-t perform 
better than boys was not borne out.)
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TABLE 22 (Experiment 4)
Number of correct "not the judgments of critical
pairs differing in one attribute, by stimulus alignment 
condition and age
Younger Subjects Older Subjects
stimulus pair and 12 34 56 12 34 56
distinguishing feature: M E N M E N
L-R Group
(n = 10 per cell) 8 7 4 10 6 3
U-D Group
(n = 10 per cell) 5 2 3 8 4 0.
All subjects 13 9 7 18 10 3
(n « 20)
% correct judgments 65% 45% 35% 90% 50% 15%
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TABLE 23 (Experiment 4)
Distribution of 28* subjects according to which of the 
critical pairs (attributes) they correctly judged to be 
not the same
STIMULUS PAIR(S) & ATTRIBUTE(S)
CORRECTLY DISTINGUISHED
12 34 56 12&34 12&56 34&S6
M E N 'M&E ' M&N E&N
L-R Group (n = 13) 5 1 0 6 1 0
U-D Group (n — 15) 6 0 2 6 1 0
All subjects
(n = 28) 11 1 2 12 2 0
*The remaining 12 subjects of the sample are omitted as they
were either correct on all three or wrong on all three 
critical pairs.
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The pattern of Mouth correct and Eyes/Nose confused was also 
striking when individual subjects rather than pooled scores were con­
sidered. Of the sample of 40 children, six correctly distinguished all 
three critical pairs and another six failed on them all. Thus 28 
children were correct on one or two but not all three critical trials. 
Table 23 shows the distribution of these 28 subjects according to which 
of the critical pairs they judged correctly, i.e., which of the attri­
butes they succeeded in discriminating. It is clear that Nose was dis­
tinguished by very few of the subjects and Mouth by most — and that a 
child did not judge Eyes correctly unless he was also correct on Mouth. 
This distribution obtained irrespective of stimulus alignment condition.
Summary and conclusions
It is quite evident that the results follow the pattern described 
as the third of the outcomes considered possible (see pp. 124-125). The 
children did respond differentially to the three attributes; and the 
same pattern, in terms of which particular attribute was most often 
correctly judged and which most often confused, obtained across both 
conditions of stimulus display. That is, regardless of stimulus align­
ment, Mouth-based decisions predominated and Nose was the most often 
confused.
This finding counters both the objective saliency and the mirror- 
image reversal hypotheses which would predict, respectively, either that 
Eyes predominate or that the distribution of responses among the three 
attributes differ between the two stimulus conditions. It appears likely, 
then, that the children subjectively assigned differential weights to the 
attributes, treating Mouth as most important and Nose as least important 
to the question of whether the faces were the same or not. We cannot yet
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state this firmly, however, for it could be argued that the way the 
subjects visually inspected the stimuli might have been at least partly 
responsible for the observed pattern of correct judgments and confusion 
errors: perhaps the children looked first to the bottom of the stimulus 
figures (Mouth) and last, if at HI, to the central detail (Nose). (A 
tendency to look at the bottom first could be invoked to explain the 
general predominance of Mouth over Eyes matches in the first three experi 
ments, too.) The toll owing experiment was designed to examine this 
possibility.
EXPERIMENT 5
Pair-comparison wi th isenrtnd stimuli
There was a simple way to test whether the predominance of Mouth in 
the correct judgments of Experiment 1 was due to a tendency to focus 
first or mainly on the lower part of the stimulus figure: repeat the 
same task with the same stimuli but now upside-down. If the lucgtios-of- 
gaze hyppohesis is true, then whhtever lies in the bottom part of the 
figure should still be the moot often correctly discriminated attribute - 
Eyes, in the case of inversion. This may be too simp^st'ic a view, how­
ever, for potential complicgtine factors arise in the use of inverted 
stimuli, and in the relationship between visual inspection and location 
within the stimulus figure of the distinguishing feature.
Whie young children in free play appear easily to identify pic­
tures viewed in unconventional orientations, there is evidence to the 
contrary from controlled laboratory investigations. One of the earliest 
rigorous examinations of children's perception of forms in canonical and 
inverted orientations seems to have been that by Hunton (1955), using a
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range of stimuli from re^l-istic (photographs, magazine illustrations) to 
schemat^'ic (simple line drawingg). Her subjects were required to signal 
stimulus identification by verbally describing what was depicted. Fol­
lowing Huuton, Ghent (1960) presented children with reaaistic pictures of 
a variety of items in upright, 180® and 90° orientations, in a kind of 
reco(^r^i‘tion“cum-seri^lmat^c^hir^(^-fr^^-^^^mple task. The child was briefly 
shown a picture and then had to either name what he had seen or point to 
an identical match from an array. Brooks and GGodstein (1963; see also 
G^o<^^'tein & Chance, 1964) gave children a series of photographs of faces 
of their classmates in upright orientation, which they had to learn to 
recognise. Later they were asked to identify those previously seen from 
an array of inverted photographs of faces.
Despite the variety of stimuli and tasks over these studies, there 
is general consensus among the findings. Oder subjects — that is, at 
least over age five years — perform about equaHy well with both inverted 
and conventionagly-rrientatsd stimuli. ChHdren younger than five years 
are less successful with inverted than with u^i^*ight forms. It appears, 
then, that "something" happens in the imueeiately pre-school period that 
prompts facilitation of handding of stimuli in unconvvntirngl orientations 
GettH^'ist or experientiagist accounts fail here, for they would imply 
that as the child is repeatedly exposed over time to objects in one 
particular orientation, he would come to recognise the mmst familiar 
orientation the mm^ readily; i.e., contrary to what actually occurs, 
older children would be expected to have more difficultly with inverted 
stimuli than younger.
Ghent (1960) speculated on an alternative possible account, which 
she proceeded to investigate systemsly (Ghent et al., 1960; GGent, 
1961; Ghent & EBmsteein, 1961; Braine, 1965; B^i^^oso & Braine, 1974;
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see also WohlwiTl & Wiener, 1964). The proposal, supported by her sub­
sequent results, was that there is an interaction between success in 
stimulus identification/recognition and starting-point and direction of 
visual scanning. She found that subjects, regardless of age, tended to 
scan stimulus forms in a downwards direction. But while those over age 
five years started the scanning at the top of the figure, u^c^dr^--fives 
started at the "focal pari;" of the figure (whhch may not coincide with 
its topmost point) and proceeded downwards from there. Young children 
may thus overlook the upper portion of the stimulus in certain circum­
stances. This was specifically tested (Braine, 1965) using stimuli with 
a focal part at one end and a distinguishing feature at the opposite end, 
the distinguishing feature being the sole point of difference among 
membbrs of a stimulus set. Each figure was briefly exposed, once in the 
upright position with the focal part at the top and distinguishing 
feature at the bottom, and once inverted. After each exposure, the sub­
ject had to indicate from an array the figure just seen. Unddr--four- 
year-olds performed worse with inverted stimuli, whi'le the oldest group 
(4% to 5 years) performed better with inverted than upright forms. This 
supported the view that the older children scanned from the top and were 
helped by having the distinguishing feature located at the top, wMle the 
youngest group tended to overlook the distinguishing feature when it was 
uppermbht. (The middle age group, 4-4^ years old, who showed no 
superiority of one or other orientation, were taken to be in a transition 
phase.)
With regard to the present study, then, the proposal that the 
children in Experiment 4 might have focussed first on the bottom of the 
stimulus and then on the top as a general scanning habit seems question­
able in the light of the Ghent Braine work. Whht is possible is that the
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Mouth of these schematic faces might, for some reason, have been treated 
as a "focal part". In that case, the effect of presentation of the faces 
in inverted orientation would not be clear in advance. If Mouth was 
indeed a focal part, and if it continues to be when the faces are upside- 
down, then performance on Mouth should be enhanced. But the common 
finding noted above that young children are generaHy less well able to 
recognise inverted than upright stimuli may complicate the maater.
Further, the unconventional orientation may destroy the facelike nature 
of the stimuli, such that Mouth may no longer serve as a focal part, if 
it ever did so. (Several aduKs shown these stimuli upside-down com­
mented that at first glance they looked like just configurations of lines 
within a circle, and identified them as inverted faces only after fur­
ther inspection.) Ne^errt^elf^f^^, a pair-comparison task with the faces 
inverted should at least reveal whether or not the bottom part of the 
stimulus figure is most often correctly discriminated regardless of its 
content (or regardless of what its content is taken to represent in terms 
of the present face context).
Subjects
The initial samppe consisted of 30 children divided into two groups, 
one to receive Lett-Right stimulus alignment and the other Up-Down align­
ment. Three were unwiiling to compete the task. Of the remainder, 18 
came from two nursery classes in St. Andrews and nine from a playgroup in 
Oxford. The final L-R Group contained seven boys and six girls, aged from 
3;7 to 5;2, with a mean of 4;6 years. In the U-D group were eight boys 
and six girls, aged 3;8 to 5;2 with a mean of 4;8 years. (The slight 
imbaiance between the two groups was due to the three subjects who were 
dropped.)
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Maaesials and Procedure
These were exactly as for Experiment 4 except that all test stimuli 
were presented upside-down.
Predictions
For reasons already outlined, several possibiiities of outcome could 
be entertained. The null hypothesis was that there would be no difference 
among the three attributes in the frequency with which each is correctly 
judged to be not the same. Such a result might obtain if, for exameie, 
comprison were generally more difficult under stimulus inversion than 
under convenniona^y-rraentated presentation of these schematic faces, 
and/or if inversion were to disrupt interpretation of the forms as faces. 
Possible alternatives were:
(1) Locatim-of-gaze hypprhesis. The question is whether the response
bias observed in the preceding experiment could be attributable to a 
focus of visual attention primar^y on the bottom of the stimulus. The 
main present aim is thus to determine whether or not the children 
exhibit a general tendency to distinguish detail in the lower part of 
the stimulus correctly more often than that in the upper part regale's 
of what that detail is or "signifies". The is here is that,
with the faces inverted, Eyes (now at the bottom) will be the predomi­
nantly correct attribute.
The remaining alternatives were carried over from the previous experiment:
(2) Subjective weighting eypoOhesis. If the earlier finding of Mouth-
dominance in correct judgments was due rather to a deliberately selec­
tive attention to this attribute as the important" — if it
served as a kind of "focal feature", to adapt Ghent Braine's term — 
then Mouth is expected again to predominate (assuming that facelike 
interpretation is sufficiently preserved under stimulus inversion).
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(3) Objective saliency hypothesis. Eyes will be most often correctly 
judged because distinct levels of this attribute are the m>st notice­
able, involving two differing lines.
(4) Mirror-image hypoOhesis. If mirror-image reversal effects come into 
play, then the two stimulus conditions will produce dissimilar response 
patterns such that in L-R presentation Mouth and Eyes will be correct 
and Nose confused, while in U-D presentation Nose will be correct and 
Mouth and Eyes confused.
Although neither objective saliency nor mirror-image effects were in 
evidence in Experiment 4, they cannot be comppetely ruled out in the pre­
sent situation, since stimulus inversion could affect the visual compprison 
process to bring them into force. Notice that hypotheses (1) and (3) both 
predict the same outcome, though for separate reasons. If Eyes turn out 
to be the dominant attribute, then, further tests will be required to 
decide between them.
DDeppte the fact that various outcomes could be regarded as possible, 
a specific prediction was made in advance: that subjective weighting 
would operate, favouring Mouth (the second hypp^es's). There were two 
grounds for this suppptititn. Firstly, although deserving of exa^ir^n^ion, 
the location-of-gaze hypothesis was considered an unlikely candidate.
The Ghent Braine research on visual scanning and focal parts suggested 
that children do not look initially at the bottom of the stimulus figure 
simply because it is the bottom. They may do so if that is where the 
focal part is located, but otherwise they would tend to look at the top. 
Secondly, although the children's verbal comments and justifications for 
their decisions in the preceding experiments had not yet been examined 
system^ttc^c^ny, the intuitive impression from them was that the children 
were? treating Mouth differently from the other attributes in their talk
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and hence also likely in their decision processes, (Justifications will 
be discussed more fully in Part 4.)
RESULTS
The various aspects of the results will be presented in roughly the 
same order as for Experi^nt 4, beginning with the control trials involv­
ing identical matches and two-attribute differences (cf. pp. 125-126).
Identical pairs: Wong "not the same" judgments. Four subjects in 
the L-R Group made a total of five eerros oo this sort, and one in the
U-D Group made one erroo. Although slightty moor than occurred in
Experiment 4, then, false negative answers were still quite rare.
No sex or age patterns were evident here, but there was one unex­
pected tendency. In Experiment 4, of the two identical match errors made, 
one child was recorded as w^o^y caHing ppir 55 not the same, adding 
"(because) they'^ funny" (p. 122, footmote- At the time, this was 
glossed over as a minor idiosyncrasy. owweerr, funr oo the six identical- 
match errors in Experiment 5 involved paias 55 or 66 -- the only 
of ^he stimulus set to' have a curved Nose -- and in each case the child 
made some remark giving the impression that tOnsn faces were being 
treated in a special way because of the Nose: "That one's that way" 
(pointing to Nooe); "Thh^ri's no '2' on it" ("1" referred to the neutral
Nose level, a vertical straight line); "Not the same" (pointing to Noe).
one of these children confronted on another trial with pair 15 
said not the usual "They're not the same", but "THAT one isn't the same" 
(pointing to the Nose on face 5 and stressing the word "that"). These 
comimets add weight to the suspicion noted earlier (p. 125, footnote): 
the children seemed to be saying not that pair 55 or 6(5 contained two
unidentical stimuli, but that faces 5 and 6, wiwh their curved Noses,
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were strange-looking and different from the rest of the stimulus set.
This raises an interesting issue concerning the children's interpretation 
of the test question "Ace these two the same or not the same?", which 
will be returned to in Part 4.
T^wraatribute distinctions: Wong "same". judgmests. Again there 
were slightly more errors than in Experiment 4 but they were still com­
paratively rare. In the L-R four subjects made a total of five
such errors, and in the U-D Group four subjects made six errors between 
them. No one particular pair nor configuration of attributes seemed 
especially to attract errors or correct judgments. There was no age 
pattern, but only one girl in each subject group made this kind of error. 
Since no child was wrong on all three two-attributes-distanct trials and 
all had performed satisfactorily in practice trials, these few errors 
were considered insignificant.
End rely correct sessions. Onny three subjects managed correct 
judgments throughout their 12 trials: two boys, aged 4;9 and 4;10 years, 
from the L-R Group and a girl aged 5;0 from the U-D Group -- all among 
the oldest subjects.
The above findings taken together suggest that pair-comparison was 
indeed slightly more difficult in general with the stimuli inverted than 
with them upright -- but only meafinag^y so. The fact that only older 
children (approaching five years) attained perfect performance with 
inverted stimuli also agrees with the reports of previous investigators.
Critical trials: Correct "not the same" judgmeets. The results on 
the critical pairs 12 (Monthh, 34 (Eyes) and 56 (Nose) are presented in 
Table 24, to which the corresponding figures from Experiment 4 have been 
added for ease of cross-reference. Correct "not the sgms" responses were
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again assigned a score of 1, and wrong "same” responses a score of 0. As 
in Experiment 4, the U-D condition produced a greater number of errors 1n 
general than did L-R alignment. Despite the slightly lower percentages 
than previously, it is very clear that Mouth continued to be the attri­
bute most often successfully discriminated (70% correct overall in 
Experiment 5, as against 44% correct for Nose and 22% for Eyes).
In view of the evidence in the literature, discussed in the intro­
duction to Experiment 5, that very young children have more difficulty 
than older ones (of around age five) with inverted stimuli, at least in 
recognition tasks, the data were inspected for age-related trends. The 
two subject groups were subdivided post hoc:
L-R Group, younger, n = 7, ages 3;7 - 4;6, mean 4;3 years
older, n 3 6, ages 4;7 - 5;2, mean 4;10
U-D Group, younger, n = 7, ages 3;8 - 4;8, mean 4;4
older, n 3 7, ages 4;9 - 5;2, mean 5;0
The results are presented 1n Table 25, as percentages of children per 
subgroup making correct "not the same" judgments. The pattern is rather 
like that observed in Experiment 4 (see Table 22, p. 129). That 1s, the 
older children performed better than the younger on Mouth but were less 
successful than their juniors on Nose (although,-uniike previously, the 
older children achieved noticeably higher scores for Eyes than did the 
younger). Upside-down stimulus presentation, 1n relation to upright, 
does not seem to have had any general particularly adverse effects for 
the younger subjects nor facilitatory ones for the older, then. In the 
subgroups of age x stimulus condition, however, the numbers were so small 
that no firm statements are warranted.
Little new is gained by looking at individual subjects instead of 
pooled scores, but for the sake of completeness these figures have been
TABLE 25 (Experiment 5)
Percentage of judgments that were correct on critical pairs differing 
in one attribute, by stimulus alignment condition and age
YOUNGER SUBJECTS OLDER SUBJECTS
stimulus pair and 12 34 56 12 34 56
distinguishing feature: M E N M E N
L-R Group 71.4 14.3 57.1 83.3 50.0 50.0
U-D Group 57.1 0 42.9 71.4 28.6 28.6
All subjects 64.3 7.1 50.0 76.9 38.5 38.5
i
i—•
ro
i
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TABLE.26 (Experiment 5)
Distribution of 18* subjects according to which of the 
critical pairs (attributes) they correctly judged to be
not the s^e
STIMULUS PAIR(S) AND ATTRIBUTEES)
CORRECTLY DISTINGUISHED
12 34 56 12&34 12&56 34&56
M E N M&E M&N E&N
L-R Group (n * 9) 2 0 1 2 4 0
U-D Group (n = 9) 4 0 1 1 3 0
All subjects
( n = 18) 6 0 2 3 7 0
*The remaining 9 subjects of the sample are omitted because 
they were either entirely correct or entirely wrong on all 
three critical pairs.
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Included (Table 26; cf. Table 23, p. 130, for Experiment 4). The three 
subjects who were entirely correct are omitted, as are a further six who 
made wrong “same” judgments on all three critical trials. Of the remain­
ing 18 children, the majority were correct either on just the Mouth 
(pair 12) or on Mouth plus one other attribute, usually Nose (pairs 12 
and 56). Few were correct on Nose alone, and none on Eyes alone; if the 
child discriminated one of these attributes, he also usually discriminated 
Mouth. This parallels the finding of Experiment 4.
The data summarised in the left half of Table 24 were subjected to 
statistical analyses as 1n Experiment 4, except that one-tailed signifi­
cance levels were used since a directional prediction was now being 
tested (i.e., that Mouth would predominate in correct responses).
According to Cochran tests, the probabilities of correct "not the same" 
judgments differed significantly among the three attributes: for all 
subjects (N = 27), 2s 14.111, p < 0.0005; for the L-R Group alone 
(n = 13), 5.- 6.0, p < 0.025; and for the U-D Group (n = 14), - 8.222,
p < 0.01 (all with df - 2). Binomial tests were conducted between pairs 
of attributes, as before (see foot of p. 127 to top p. 128). Only the 
following reached significance (at the one-tailed level). Mouth vs Eyes: 
for all subjects, p < 0.001 (N = 13, x ~ 0); L-R Group, p = 0.008 (N = 7, 
x = 0); U-D Group, p = 0.016 (N = 6, x s 0). Mouth vs Nose, only for 
all subjects pooled: p = 0.033 (N - 11, x = 2).
These tests confirm that the strong response bias towards Mouth 
persisted when the faces were presented upside-down. From Table 24, 
however, 1t is apparent that the results of Experiments 4 and 5 differed 
with respect to frequency of correct Eyes and Nose judgments. Responses 
on these two attributes exhibited a near-perfect cross-over effect 
between the two experiments. Under normal stimulus orientation, Eyes
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were discerned by about half the subjects and Nose by only a quarter — 
and vice versa under stimulus Inversion. '
This finding could be regarded as congruent with Ghent Bralne’s 
theory, summarised in the Introduction to Experiment 5, if we assume that 
Mouth acted as a "focal feature". The rationale 1s then as follows.
When the stimuli were presented upright, the children looked first to 
Mouth. Since there was nothing below Mouth, most of them reverted next 
to top-down scanning, jumping up to Eyes and coming to Nose last, if at 
all (bearing 1n mind that young children may terminate scanning before 
all parts of a figure have been covered). Hence the rank order of cor­
rectness of the attributes found in Experiment 4: M > E > N. When the 
stimuli were presented upside-down, the children again looked first to 
Mouth — but could now proceed directly downwards, to Nose next and Eyes 
last. Hence the Experiment 5 order, M > N > E.
While such an explanation is — 1n the absence of further testing — 
quite speculative, 1t has appeal, for there 1s another point of agreement 
between the present response patterns and those of Bralne (1965).
Bralne’s results, recall, suggested that a tendency to start scanning 
from the top of a figure rather than from the focal part developed as the 
child approached five years of age. In the present study, the Mouth 
dominance pointed to primary attention to the focal feature regardless of 
the subject's age. But there is some Indication in the age-group data 
of Tables 22 and 25 that after looking to Mouth the older children 
showed a stronger tendency to move on to strict top-down scanning than 
did the younger. With upright stimulus orientation, only 15% of the older 
children distinguished Nose where 35% of the younger group succeeded (out 
of 20 in each age group). Although minor, this pattern conforms with the 
notion that the older children looked to Nose last, while some of the
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younger group may have gone to Nose directly after Month, scanning 
upwards from the focal feature. A similar argument could be applied 1n 
the case of inverted stimulus presentation (Table 25). There, rising- 
five -year-olds performed at an equal level on Nose and Eyes (five out of 
13 children correct) but only one younger child distinguished the Nose. 
Perhaps at least some of the older children proceeded systemtic^^lly 
downwards from Mouth to encompass both Nose and Eyes, wile their juniors 
tended to be less systematic and switched from the top to the bottom of 
the figure, missing the central detail?
Summary and conclusions
Mouth has been shown clearly to predominate over Eyes and Nose in 
correct pair-comparison judgments regardless of whether the faces were 
presented in conventional or inverted orientation. The Ghent Braine type 
of explanation fits these data rather well: Mouth could be viewed as a 
sort of focal feature gaining the child's visual attention first. More 
speculatively, the differential between Experiments 4 and 5 in order of 
correctness among the three attributes and the slight age-group differ­
ences are in Une with Ghent Brake's suggestion of a strengthening top- 
down scanning strategy with increasing age. in the present situation, 
however, top-down scanning would have to be regarded as secondary to 
attending to the focal feature — perhaps the use of schemmaic faces 
rather than geommtrlc forms played some part here.*
★
See also the earlier caveat on p. 12 and VurpHlot's (1976) criticism of 
Ghent Brake's work. The (un)llkel 1 hood of visual inspection strategy as 
a significant contributor to the observed response patterns in these 
experiments will be taken up again in Part 4 (pp. 198-200).
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With stimulus inversion, the children evidently did not focus pri­
marily on the bottom of the stimulus (Eyes), nor did they operate on the 
fact that the Eyes distinction involved two lines of difference. More­
over, the distribution of correct responses over the three attributes 
remained essentially unchanged across the two conditions of stimulus 
alignment. in other words, the findings run counter to what could be 
predicted according to the location-of-gaze, objective saliency, and 
mirror-image hypotheses. The subjective weighting hypothesis stands 
unrejected.
The expression "subjective weighting" (of one attribute relative to 
another) is used here in preference to Ghent Braine's "focal part" termi­
nology. One reason is that to talk of a stimulus as having a focal part 
could be taken to suggest an ng situation: one part of a
stimulus is focal and and all the rest of the figure is non­
focal and not imppotant. With the present schemaaic faces, it seems toot's 
likely that each attribute is teing ranked on a scale from mere imppotant 
to less important, as it were.
A second reason is that Ghent Bralne seems tr imppy something 
maanly visual — which part rf a figure is focal appears to be defined 
largely by the physical structure of the figure. in the case of the 
present schematic faces, this seems inappropmiate because of the equation 
rf their physical properties across attributes. "Sutdective weighting", 
rn the other hand, admits of both visual and cogMtive comppnenns. That 
is, rne stimulus feature (Mouth, in the present case) is treated as more 
important than others fur the task in hand partly because of p^sical 
structure but also because rf the subjective significance that an entire 
stimulus figure or its individual features can have for the perceiver-as- 
interpreter.
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One further point deserves discussion. At the start of this
experiment, there had been concern that inversion might reduce idennifi- 
abillty of the stimuli as faces — recall the adults who perceived them 
initially as just circles containing lines and curves. This, together 
with the reports by other investigators that young children recognise 
inverted stimuli less readily than upright ones in general, gave some 
grounds for anticipating negative or inconclusive results from Experiment 
5. That inversion did not after all give general difficulty has been 
demoostrated: the percentages of errors were not appreciably higher in 
Experiment 5 than in Experlmnt 4.
A few of the Experiment 5 subjects were observed to tilt their 
heads sideways when viewing the stimuli or to attempt to turn round the 
cards (winch the Experimenter prevented), suggesting these children's 
awareness that the forms had a "normal" orientation from which they cur­
rently deviated. There was also some evidence that the stimuli were 
treated spedfically as faces even wren upside-down, from comments made 
by some of the subjects about them during pair-comparison. The co]meosnt 
verbal signs of recognition of "faceness" were: use of the word "face" 
itself (or somet1ees, "men"); naming an attribute specifically as 
"1^^", "eyes", "nose"; or descriptions imputing charaaterrsticu 
. peculiar to faces or people, such as "smiiing", "sleeping". (Remember 
that the Experimmnter had been careful to avvid usinn sud tteme herseef.) 
With the upright stimulus presentation of Experinmnt 4, 27.5% of the 40 
subjects gave some verbal comment indicative of face^^^s. Of the 77 sub­
jects receiving inverted presentation in Experiment 5, 79.6% used lan­
guage appropplate to faces. These remarkably close proportions of sub­
jects producing face-related utterances in the two orientation conditions 
make it seem likely that inversion caused Ilttle idSteferensc with in'th- 
pretatios of the figures as faces.
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The consistent dominance of Mouth 1n correct judgments, moreover, 
argues that some property peculiar to this attribute continued to be 
Important — that Inversion did not hinder Its Identification to any 
major extent. One might then speculate that whatever 1t was about Mouth 
that gained 1t favour over the other attributes, it had to do with the 
face context within which it occurred. This possibility will be directly 
addressed in Parts 4 and 5. First, however, a further experiment was 
conducted under this section.
EXPERIMENT 6
Pair-comparison preceded by familiarisation with the stimuli
It has been argued that, by the device of equating physical struc­
ture (as far as feasible) across the elements composing the present 
schematic faces, their three attributes should be about equally objec-. 
tlvely salient and their distinguishing levels equally discernible. On 
this basis, in other words, there 1s no reason to suppose any of the 
attribute distinctions to be more, or less, detectable than another. So 
correct pair-comparison judgments (or, conversely, errors) should in 
principle be roughly evenly distributed among the attributes.
As Experiments 4 and 5 have demonstrated, any effects of unequal 
visual sallencies or m1rror-1mage reversal confusions were indeed minimal. 
Yet, consistently, Mouth variants were correctly discerned significantly 
more often than were Eyes or Nose. It begins to look as though the 
observed patterns of correct judgments and confusions occurred 1n these 
pair-comparison tasks not so much through a failure to detect a partic­
ular attribute or the distinction between its variants as because of a 
deliberate assignment of priority to one attribute over another.
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The following experiment provided a further check on the detection 
versus subjective weighting question. As it was mant primarily as just 
a supplementary test, and because of the length of the experimental 
session, only a small sample of subjects was used — if anything unex­
pected emerged, a larger samppe could be taken later. The critical 
measure was again to be the distribution over Mouth, Eyes and Nose of 
correct "not the same" judgments in conventional pair-comparison with 
the second set of schematic faces — exactly as in Experiment 4. But 
besides having all three face attributes constructed along physically 
identical lines, an additional step was taken to help ensure that the 
children could detect all the attributes and their distinguishing levels. 
This was tccomplished by providing a kind of pretraining, intended to 
famiiiarise the children with the discriminanda they would subsequently 
meet in the pair-comparison task. in this preliminary famiiiarisation 
period, the child was to describe each stimulus face. Special emppaais 
was placed on eliciting indications that he perceived the dissimilarities 
among faces, particularly the distinction between the two curved variants 
within each attribute.
By this mans, it was hoped, any attribute or distinct 1on that 
might not be initially visually salient could be rendered more so, such 
that in subsequent pair-comparison the child would be more likely to 
detect it than he would have been without the prior experience. in other 
words, the foniilarisa^n period was expected to have. if .anything, an 
all-round facilitatory effect on discrimination of the attribute variants 
during later pa1r-comparison. in fact, since there was more room for 
improvemnt on Eyes and Nose discriminations, any enhancement effect 
should be greater for those two attributes than for Mooth, which is 
already near its ceiling. The distribution of correct "not the same"
judgments should thus tend to level out over the three attributes — at
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least according to the "differential detection" view of children's con­
fusion errors in saroness-judgment tasks.
Subjects
Fourteen children served as subjects, eight from a nursery class 
in St. Andrews and six from a playgroup in Oxford. They were assigned to 
two groups, of four boys and three ggrls each, balancing age as far as 
possible. This subdivision was relevant only for the pair-comparison 
part of the test session, 1n which, as botore, one group was to receive 
the stimuli 1n Leet-Right alignment and the other 1n Up-Down
The age range of the children in the L-R Group was 3;9 to 5;0 years and 
that of the U-D Group was 3;8 to 4;10 years, both with a mean of 4;5.
Materials and Procedure
The test stimuli were again the six schematic faces of the second 
set.(shown in Appendix 1, Figure 3). The set of "stick figures” in 
various postures that had been employed for practice in Experiment 1 were 
re-used here for practice. (For present purposes, the original stick 
figures were preferred over the practice stimuli of Experiments 4 and 5 
since those geometric forms were more difficult for children to describe 
verbally, and training on verbal description of stimuli and their features 
was now more imppotann.)
The test session was divided into two parts, run consecutively.
First came famiiiarisation with the stimuli, followed imeeiately by the 
pair-comparison task. The procedure during the pair-comparison part was 
the conventional method (with the faces in upright orientation) identical 
to that emppoyed in Experiment 4, and requires no further comrant here.
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The results of the pair-comparison task will be presented shortly, 
but first the prior familiarisation period needs explaining. As already 
noted, the aim of this "training" was to try to make sure that the child 
perceived all stimulus features, especially the distinctions that would 
be relevant to correct performance in subsequent pair-comparrson. The 
format was as follows.
The six schematic faces were laid out face up in a row on the table, 
in a different order for each child (obtained simply by shuffling the 
stimulus cards). This array was on view throughout the farniiiarisation 
period. A single card was taken from the row and placed centrally below 
it, in front of the child. The Experimenter asked the child about the 
stimulus figure, always beginning wth, "Whht do you see in this picture?" 
At the start of a session, the child’s first responses were typically 
ratter vague ("It's a man", "A face"). Questioning proceeded, at first 
on a very general, open level (e.g., "Cain you tell me a bit more about 
the face?"); but if the child did not come to describe the detail con­
tained in the figure, the Experi^nter prompted by asking more "leading" 
questions about specific parts of the face ("What about this bit?" 
[Experimenter pointing to a feature^, "Cain you tell me what this is?", 
"Whht does this bit look like?", etc.). Q^^^^ioning was continued until 
the child had mentioned each attribute using either its conventional 
"^^i^lt" name or some idiosyncratic but consistent term, and had shown, 
either linguistically or gesturally, to the Expprrmeeter’s satisfaction 
that he could distinguish between the levels of each attribute. A tran­
scription of a typical question-answer sequence follows, from a child 
aged 3;8 given face 3 on her first trial. (Appendix 3.2, pp. xv1-xv1i1, 
gives further examples of the children's responses.)
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Experimenter:
What do you see 1n this picture?
Can you tell me some more about 
the picture?
Can you tell me a bit more about 
the face?
What else has he got?
What other things are in the face?
What about this bit [e. points 
to Nose]?
That's right. What's the nose 
look like?
What else is in.the face?
What about this bit [E. points 
to Mouth] ?
Child:
A wee man.
He's got a face.
He's got funny eyes — they're 
sleeping.
[no response]
[no response]
A nose.
A straight thin nose.
[no response]
A straight mouth.
The Experimenter did not normally mention the word "face" nor name 
an attribute until the child had done so, after which the Experimenter 
adopted whatever terms the child employed. In attempting to elicit a 
description of a specific attribute, the Experimenter simply pointed to 
1t and referred to 1t as "this bit" (etc.). The order in which the 
Experimenter introduced the attributes, when this was necessary, differed 
across subjects. For example, Eyes would be introduced first for one 
child, second for another, and last for another child, lest the order in 
which the attributes were brought to the child's notice should affect the 
order in which he scanned or ranked them in subsequent pair-comparison.
No child was unable to name an attribute himself, but there were 
certain exceptions to the Experimenter's rule of not describing an attri­
bute variant before the child had. These were the cases where the child 
simply did not reply to the Experimenter's question. Most of these 
instances had the character of the child's being at a loss to say what he
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wanted — he seemed to be "searching for the right words", unable to 
grasp some distinction linguistically rather than perceptually. This 
was particularly true of the Nose. The child could usually discriminate 
a "straight line nose" from a "curly nose", but might fail to describe the 
two curved variants in a way that distinguished them. The subjects here 
were too young to be able to cope reliably with the terms "left" and 
"right" for specifying the direction of the curve. The Experimenter 
therefore suggested, say, that the child point his own nose the same way 
as the stimulus face, or that he say something like "the nose is turned 
to the door" (to the child's left) versus "it's turned to the window" (to 
his right). This was readily accomplished by those subjects who had 
initial difficulty. This kind of problem was rarely encountered with 
Eyes and Mouth, where the children had available terms for describing the 
different curves (e.g., "up" vs "down").
When the Experimenter was satisfied with the child's description of 
a face, the stimulus card was replaced in the upper row and the next one 
was brought down, until all six stimuli had been dealt with. As the 
session progressed, the children appeared to become aware of the kind of 
answer expected and to offer adequately detailed descriptions with less 
intervention from the Experimenter.
The session using the test faces was preceded by practice on the 
stick figures, with which three familiarisation trials and then three 
pair-comparison trials were presented successively, using the test pro­
cedure. The stick figures proved easy for the children to cope with, 
since the distinctions among stimuli could normally be captured in terms 
of an action ("It's a running man", "He's kicking up his leg"). The 
Experimenter pressed for additional information ("Is he running towards 
the door or towards the window?", "What's he doing with his hands?") to
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accustom the children to attending to detail and to the lengthy question­
ing in general. All subjects performed satisfactorily in practice on 
both famiiiarisation and pair-comparison. Following practice, the 
schematic faces were shuffled and laid out in a row for the famiiiarisa- 
tion part of the test session. After those six trials, the stimulus 
cards were reshuffled and turned face-down, ready to go immdia^etly into 
the pair-comparison test trials. The entire session lasted for 30 to 
40 minutes.
Prediction
The preliminary famiiiarisation period was not important here 
(though it will be discussed in Part 4). What was of interest was any 
effects the famiiiarisation with the stimuli might have on the children's 
subsequent performance in the pair-comparison task, which provided the 
test of the detection versus subjective weighting question.
The null hypothesis was that there would be no difference in fre­
quency of correct “not the same" judgments across the attributes Mut^th, 
Eyes and Nooe, i.e., across the three critical trials, on face pairs 12, 
34 and 56, respectively. If the prior experience of the discrlminanda 
afforded by the famiiiarisation period had any effect it was expected to 
be reflected in a general improvement in detection of differences between 
stimuli: the distribution of correct responses would tend to level out 
over the attributes, a result that would be in keeping with the null 
hyppohhsis.
Howevvr, if in Experiments 4 and 5 — without the prior experience 
the children were already noticing the differences, then the famiiiarisa­
tion now provided could not be of much help. The results would then be
expected to parallel those of Experiments 4 and 5, i.e., Muth would
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predominate 1n correct judgments. This was the alternative hypothesis 
under consideration. On the basis of those previous experiments, in 
fact, it was predicted that the differential frequency of correct 
responses among the attributes would be maintained. Such an outcome 
would be in keeping with the view that, in deciding about the sameness of 
these faces, the children were weighting Mouth over Eyes or Nose.
RESULTS
Identical pairs: Wrong "not the same" judgments. Among the 14 
subjects, each receiving six identical pairs, only one false negative 
response occurred — made by a five-year-old girl on pair 22 presented in 
L-R alignment. It was probably simply an "accidental slip".
Two-attribute distinctions: Wrong "same" judgments. Each subject 
received three trials in which the stimuli differed by two attributes. 
Again, only one error was made, this time by a four-year-old boy 1n the 
U-D Group, on pair 15 (differing in Mouth and Eyes).
Entirely correct sessions. Six of the 14 subjects answered cor­
rectly on all 12 pair-comparison trials -- three children in each 
stimulus alignment condition. Their ages ranged from 4;2 to 4;10 years, 
and both sexes were represented.
The above results suggest that the children who received prior 
experience with the stimuli were generally more successful than their 
"inexperienced" predecessors. In Experiments 4 and 5, where the stimuli 
were unfamiliar, errors on identical-match pairs and on pairs differing 
by two attributes had been quite infrequent; but now they were all but 
nonexistent. Moreover, the percentage of subjects managing correct 
responses throughout the task was considerably higher than before. Six
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out of 40 children in Experiment 4, and three out of 27 in Experiment 5, 
were entirely correct — proportions of 15% and 11% respectively; the 
figure in the present case was 43%. it appears, then, that famiiiarising 
the subjects with the discriminanda did improve their chances of success 
when they were subsequently presented with the same figures for pa1r- 
compprison.
Critical trials: Correct "not the same" judgments. Of the rela­
tively few errors made, almost all involved confusions of just one attri­
bute. The crucial question is, how were they distributed among the 
attributes, compared with previously. Table 27 shows the percentages of 
children giving correct "not the same" answers on the three critical 
pairs, 12 (M different), 34 (E different) and 56 (N different). (For 
ease of comppHson, the results from the preceding two experiments with 
unfamiliar stimuli have been carried forward. Onty the percentages for 
both L-R and U-D conditions comb^ed are reproduced here; for details of 
the subgroups separately, see Table 24 on p. 140, and Figure 5, p. 160.)
As before, subjects given the stimuli in U-D alignment performed 
slightly worse than those given L-R alignment. But also as before, in 
both stimulus presentation conditions Mouth was clearly far superior to 
Eyes and Nose in terms of the number of subjects who managed to dis­
tinguish the two curved variants of each attribute.
Cochran £ tests were applied to these data, with significant out­
comes in all cases. Taking all 14 subjects together, the differential 
response frequencies over the three attributes were associated with a p- 
value of < 0.0005 (g = 21.273). For the seven children in the L-R Group 
alone, again p < 0.0005 (£ - 18.80); but results for the seven in the 
U-D Group only just reached significance, at p < 0.05 (Q - 4.667). (All
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significance levels were one-tailed, since an uneven response distribu­
tion was predicted with the direction of bias specified in advance; df = 
2.) Binomial tests (one-tailed) were again conducted between pairs of 
attributes: Mouth vs Eyes, p - 0.016 (N = 6, x = 0); Mouth vs Nose, 
p = 0.031 (N = 5, x = 0). These values pertain to the data for all sub­
jects combined — the numbers in the two subgroups were too small to 
allow separate treatment by stimulus alignment condition. By inspection, 
there was no difference between Eyes and Nose in frequencies of correct 
responses. The statistical analyses confirmed the marked superiority of 
Mouth over Eyes and Nose in correct pair-comparison discriminations.
At the outset of Experiment 6, we noted the possibility of a 
general improvesnt in pair-comparison performance arising from the 
children's prior experience with the stimuli during the famiiiarisation 
period. We have already seen evidence of such an improvemnt: in the 
lower proportion of errors on identical -match pairs and two-attribute 
differences, and in the higher proportion of entirely correct sessions 
achieved by the experienced subjects in Expertant 6 compared with their 
inexperienced counterparts in Experlnts 4 and 5. Table 27 shows that a 
similar pattern obtainedfor judgments of pairs differing by a single 
attribute. The Experiment 6 subjects performed best and the EExpermn 5 
subjects worst in terms of overall proportions of correct discriminations 
achieved (i.e., disregarding the differential frequencies across the 
three attribu^^s). This trend is highlighted in Figure 5, a graphical 
representation of the data from Tabbes 24 and 27, for S-R and U-D con­
ditions se^^i^^a^^ly. Wait emrges is a steady decline in the general 
level of performance across Experiments 6, 4 and 5. The three sets of 
experimental conditions — from famiiiarity with the stimuli, to unfamii- 
iarity, to unfami1iarity plus stimulus inversion — appear as if on a
FIGURE 5
Performance decrement over various conditions of pair-comparison: Percentages of 
responses that were correct ("not the same") on pairs differing by a single attribute.
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linearly-sloping gradient according to the degree of facilitation/ 
hindrance each afforded.
There is an interesting point to be noted in this connection. 
Occasionally on a pair-comparison trial, a child would give a quick 
answer but promptly change it. With respect to the trials involving a 
single-attribute distinction, the impression from the subjects’ verbal 
comments was usually that the child had answered "same" rather hastily 
after a superficial glance at the pair, but then realised there was some 
difference. In the data presented so far from all experiments, when a 
child changed his mind his first answer was ignored; only the final 
judgment was scored, since it seemed more representative of the child’s 
true decision and of his capacity for judging samnens-difference.
When the stimuli ^re unfarniiiar to the child, reversed decisions 
occurred quite rarely. In Experiment 4, only two children (out of 40) 
made a switch, both from "same" to "not the same" on the pair differing In 
Eyes. In Experiment 5, three subjects (out of 27) changed their minds — 
one from same to different when Eyes were distinct; one from same to
different when Nose was distinct; and one from different to same when 
Nose was distinct. When the stimuli were famiiiar, however, there was a 
higher incidence of reversal. The 14 subjects in Experiment 6 produced 
six instances: two each on Mouth, Eyes and Nose, all in the direction of 
false "same" to correct "not the same" judgment.
Table 28 presents the data from the three experiments comparing the 
percentages obtained by scoring the children’s first responses against 
those yielded by their final responses (the latter reproduced from Table 
27). Though for Experiments 4 and 5 there.is not much change whether 
first or last decision was scored, the picture for Experiment 6 is of a
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TABLE 28
Percentage of judgments that were correct ("not 
the same") on critical pairs differing by a single 
attribute, comparing first against second responses 
(where given) across Experiments 6,4 and 5
STIMULUS PAIR (AND DISTINGUISHING FEATURE)
12 M) J34JX)
-
5 -( N)
Experiment 6 
(familiar stimuli) 78.6 (92.9) 35.7 (50.0) 42.9 (57.1)
Experiment 4 
(unfamiliar) 77.5 (77.5) 42.5 (47.5) 25.0 (25.0)
Experiment 5 
(unfammiiar,
invert, ed)
70.4 (70.4) 18.5 (22.2) 44.4 (44.4)
Notes to Table 28. Under each stimulus pair, the left-hand 
column gives figures based on first responses and the 
right-hand column (figures in parentheses) takes into 
account second responses, after subjects had changed their 
minds (cf. Table 27).
Numers of subjects were: Experiment 6—14; Experiment 4-40; 
Experiment 5-27 (with both stimulus alignment conditions 
combined).
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level of initial achievement markedly lower than that finally attained 
after minds were changed. Unfortunately, the smill number of subjects 
participating in Experiment 6 means that minor shifts in response fre­
quencies appear exaggerated when converted to percentage terms, relative 
to the shifts on the other two experiments with their larger samples. 
Still, the fact that 14 subjects in Experiment 6 produced six reversed 
decisions, wile 40 in Experiment 4 produced only two reversals, is note­
worthy. For, when first responses alone are considered, the children in 
Experiment 6 appear to have fared no tetter than their inexperienced 
predecessors. Whie not too much weight can be placed on this apparent 
result, it is suggestive that what the prior famiiiarisation period 
accomppished had to do not so much with improving discrimination directly, 
as with training the children to take a second look and give a more care­
fully considered opinion.
Although this could certainly be regarded as an effect on the 
children's detection of the attributes and their distinguishing variants, 
it is not quite of the character initially envisaged. it has not altered 
the differential pr^^oi^^ions of correct judgments accruing to the three 
attributes by bringing performance on Eyes and Nose distinctions up to 
the level of performance on Mouth — the effect looked for. Discrimina­
tion has been instead enhanced about equally for all three attributes, 
with the result that Mouth was still by far the rost often successfully 
discerned. Although compparUvely few subjects were tested in Experiment 
6, this pattern was so pronounced, statistically robust, and so uniform 
across the subjects, that it was considered unnncessary after all to 
enlarge the samppe.
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Summary and conclusions
Throughout the three experiments 1n this section of the study, the 
same stimulus set of six schematic faces has been in the same
basic palr-comparlson task format. Despite the fact that the physical 
structure of the variants was more or less equated across the three 
attributes of these faces, Mouth consistently predominated over Eyes and 
Nose In correct "not the same" judgments. This was true whether the 
stimuli were presented in conventional orientation (Experiment 4) or in 
inverted orientation (Experiment 5), and. also when the palr-comparlson 
trials were preceded by a kind of training period designed to famiiiarise 
the subjects with the stimuli and promote detection of any attribute that 
might otherwise, for some reason, be noticed less than the others 
(Experiment 6).
Walt did tend to vary across the- three experiments was the 
children's general level of pair-comparison performance; it appears that 
stimulus inversion (like Up-Down alignment) slightly impaired it whi’le 
provision of prior experience with the stimuli slightly enhanced it in 
relation to the base level of Experiment 4. The three conditions also 
ap^^i^^i^ntly had some effect on which attribute would be the imost often 
confused, Eyes or Nose. With conventional upright presentation, Nose was 
inferior, wlnle E/es were inferior when the stimuli were viewed upside- 
down. This cross-over can perhaps be explained in terms of a visual 
factor: the part of the stimulus figure to gaze is first directed,
and the subsequent direction of scanning from that starting point (Braine 
1965). (The improveirant in judgments of Nose in Experiment 6 compared 
with Experiment 4 is possibly attributable to the prior training on 
detection and discrimination given in the former case.)
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But the consistent dominance, under all conditions, of Mouth cannot 
be accounted for in purely visual terms. It was not that Mouth was more 
visually salient — if anything, Eyes should have been the most objec­
tively noticeable attribute, since it was composed of two lines. It was 
not that mirror-image reversal effects played any significant part -- for 
otherwise Eyes and Mouth scores should have been equal, and there should 
have been a cross-over effect between the Left-Right and Up-Down stimulus 
alignment conditions with regard to scores on Nose versus Eyes/Mouth. It 
was not that the children attended primarily to the bottom of the 
stimulus card, for then Eyes should have been correctly judged in the 
stimulus-inversion condition, when in fact Eyes were the most often con­
fused attribute. Finally, the attempt to see whether Eyes and Nose 
scores could be brought up to the level of Mouth by emphasising the dis­
criminanda during a pretraining period ended in a negative outcome — 
performance on Mouth was simply equally raised.
This section of the study was embarked on with the objective of 
determining whether the response patterns observed in the first three 
experiments of the programme could be at least partly due to the fact 
that in the earlier set of stimulus faces the three attributes (then 
Shape, Eyes and Mouth) were quite different in their physical structure. 
Since the Shape variable was subsequently dropped, the question became 
whether the earlier finding of Mouth dominance could be attributed to 
differential objective visual salience between Mouth and Eyes. On the 
basis of the results of the second group of three experiments, the answer 
is that this is unlikely. And if the dominance of Mouth cannot be 
explained on such perceptual grounds as have been examined here, we are 
drawn towards the conclusion that a cognitive factor was involved. For 
some reason, Mouth was subjectively salient; as a criterion of sameness-
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difference, It appears to have been assigned more weight than were Eyes
or Nose.
Why? Is the mouth genera^y a highly significant part of the face 
for young children, or is it rather that the specific nature of the
present stimulus faces made it so just in these circumstances? Hints 
have already appeared that in their incidental verbal cormmets during 
test sessions, the children treated the attribute Mouth in different 
terms from the way they referred to the other features. In the following 
section, the children's spontaneous remarks and requested justifications 
for their decisions in the preceding experiments are examined in Dire 
detail, with a view to attempting to clarify this issue, among others.
~ 167 -
PART 4
DETECTION OR SELECTION OF STIMULUS ATTRIBUTES?
II. SOME CLUES FROM SUBJECTS' JUSTIFICATORY RESPONSES
During Experiments 2 to 6, alongside the subjects' 
main task decision about the sameness of stimuli on each 
trial, the Experimenter recorded any instances where the 
child commented on a stimulus figure or indicated specific 
aspects of sameness or difference between figures. Fairly 
often, such information was volunteered spontaneously. 
Additionally, in Experiments 2 and 3 subjects were expli­
citly asked at random intervals to comment or to "justify" 
a decision ("How are they the same/not the same?", "Can
you see anything else about them that's not the sams?",
*
etc.). For the sake of simplicity, all these responses — 
spontaneous or requested, verbal or gestural — are here 
called justificatory, as distinct from the main-task 
responses (pair chosen from triad, or pair-comparison judg­
ment) with which they were associated.
The justificatory responses all of rather similar
nature: indicating that one or attributes shared (or
* Experiment 2 was embarked upon with the intention of elici­
ting a justification on every trial. This proved infeasible, 
partly because the test session became too lengthy and 
partly because some of these young children w^;re reluctant 
or even bec^e upset, reacting as though they felt the 
correctness of their main-task decision was in question.
In any case, justifications w^^e quite consistent within 
a subject's sessi^on, so that a sa^^^Le from each child 
sufficed. In Experiment 3, therefore, justifications were 
requested on only a few trials at random (with reluctant 
children not questioned after an initial attempt), and there­
after w^^e not specifically asked for at all.
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did not share) the same level in the given stimulus pair 
by pointing to the feature, naming it, or describing its 
(visual or other) character. They were thus relatively 
easy to analyse. Where they did vary across children and 
across stimulus pairs, it was largely in terms of:
the amount of information included in the response 
(e.g., number of attributes noted);
order in which attributes were referred to in militiple 
responses, i.e., when more than one was noted within a 
single trial;
number of times each attribute was referenced;
and manner of referring to an attribute (e.g., by just
pointing, or by verbally describing its variants, etc.).
These quantitative and qualitative factors will be considered 
in turn for their relationships, if any, with the patterns 
of correct matches and confusion errors observed in main-task
performance.
The aim of examining the justificatory responses was 
to try to shed further light on such questions as the extent 
to which, and respects in which, young children succeed 
or fail in judging sameness/difference, how they go about 
making their decisions, and ultimately what they understand 
by the word "seme" in these tasks. In the present context, 
the important finding to be explained is that children's 
confusion errors are not randomly distributed, but tend 
to be systematically biassed towards certain types of 
discriminanda. Here, two main possibilities are under 
consideration: that particular stimulus features were
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overlooked either because they had low objective visual 
saliency relative to other features and were therefore 
accidentally not noticed (failure-to-detect view); or 
because they were treated as not relevant in the given 
task and stimulus context, were assigned a lower subjective 
weight than other features, and w^^e therefore deliberately 
ignored (failure-to-select view).
On the evidence so far from the present series of 
experiments, it has been suggested that the observed con­
fusion errors seem to owe more to non-selection than to
non-detection. Is there anything in the justificatory 
responses to help support or refute that contention? And 
if the former, are there any clues as to the possible bases 
on which differential subjective weights were assigned 
among the stimulus attributes? To illustrate the idea: 
Suppose a Shape-matching subject explicitly and consistently 
indicates identity of Shape as the reason for his decisions 
and makes little or no reference to Mouth. In that case, 
we have no way of telling whether or not he perceives 
the Mouth differences that he confuses. However, if he 
does explicitly (and correctly) point out samness/c^i-fference 
of Mouth, then we are forced to conclude that Mouth is 
perceived but not used as the basis for decision. Further, 
given the Shape-matcher who indicates that he perceives both 
Shape and Mouth, we can ask whether there is any difference 
in the way he refers to them (e.g., in the terminology 
of his verbal descriptions) that could tell us what it is 
that has led him to base his sameness judgment on Shape alone
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The various methods of analysing the justificatory 
responses were largely parallel across all experiments. 
However, Experiments 2 and 3 will be discussed separately 
from Experiments 4-6 because of the two distinct stim­
ulus* sets employed, the attributes in the first set being 
Mouth, Eyes and Shape (M, E, S) and in the second, Mouth,
Eyes and Nose (M, E, N) (with Eyes constructed differently 
in the t:wo cases) .
It should be noted that the aim of recording justifi­
cations was not to furnish independent evidence that would 
stand on its own. Wile they may (or may not!) provide 
helpful information, they were intended simply as an 
adjunct to the principal data obtained from the corresponding 
triad and pair-comparison judgments. Their treatment in
what follows is therefore informal.
Samples of the subjects' justificatory responses are 
reproduced in Appendix 3.
1. Experiments 2 (triads) and 3'(pair-comparison)
See Figure 1 of Appendix 1 for the comppsstion of the 
eight schematic faces making up the stimuli employed 
in these two experiments.
No discernible differences in the justifications emerged 
according to whether the subjects received Framed or 
Unframed stimuli; stimulus condition will therefore be 
ignored throughout the foilowing analyses. Instead, the 
subjects were divided into their classes according to the
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dominant attribute matched in the main task. The triad's
task yielded 12 Shape-matchers, 11 MouUh-mmtchers, one 
Eyes-Matcher, and 12 Mixed-matchers (unclassified because 
inconsistent). (There was no possibility of being correct 
in this task, recall.) All of these subjects produced at 
least several justificatory responses. Of the 62 subjects 
taking part in the pair-comparison experiment, however, 22 
produced no justificatory responses; these were excluded 
from the present analyses, except in the calculation of 
basic response rates. The remaining 42 subjects were dis­
tributed among matcher-groups as foioows: 4 Shape-,
9 Mooiuh-, 4 Eyes-, 4 StM- (i.e., for whom both Shape and 
Mouth had to match, though not Eyes, before stimuli 
judged to be the same), 2 StE-, 2 E+M-, 6 and
9 Correct-matchers. (For present purposes, subjects who 
made fewer than four confusion errors altogether were 
classed as if entirely Correct. See Table 19, p. 92 , 
for the original distribution of the entire sample of 
62 subjects.)
Samples of the kinds of justificatory responses pro­
duced in Experiments 2 and 3 are provided in Appendix 3, 
Section 1. Pages ii - vii show sequences from the response 
sheets covering a series of trials.- These segments were 
selected to provide a general picture of the sorts of
* For ease of comparison, these segments have been trans­
cribed such that the order of the triads is the same across 
subjects. They do not represent consecutive responses as 
actually given, since order of trials (and position of 
stimulus cards within trials) was randomised across subjects.
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responses given. They are fairly typical of the range of verbal 
responses that did occur, but are not necessarily typical of the record 
sheets themselves since, as we shall see, many responses consisted of 
simply pointing to or mnosyllabically naming an attribute and since -­
particularly in pair-comparison -- many trials received no justification 
at all. Pages viii - xi of Appendix 3, Section 1 list some further 
individual justificatory responses, again often atypical in their com­
plexity, or added specifically to illustrate some peculiarity.
*
Response rates
O^eraH, some justificatory response was supplied on haaf of the 
trials in the triads, but only a quarter of the time in the pair- 
comparison task. This difference in rate of responding was presumably 
due simply to the restriction of requests for justifications to a 
limited samp^ of trials in Experiment 3.
Response frequencies varied somewhat across the different classes 
of subjects. Table 29 shows the proportions of trials with which 
were associated no response, reference to just one attribute, and 
reference to two or to all three attributes, for each mattheraciass.
In both triads and pair-comparison tasks, subjects who performed 
without any conoistrntiy dominant attribute (Mixed groups) offered
* For all experiments, responses consisting simply of, 
e.g., "They're the sa^6^/oot the same", where the only
rrfereocr was to the entire stimulus figure rather than 
to a particular attribute, were classed as "no response" 
as far as justifications w^:re concerned. Such responses 
merely answ^^ed the test-question of the main task without 
justifying those main-task decisions.
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TABLE 29
Percentage of trials receiving no response, or reference to 
one, two, or all three attributes, by class of subject
NUMBER OF ATTRIBUTES REFERRED TO PER RESPONSE
CLASS OF SUBJECTS (n) No Ref. to 1 Ref. to 2 Ref, to 3
response attribute attributes attributes
Triads task
Shape-matchers (12) 75 17 6 3
Mouth- " (11) 65 23 12 0
Eyes- " (1) 82 18 0 0
Mixed- " (12) 19 45 28 8
Pair-comparison task
Shape-matchers (4) 86 8 5 2
Mouth- " (9) 73 21 4 2
Eyes- " (4) 88 10 1 1
S + M- ” (4) 63 23 11 3
S + E- " (2) 82 16 2 0
E + M- " (2) 93 7 0 0
Mixed- " (6) 61 14 11 14
CoorrTect- " (9) 85 8 4 4
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the greatest number of justificatory responses (seen from
their low siores in the "no response" iolumn), and made 
referenie to more than one attribute within a trial m^;re 
often than did the other subjeit ilasses. Mouth-matching 
subjeits also produced fairly high response rates,
In Experiment 2, where the task was to seleit the most 
similar pair from a triad, the ihildren sometimes spontan­
eously noted the third, unchosen faie in their justificatory 
responses. These referenies were of two types:
(a) "All the same’ ' responses. The child said that the 
three faies in the triad were "ail the same" (and usually 
had to be eniouraged to find a pair "more the same" than 
the others). (For illustration, see Appendix 3.1, pp. viii - 
xi, examples 6-- 9, 11, eti.) This happened on trials 
where the ihild's dominant matching attribute was iommon 
to all three faies, e.g., when a Shape-matcher was ionfronted 
with a triad in whiih the three possible pairs shared just 
Shape, orS + M, or S + E. Over the 56 trials ^mp^sing 
this task, an "all the response iould oidr on the
basis of shared dominant attribute a maximum of eight ti^mes 
for eaih attribute. In fait, this response was given a 
mean of four or five times per subject, with several ihil­
dren attaining the maximum. This relatively high frequeniy 
suggests the "power" of the dominant matching attribute; 
it happened even when the three faies appeared (to an adulti) 
rather dissimilar ‘(compare, e.g., faies 1, 4 and 7 -- straight 
Mouth iommon — in Figure 1 of Appendix 1).
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(b) Comparison with third face. Having selected a 
pair, the child aoomonted, directly oc indirectly, on one 
oc more attributes in the third face, relating or contrasting 
it with the chosen ones. Appendix 3/1, pp. viii - xi gives 
a number of examples, e.g., 10, 18, 19, 21, and especially 
14 for its detail. Commiaison with the third face occurred 
on average only twice per 56-trial session for Shape- and 
Mouuh-rnaaching subjects, but seven times for Mixed-matchers. 
Given their higher basic rate of giving justifications and 
muutiple responses as well, one might speculate that 
Mixed-matchers were inconsistent because they were more 
aware of all the attributes and of alternative possibilities.
Order of Reference
Muutiple responses — those containing reference to 
more than one attribute within a single trial — were 
examined to see whether there were any consistent patterns 
of order of reference to the three attributes. One might, 
intuitively, expect subjects to refer to their particular
dominant attribute first. Or is it rather that one attri­
bute tended to receive first mention across subjects 
regardless of what the child actually matched?
Six orders of reference were possible: S>.M>E,
S>E>M, M>S>E, M>E>S, E>S>M and E>M>S. Table 30 
shows which of these actually occurred most often. (For 
simplicity, in responses referring to just two attributes, 
the unmentioned one was assigned last place in the sequence.)
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It is clear from the table that an internal feature was
typically indicated first — even by Shape-matching sub­
jects J In fact. Shape consistently came last rather than 
second in the sequence, except for those subjects taking 
Shape as the (or a) dominant attribute in the main task.
Modh-maachers w^;re the most internally uniform 
group, showing almost universal preference for the order 
M>S>E. Surprisingly, Shape-matchers (rather than Mixed- 
matchers) were the least uniform — particularly in the 
triads task where, for Shape-matchers, order tended to 
be associated with whichever attributes were ac—ually 
shared by the chosen face pair. That is, on trials where 
Mouth differed, the comm)n Shape was indicated first and 
the Mouth difference last. But when Mouth too was common, 
Shape was noted only rarely, and then last. These children's 
reactions to further questioning on M^o^t^lr-s^me pairs gave 
the impression that they took the cc^mmon Shape for granted. 
Apparently, they chose instead to remark on the fact that 
Mouth, too, was shared, and seemed surprised when then 
asked about Shape, as if its identity was obvious.
Distribution of references among attributes
The total number of times each attribute was referred
to was calculated over all responses. (Multiple mentions 
of one and the same attribute within a single trial were 
counted as one reference to that attribute; mention of 
two attributes counted as two references, one for each
178 -
attribute.) Table 31 shows how the references were dis­
tributed among the three attributes for each class of 
subject. "Enroraeous” references are included in these 
data, with their occurrence marked by a superscript a, b 
or c_, denoting the proportion of entries in the cell that 
were erroneous. These were instances where the child indi­
cated (by word or gesture) that an attribute was the same 
in two faces when it in fact differed; or where he indicated 
that an attribute was different when it was actually iden­
tical (a rare occurrence); or where he gave a false verbal 
description of an attribute level (e.g., calling black Eyes 
"white"). Descriptions that were idiosyncratic but con­
sistently applied in a manner that successfully distinguished 
attribute levels (e.g., systematically calling white 
Eyes "orange" and black E^^s "blue") were not classed as
erroneous.
The right-hand column of Table 31 sumnarises these 
data, showing the order of frequency of reference among the 
attributes, from most to least often mentioned. The pattern 
rather closely resembles that of Table 30, presenting the 
order in which attributes were introduced in multiple res­
ponses. That is, Shape consistently received the fewest 
references, except by subjects who took Shape as dominant 
attribute in matching performance. But even for Shape- 
matchers internal features were prominent, receiving at 
least as many references as Shape. A possible explanation 
for this pattern will be suggested in the following sub­
section, when types of reference are considered.
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TABLE 31
Percentage of trials containing reference to each 
attribute, within each class of subjects
CLASS OF 
SUBJECT* (n)
% references to: total
refs.
ORDER OF FREQUENCY OF 
ATTRIBUTE REFERENCESSHAPE MOUTH EYES
Triads task
S- matchers (12) 34 37a 30C 245 b M= S = E
M - matchers (11) 19 56 25a 298 M>E>S
Mixed-matchers (12) 16 45a 39C 759® M>E >S ,■
Over all subjects 20 46 34 1302
Pair-comparison
task
S - matchers (4) 32 32 36C 25 C E=S= M
M - matchers (9) 17 63 20 86 M>E=S
S+M- matchers (4) 32 63 5 59 M>S>E 1
Mixed-matchers (6) 25 37 38 130 E - M> S
Correct-
matchers (9) 17 41a 42® 68 E = M> s
Over all subjects 24 48 28 368
KeV=
a. 5 - 10% of references 
erroneous
in this cell were A
(see text
b. 10 - 15% of references 
erroneous
in this cell were V for further
c. 25% of references
erroneous
in this cell were J explanation)
' > " — received more references than
"--received as many references as
* Eyes-, S+E-, and E + M-maacher groups are omitted because 
they produced too few references to attributes (16 or fewer 
total per group).
i
' V 
'=
v:
1
]
s
4
- 180 -
Although internal features received more references 
however, it was here — especially on Eyes — that most 
errors of reference were made. Shape itself was hardly 
ever wrongly referenced; but paradoxically, it was the’ Shape 
matchers who produced the highest proportions of erroneous 
references (mostly on Eyes). Interestingly, even those 
children who performed entirely correctly in their sameness 
judgments (applicable to pair-comparison only) still made 
errors when indicating points of sameness/difference in 
justifying those judgments] Since the achievement of 
100% successful discrimination over 28 nonidentical pairs 
can hardly be a chance outcome, these children must have 
both perceived and used all attribute-variants in making 
their judgments. It is therefore likely that their con­
fusions of attribute levels in subsequent justifications were 
due to accidental "slips of the tongue" or lapses of atten­
tion. It is difficult to extend this explanation to the 
other subject groups, however, for one would expect propor­
tions of erroneous references then to be about equal among 
these groups, whereas in fact Shape-matchers "lapsed" con­
siderably more often than did Mouth-maachers.
Types of reference
Each reference to an attribute was classified according 
to the following category system (established on a post-hoc 
basis after inspection of the various means used to refer 
to attributes):
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Point/Name: The child pointed to or named an attribute 
to indicate that it was the same (or different) across 
faces. He did not explicitly differentiate the two 
levels of the attribute. Examples of verbal responses 
assigned to this category are: "Tlie mouths the same",
"Not the eyes", "That bit's the same [pointing to Shape]".
Feature-level: The child verbally described the attribute 
in a way that explicitly differentiated between its two 
levels. But the description was confined to the physical, 
visual properties of the attribute itself. Idiosyncratic 
descriptions that preserved differentiation and referred 
to physical structure were permitted. Examples are:
"That one's got black eyes and that one's got white 
eyes", "An upright egg and a sideways egg [= vertical/ 
horizontal Shape]", "They both got straight-line mouths".
Face-level: The two levels of an attribute were explicitly 
differentiated but in a way that went beyond physical 
properties, and went beyond the attribute itself, to 
characterise the whole face (or "the person behind the 
face") as being in some state or action. Examppes: 
"They're both happy faces" (re. curved-up Mouth),
"Hh's bulging his cheeks out like this" (child puffs 
out his own cheeks; re. horizontal Shape), "They do 
that when they're crying" (re. blank Eyes).
Further examples of the kinds of terms used in des­
criptions categorised as Feature- or as Face-level are 
provided in Table 32.
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TABLE. 32
Examples of justificatory responses that successfully 
differentiated the two levels of an attribute
(a) at the Feature-level:
SHAPE: attribute called:
vertical orientation
upright; standing up; 
straight; long; thini; 
round*
EYES: attribute called: eyes
black circles
black; blue; fiHed-in; 
coloured(-in); scribbled in
MOUTH: attribute called: mouth,
straight line
straight; line; straight-line; 
along the way; across the way; 
not a smbLet
head. face, shape, egg
horizontal orientation
flat; lying down; sideways; 
short; fat+; not round*
blank circles
white; not coloured(-in); empty; 
not got scribbles in; round*
f ace
upward curve
curve(d); curl(y); not a line; 
round; up the way; smilet
(b) at the Face-level:
said; cross; grumpy; angry; 
frowning; crying; thint
happy; smiling; smileyt; 
laughing; fati
NOTES: _ _ _ _
round: This could occur in various contexts. With respect to Shape, some 
children said round for vertical oval, distinguishing it from (e.g.) not 
round for horizontal oval; or, others said sort of round for vertical and 
round for horizontal, etc. These instances of successful differentiation of 
Shape are distinct from cases where the child did not differentiate ' the two 
orientations, e.g., using sort of round for both levels. (The latter sort of
reference was coded as Point/Name, not Featurrelevvl.) Similarly with respect 
to Eyes: sometimes round (= blank) was contrasted with black-or filled-in; 
but sometimes round was used indiscriminately for either level. In Mouth 
references, round was used exclusively for only the curved variant.
fat/thin; smile (smiling, smiley): Whhther these were coded as Face- or as 
Feature-level depended on their linguistic context. Thus, "He's got a fat/ 
thin head" was classed as Feature-level (regarded as restricted to the attri­
bute and to physical chatrtCesistics), wh-ile "He'e. ta//ehin" was classed as 
Face-level (taken to refer to some state the "person" was in). Similarly, 
"It's got a smile", "TF^c^fs a smiling mouth", etc., were taken as Feature- 
level, but "He'2 smiling" or "T-t’s a smiley face" were treated as Facc-level. 
(See further text pp. 83-84.)
Face-level qualifisrs like sad, crying, usuaHy referred t6 the straight-line 
Mouth but occasionally were applied to blank Eyes. The referent was normaHy 
clear from the rest of the child's utterance and from his pointing.
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Other: The response was incomprehensible or conveyed
insufficient information to allow classification, and 
the child did not clarify it. Very few responses, in 
fact, were unclassifiable; almost all those that 
did occur are listed in Appendix 3.1 (Examppes 24 - 26 
and 42 - 46).
Some notes on the classification procedure are in 
order. Firstly, cross-referencing over trials was often 
required before a particular response could be coded. For 
example, some children called Shape "rouncl" regardless of 
orientation; such references were entered in the undif­
ferentiated Point/Nime category. But others said (e.g.) 
"round’' on trials involving vertical Shape, contrasting 
this on other trials with "flat"' for horizontal Shape.
Also, some children used face to mean the whole stimulus 
figure, some to mean Shape, and some to mean Mouth. Thus, 
e.g., "They've both got straight faces" was highly ambiguous 
unless compared against another trial, when the child might 
say, "That's a straight and that's a round face" (indicating 
the two Shapes) or, "That's a straight face and that's a 
smiley face" (indicating the two Mouths).
Secondly, the distinetion between Feature-level and 
Face-level responses could often be made on the basis of 
the presence of the words has (got) versus is, Thus:
The face HAS (GOT) a particular FEATURE (black eyes, curly 
mouth, etc.) could be contrasted with The face , (person) IS 
in some STATE/ACTION (he's smiling). Additionally, replace­
ment of the name for the attribute by the word "face"
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suggested Face-level coding, provided its qualifier went 
beyond the attribute's physical properties. For example, 
"That’s a happy face" was clas^sed as Face-level because a 
state was ascribed to the face. But "They’re both straight 
faces" (referring to Mouth) was classed as Feature-level 
despite the occurrence of "face", because the child did not 
explicitly transcend the attribute's physical character­
istics in that particular response. Descriptions of Shape 
in terms of "long face", "wide face", etc., were taken as 
Feature-level (referring to the attribute's physical pro­
perties), but "He’s fat", "He's thin", were taken as Face- 
level (ascribing a state to the person). Similarly, "Got 
a smi-le", "The mouth is happy" were treated as restricted 
to the Feature, while "He's smiling", "It's a happy face"
were treated as Face-level.
Finally, each attribute was coded only once per trial, 
even if it received multiple references within a single 
response. For this purpose, the categories were treated as 
if "hierarchical" in the order Face_level> Feature-level> 
Point/Name> Other (where ">" means "took precedence over"). 
Take, for instance, a response to face pair 15: "They’ve
both got upright heads but one's a cross face and one's got 
a curl on the mouth". Upright head captured the Shape dis­
tinction at the physical Feature-level (contrasted, for this 
subject, with lying-down head on other trials). Curl 
distnnguished the curved Mouth, again at the physical 
Feature-level. But cross face, associated with straight
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Mouth, belonged to Face-level. The entire utterance was 
thus scored as one Shape reference at Feature-level and
one Mouth reference at Face-level (no Eyes reference).
This "hierarchical" treatment of the categories does 
not mean to say that one type of reference was regarded 
as "superior to" another type. Though Face- and Feature-level 
were favoured over Point/Name references -because they gave 
mDire information (showing that the child differentiated attri­
bute levels), Feature-level descriptions could be regarded 
if anything as more "adult-like" than Face-level ones.
However, we are not here interested in the sophist ication 
of the children's descriptions for its own sake. The focus 
is on the association (if any) between the patterns of 
samennss/difference judgments made in the main task and 
the kinds of justifications given for those judgments.
The idea is that there may be something in the way the ref­
erences to attributes linguiStically encoded during
justification that might tell us about the way the stimuli 
were cognitively encoded during the decision-making process. 
Face-level descriptions were allotted primacy in the class­
if ication because, as we shall see, they seemed the more 
interesting in this connection.
Tables 33 and 34 sumnmrise these data, the former showing 
the distribution of references among the type-categories 
according to subject classes, the latter showing the distribution 
according to the particular attribute referred to, irrespective of 
subject class.
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TABLE 33
Percentage of references that were of each type,
for each class of subject
CLASS OF SUBJECT (n) Point/
Name
TYPE OF REFERENCE
Other
Total
refs.
Feature-
level
- Face- 
level
Triads task
Shape-matchers (12) 61 28 9 2 247
Mouth- " (11) 62 21 17 0 298
Mixed- " (12) 56 29 13 2 761
Pair-comparison task
Shape-matchers (4) 84 8 8 0 25
Mouth- " (9) 23 33 42 2 88
Sf M- " (4) 17 63 20 0 59
Mixed- " (6) 43 38 18 0 130
Correct- " (9) 33 40 22 4 72
NOtes:
Eyes-, S-4-E-, and E+M~matchers are omitted because these 
groups gave too few responses. The references they did make 
fell about half in PointNName and half in Feature-level.
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TABLE 34
Percentage of references to each attribute that were 
of each type (regardless of class of subject)
ATTRIBUTE 
REFERRED TO Point/
Name
TYPE-OF REFERENCE
Total 
. refs.
Feature-
level
Face-
level
Triads:
Shape 78 20 3 256
Mouth 54 18 28 605
Eyes 54 46 0 447
Pair-comparison
Shape 35 65 0 95
Mouth 31 19 ' 50 183
Eyes 47 53 0 122
Notes:
Responses by Eyes-, S4-E-, and E+M-maachers are included 
in the above.
"Other" responses are omitted (since they could often not be 
linked to a specific attribute).
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In the triads task, for all subject classes, than 4
■
half of the references were of the simple, undifferentiating
Point/Name type. The difference among suUjeeC classes :
lay mainly in the relati^ve proportions oO Feeauur- aad 
Face-level descriptions, with MooUh-maachers making almost 4
as many Face- as Feature-level references, and the other |
two groups preferring Feature-level. As Table 34 demon- i
P
strates, however, almost all the Face-level references 1
in fact pertained to Mouth, regardless oo suujeec class.
In general, then, Shape was referred to mostly by Point/Name, I
Eyes references fell about equally in the Point/N^me i
and Feature-level categories, and Mouth received either just 
a Point/Name reference or a full Face-level description. 1
Thus, in this task, type of reference was rather closely '4
tied to kind of attribute referenced. That is, the apparent 
variation among subject classes seems to be largely a j
function of the particular attribute most often referenced, |
rather than of the way attributes were referenced.
The pair-comparison format produced greater variety 4
among the subject classes and a stronger separation of >
Mouth (and Moouh-matchers) in the direction of Face-level
descriptions. Shape-matchers almost always merely pointed to 
or named an attribute, be it Shape, Mouth or Eyes. (Again, ‘ i
they referred to all three attributes about equally often, j
though producing few responses in total.) Moouh-maachers i
focussed rather strongly on Face-level Mouth descriptions,
and used Feature-level description rather than just Point/Nane 
when they did refer to Shape or Eyes. Shape•tMouUU-mnauhers,
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too, rarely just pointed to or named an attribute, while
Mixed- and Correct-matchers used a mixture of all means of
reference, except that Mixed subjects described Shape by 
Feature-level whereas Correct subjects merely indicated 
Shape by pointing.
As in the triads task, then, the Face-level descriptions 
pertained (exclusively, this t;^me) to Mouth; indeed, half 
of the references to Mouth w^;re made at the Face-level.
Eyes references, also as before, occurred in both PointNNfme 
and Feature-level categories. These distributions were 
largely independent of subject class. Surprisingly, however, 
Shape- and Correct-matchers (i.e., children who judged 
Shape correctly in pair-comparison) referred to Shape only 
by undifferentiated Point/Name, while the other subject 
groups • (who confused Shape in pair-comparison) successfully 
differentiated its variants at the Feature-level in their
justifications I
Almost all of the "erroneous" references that occurred
(see pp. 178-180 and Table 31) associated with the
PointNName type of reference. All but two of these erred 
in the direction of indicating that an attribute had the 
same level in two faces when it actually differed. E^;roneous 
references to Mouth (which were relatively uncc^mmon) 
typically consisted of the child’s saying something like 
just "The mouth is the same", which might be construed as 
an "accidental oversight". But this kind of error never 
occurred on Shape, and rarely on Eyes. A numi^fsr of the Eyes
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errors consisted of false descriptions of the physical
Feature-level — calling black Eyes "whhte", or vice
versa. Again, these might be taken as accidental slips 
or, given the young age of some of the subjects, they mmggt 
reflect difficulty in the application of the terms black
and white.
However, many of the Eyes errors, and all of the Shhpp 
errors, were of another type. Here, the child used an 
adjective picking up on a visual aspect that was irrelevant 
in the task context (and failing to differentiate variants). 
The most cc^mmon irrelevant description for both Shape and 
Eyes was "Thhy're both round" (or, for Shape, also "Thhy're 
both eggs"). Children who gave this kind of ambiguous 
description for both Shape levels tended to turn their heads 
sideways to view the horizontal ellipse, or attempted to 
turn the stimulus card round. This was surely clear indi­
cation that they perceived the distinction between the 
two Shape orientations, but regarded it as indeed irrelevant.
Summary and discussion
Table 35 presents a condensed overvi^^w of the main 
points dealt with concerning the justificatory responses 
produced in the triads and pair-comparison tasks with the 
first set of stimuli. Some differences among the classes 
of subjects and among the attributes begin to emerge.
The sharpest separation is between Shape-matchers and 
Mouth-maachers, in terms of subject class; and also between
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Shape and Mouth, in terms of attribute. Shape-matchers 
e^^jrge as either less willing or less able than the other 
groups to justify their sameness judgments, giving fewest 
references, giving fewest verbal descriptions differentiating 
attribute levels, making most erroneous references, and 
showing no particular preference for their dominant matching 
attribute over Mouth or Eyes in terms of both frequency 
and primacy of mention. Mouth-matchers’ justifications 
focussed rather strongly on their dominant attribute, 
although they showed that they were capable of correctly 
differentiating Shape and Eyes too. Mixed-matchers were 
the most responsive, giving many and informative justifi­
cations and including all three attributes in their references
These patterns in the justificatory responses are 
consistent with the main task performance of the three 
subject classes. Shape-maachers, recall, tended to be 
not quite fully "strict" (as defined on pp. 73-74 and 
90-91 ) in their adherence to their dominant attribute
in both triads and pair-comparison performance, in that 
their matches were occasionally based on Mouth instead of 
or as well as Shape. A greater proportion of the Mouth- 
matchers adhered entirely strictly to their dominant attri­
bute. And a number of the Mixed-matchers lacked a dominant-
attribute matching pattern because they alternated between 
judging on the basis of number of shared attributes and 
judging on the basis of type of shared attribute, sometimes 
favouring a match of any two attributes over a match
based on just one, dominant attribute.
- 193
How do the justification patterns relate to the char­
acteristics of the attributes themselves? As Table 35
shows, Shape was associated with the smallest num^^r of 
references and did not come first in the sequence when 
more than one attribute was referred to. Mouth, by con­
trast, consistently received the highest proportion of 
references, and was often first mentioned in multiple 
responses, with Eyes next.
The amount of attention devoted to Eyes in the justi­
ficatory responses contrasts with their infrequent appear­
ance as the basis of judgment in performance on the main 
task. To receive such a number of references, Eyes, as a 
general feature, must have been reasonably salient and not 
simply totally overlooked. Remember, however- that a fair 
proportion of the references to Eyes in the justifications 
was erroneous — they were indicated to be the same across 
two faces when they actually differed. It is possible, then, 
that the distinction between the two levels of Eyes was not 
so readily discriminate.
The case for Shape is slightly different. As we have 
seen, children who did' refer to Shape at all tended to do 
so by simply pointing to or naming it as (not) the same 
without explicitly, linguistically differentiating between 
its two levels. There is a likely reason for the relative 
lack of Shape references and its loading in the Point//L!^ne 
category that is independent from the detection versus 
selection issue, for Shape seemed to pose a vocabulary 
problem. In many instances, a child would gesture vaguely
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at the stimuli while appearing to be searching for words 
to convey, what he wished to say. If the Experimenter then 
supplied a term like "shape" or "heady, or an adjective 
"long" or "fat;" to describe the two levels, the child's 
reaction implied "That's what I was trying to sayI" and 
he would proceed to use these terms appropriately himself. 
It seems plausible, then, that Shape received compprraively 
few references simply because some of these young children 
lacked the lexical repertory necessary to name the attri­
bute and describe verbally its two orientation levels. In 
any case, we have here no clear evidence that the children 
did not perceive the Shape variation.
There was no such problem in referring to Mouth, the 
most frequently-mentioned attribute for the maaority of 
children. The distinction between its curved and straight­
line variants could be readily captured in language in the 
opposition between "smiling" or "happy" on the one hand and 
"sad." or "straight" on the other. The striking thing here 
was the high proportion of Face-level descriptions: the 
adjective was frequently extended beyond the attribute to 
the whole face or the "person". In practice, the tendency 
was for the curved variant to elicit mostly Face-level 
descriptions, while the straight variant sometimes instead 
elicited physical Feature-level description.
However, the word "face" did often occur in connection 
with the straight Mouth variant — but in a peculiar,
"non-adult" context. It is one thing to say "It's a happy
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face"; it is another to say "It's got a straight (or. 
flat) face" when what is meant is that the face has got 
a straight (flat) mouth. Yet this kind of statement 
occurred with surprising frequency. (Examples appear in 
Appendix 3.1: p. vi, Eyes-matcher on pair 18; p. vii, 
Correct-matcher on pairs 16 and 23; p. viii, no 2; p. x, 
no. 37.) Similarly, responses such as "They've got the 
same faces" accompanied by a point to just the Mouth w^;re
common. The children thus often treated "mouth and "face"
as synonymous in con-texts where an adult would not do so .
In short, the distinction between the two levels of 
Mouth was obviously readily discriminate, both perceptually 
and linguistically, and to subjects for whom it was not the 
dominant matching attribute as well as for MoiUh-malchers. 
CLearly, moreover, the structure of the Mouth variants 
especially lent itself to Face-level treatment. And when 
Mouth level was shared in a face pair, the pictures could 
be judged to be the same "because they're both happy/sad 
faces". /either Shape for Eyes could be used to characteris 
identity or difference between entire faces in this succinct 
global fashion. Perhaps Mouth may have been especially 
subjectively (cognitively) salient in these stimuli because 
sameness and difference could be so simply encoded by
* This usage of the word "face" in connection with straight 
Mouth is quite distinct from its usage to refer to Shape — 
as in "round face" vs "straight face” for horizontal vs 
vertical ellipse — which is acceptable "adult talk".
Whhther applied to Shape or to Mouth, references of the 
"straight face" kind were coded as Feature-, not Face-, 
level, since they adhered to physical properties.
- 196 -
reference to it? Let us then proceed to exam.ne what
happened when physical structure, and hence objective
visual salience, was equated across attributes.
2 • Experiments 4. 5 and 6 (pair-comparison with stimuli
conventional, inverted, or familiar)
For the stimuli used in this section of the study, 
see Figure 3 of Appendix 1, and pp. 116 -119 . To recap:
The pair-comparison method was employed throughout; stimuli 
were presented in conventional orientation in Experiments 4 
and 6, but upside-down in Experiment 5. In Experiment 6, 
pair-comparison was preceded by a familiarisation period 
in which the subjects were required to describe each 
stimulus figure verbally; these descriptions will also be 
discussed here. The presentation of stimulus pairs under 
the two alignment conditions, Left-Right and-Up-Down, will 
be ignored since they were associated with no obvious 
differences in justifications.
The three stimulus attributes w^^e now Mouth, Eyes,
Nose (M, E, N), with the outer head-shape a constant 
circle. Each attribute had three levels: one a straight 
line (neutral variant) and two, mirror-image, curved 
variants. The three critical stimulus pairs were 12 
(differing in just orientation of M curve), 34 (differing in just E curve) 
and 56 (differing in just N curve). All other pairs either
differed by two attributes or were identical.
The patterns of correct "not the same" judgments were
roughly parallel across the three experiments, with Mouth
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receiving by far the greatest number of correct discrdomi­
nations — more than half as many again as Eyes or /ose 
(see Table 27, p. 158 , and Figure 5, p. 160) for further 
de-tail) • The main question here is then whether there is 
some corresponding pattern in the justificatory responses 
that might bear on the main task findings that the two 
curved- Mouth variants tended to be successfully discriminated 
while the two similarly-constructed curved variants of 
Eyes and /ose were often confused.
Section 2 of Appendix 3 illustrates the kinds of 
justificatory responses given. For each experiment, 
justifications associated with the critical pairs 12, 34 
and 56 are listed in that order (along with the corresponding 
identical pairs 11, 22 ... 66); justificatior£ for pairs 
differing by two attributes follow, and lastly any "unclassi- 
f-iable" responses. For Experiment 4, all of the justifi­
cations that occurred are listed (p. xii), since there 
so few in total. Only a sample is given for Experiments 
5 and 6, representative of the range offered (pp. xiii - xiv 
and xv) . Finally, samples of the descr iptions of individual 
stimuli elicited during the preliminary familiarisation 
period of Experiment 6 are added (pp. xvi - xvii).
Response. rates
Response rates w^;re generally low since justif ications 
were not specifically requested. Of the 40 subjects in 
Experiment 4, only 15 offered some justificatory response.
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on a total of 27 trials. The inverted stimulus presentation 
of Experiment 5 provoked more comment: 14 of the 2 7 
subjects responded, on a total of 48 trials. The children 
given the "pretraining" on verbal description in Experiment 
6 were the most inclined to respond during pair-comparison, 
producing a justification on a total of 40 trials, with 
only one of the 14 subjects making no response.
Order of reference
Responses containing reference to more than one attri­
bute w^]re scarce. In Experiment 4, there was only one mul­
tiple response, mentioning Mouth and Nose (see Appendix 3.2, 
Example 22). Experiment 5 produced eight muutiple responses, 
six referring to Mouth first (Mose second). Experiment 6 
included seven muutiple responses, three with Mouth first and 
four with Eyes first. These are so few as to be generally 
uninformative, although in the 16 muutiple responses gener­
ated in all, it is perhaps worth noting that Nose was first- 
mentioned only once (Experiment 5).
In the familiarisation period of Experiment 6, however, 
all children were required to comment on all three attri­
butes for each stimulus. Overall, the distribution of 
these muutiple descriptions among the six possible orders
of reference was:
Mouth. first, 38 times (2A M>E>N, 14> M>N>E)
Eyes f irst, 33 times (13 E> M>N, 20 E>N>M)
Nose first, 13 times (5 N>M>E, 8 N>E>M).
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The favoured order of reference tended to be related to
the particular face being described. When Mouth was curved 
(faces 1 and 2), Mouth came first in 24 of the 28 descriptions. 
When Eyes were curved (faces 3, 4), Eyes tended to be
first mentioned (18 times) — otherwise Mouth was first.
Faces 5 and 6, with /ose curved, produced more variation 
of order: /ose came first 12 times. Eyes first 11 times 
and Mouth first 5 times. Ganer^ErUy, then, /ose did not 
receive first mention except sometimes when /ose was the 
only curved feature present.
In the earlier discussion of the children's pair- 
lom^^l^i•soc performance, the possibility was considered that 
visual scanning patterns might contribute to the distri­
bution of correct matches among the attributes (see the 
discussion of those results in relation to Ghent Braine's 
work: pp. 133 - 135 and 145 -146 ) . The question was whether 
the subjects were treating Mouth as a "focal feature" 
and were beginning inspection of the stimulus figures at 
Mouth, or whether they were following a top-down order of 
inspection.
When the stimuli were inverted (E^^^^iment 5), both 
scanning strategies would have led the children to inspect 
the stimulus attributes in the order M>/>E (top-middle- 
bottom)• The data on order of mention of the attributes 
in muutiple justificatory responses, however, do not 
particularly correspond with such a pattern. Although
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in Experiment 5 only seven multiple responses were produced 
altogether, four of these placed the bottommost and 
presumedly non-focal attribute, Eyes, first.
With the stimuli in conventional orientation, atten­
tion to the focal feature first would have led to the
scanning order M>N>E (bottom-up) or M>E>N (bottom focal 
feature first, then reverting to top-down); while a 
straightforward top-down pattern would have produced the 
order E>N>M. The descript ions given during the familiar­
isation period of Experiment 6 favoured the orders M)E>N 
and E>N>M about equally, with M>N>E and E>M>N ne^t.
The order in which the attributes were referred to thus
provides no clear evidence in support of either visual 
scanning strategy. If order of reference can be taken as 
reflecting order of visual inspection, it seems rather as 
though with this stimulus set the children were attracted 
first to whichever of the attributes appeared in "unusual" — 
i.e., curved — form.
Frequency of reference to each attribute
Table 36 shows how the references were distributed
among the three attributes. Eyes consistently received
the fewest references. Mouth and Nose were referred to
equally often in Experiments 5 and 6, but Mouth was the 
most commonly noted in Experiment 4. Interestingly, these 
frequency data do not exactly parallel the corresponding 
patterns of correct matches observed in the main tasks (see
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TABLE 36
Distribution of references among the attributes 
tages of total references for each experiment)
(percen-
Mouth Eyes: ^ose Total refs, *
Experiment 4 50 19 11 26
Experiment 5 333 20 -42 50
Experiment 6 37 26 3 7 46
* Excludes "'undassifiable" responses
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Table 27, p. 158), in that Nose featured considerably
prominently in the justifications than would have been anti­
cipated on the basis of its rather poor pair-comparison
results.
There is, however, a close parallel between mention of 
an attribute and its appearance in curved rather than neutral 
form: the child usually indicated any curved feature 
present, but seldom indicated the other, straight features. 
The strength of this pattern of noting just curved features 
is highlighted in Table 37. For clarity, only the figures 
for identical and single-attribute-different pairs are 
shown, but the same pattern was evident also for pairs 
differing by two attributes. Nor was it simply that the 
children were remarking on the one attribute whose variants 
marked the difference in a face pair, for this pattern of
noting only the single curved attribute still obtained with 
identical pairs. In fact, occasions on which only a neutral 
feature was referenced w^;re generally associated with wrong
pair-comparison judgments — see, for example,
Appendix 3.2, nos. 17, 31, 35.
Types of reference
The references to each attribute w^^e classified by 
type foioowing the system outlined on pp. 181 ff. For
this second group of experiments, however, an extra cate­
gory was felt to be necessary. A considerable number of 
responses now consisted of the child's remarking that a 
line (or an attribute, or a bit, etc.) was "going that
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TABLE 37
Distribution of references among the attributes in 
relation to the structure of the stimuli (raw frequencies)
Note:
Circled cells are one would expect the references to
occur if justifications have to do with remarking 
on curved rather than straight forms of attributes
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way" on one face and "going that way" (i.e., a different 
way) on the other face of a pair, as the child pointed to 
the specific aspect of difference to show exactly what 
he meant. While this did not capture the distinction between 
variants in language in the way that the usual Feature-level 
or Face-level responses did (i.e., by overtly saying 
"curved" vs "straight", "up" vs "down", "happy" vs "sad", 
etc.), the child was nonetheless clearly differentiating 
the levels. The undifferentiated Point/Name category seemed 
inadequate for such instances, and a new differentiated 
Point-level category was therefore added. In "hierarchical" 
order (see pp. 184 - 185) , the categories were now:
Face-level: Child linguistically differentiates levels but 
goes beyond purely physical characteristics of the 
attribute to characterise the whole face by state or 
action. Examples: "happy" vs "sad", "sleeping" vs "awake", 
"looking up" vs "looking down".
Feature-level: Child linguistically differentiates levels
in terms of objective physical structure of attribute. 
Examples: "curve", "straight", "going up", "curling 
down", "going along the way", "bent", etc. Also figur­
ative descriptions such as "like a moon", "like a 
(ba)nana" (= crescent-shaped), "like a 'one'" (= straight 
line, as in a written number "1").
Point-lev el: Child differentiates levels but not fully in 
language. He points to the appropriate variants and 
says that one is "going one way" and the other is "going
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the other way", or one is "like that" and the other is 
'■'not like that", etc., while tracing the respective 
outlines with his finger.
Point/Name: Child does not explicitly capture the distinc­
tion between levels in language. He simply points to
or names an attribute to indicate that it is the same
or not the same. Verbal examples: "Mouths the sa^me";
"the nose goes a different way".
Other: Unclassifiable responses. Appendix 3.2 gives
several examples,
In all other respects, the coding proceeded as des­
cribed for the first two experiments. Notice, however, 
that now there are three levels of each attribute to be
differentiated. It was relatively easy for the children to 
distinguish a curved from a neutral variant in words like 
"curly" vs "straight". But to distinguish the two curved 
variants or a single attribute from each other sometimes 
proved more difficult, for this involved both noting the 
curve and finding some way of specifying its direction.
This is presumably why the new Point-level kind of reference 
came into play. When a child gave an ambiguous reference, 
such as that both Noses on pair 56 w^^e "bent", the Experi­
menter pressed for clarification. If the child then seemed 
to be aware of the distinction and to be trying but failing 
to describe it verbally, the Experimenter offered termino­
logy or suggested that he point his finger or face in the 
direction indicated by the curve. In cases where the dis­
tinction remained unclarified, the reference was classed
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as undifferentiated Point/Name despite the occurrence of 
a physical-descriptor term like "curve", since the critical
difference of levels had not been specified.
Table 38 shows how the references were distributed
by type for each attribute during the three pair-comparison 
tasks. Raw frequencies are presented, since numbers w^^e 
so small. The corresponding figures for the descriptions 
given during the prior familiarisation period of Experiment 6
have been added.
Taking just the pair-comparison justifications, it is 
obvious that once again Mouth was the only attribute with 
which Face-level descriptions were associated; otherwise, 
Mouth was simply pointed to or named. Eyes references 
fell mostly in the Point/Name class with some Feature-level 
description, while /ose references w^;re a mix of Point/Name, 
Point-level and Feature-level.
The pattern of descriptions from the familiarisation 
part of Experiment 6 is quite strikingly different.
Point/Nime references were more or less precluded here, 
since .the Experimenter pressed for verbal description except
in one or two odd cases where the child either seemed
upset by the questioning or had already amply demonntrated 
his ability to describe the attribute's three variants 
distinctively. What is surprising is the large proportion 
of full Feature-level descriptions as opposed to the less 
explicit Point-level type, and the remarkably high propor­
tion of Face-level references accruing to Eyes. As can be
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Frequencies of references of various types for 
each attribute
TABLE 38
ATTRIBUTE 
REFERRED TO TYPE OF REFERENCE
POINT/
NAME
POINT-
LEVEL
FEATURE-
LEVEL
FACE-
LEVEL
' MOUTH 1 0 0 12Experiment
4 < EYES 3 1 1 0
(conventional) NOSE 4 4 0 0
' MOUTH 8 4 2 5Experiment
6 < EYES 7 0 3 0
(f amiliar) NOSE 8 6 7 0
' MOUTH 6 1 4 6Experiment \
5 ) EYES 6 2 4 0
(inverted) , NOSE 11 4 2 0
Experiment r MOUTH 3 2 47 32
descriptions
) EYES 3 3 37 41
during NOSE 5 18 61 0
familiarisation
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seen from the examples in Appendix 3.2, most of these
were of the type "He’s sleeping", "He's opened his eyes", 
"He’s looking up". The "sleeping" or "eyes shut" kinds 
occurred especially with reference to the straight-line 
Eyes variant.
The child often ran into difficulty over Eyes des­
cr iptions here, however. What commonly happened was that 
he began by associating the neutral variant with sleeping.
If on his first encounter with a curved variant he then
captured the contrast with neu-tral by saying wakened,
he had a problem when the second curved variant appeared 
and he had to find a third contrasting term! In such a 
situation, the child tended to "revise his strategy", using 
sleeping and wakened subsequently for the two curved variants 
and changing to straight for the neu-tral one, or switching 
to Feature-level description for all three variants. 'This 
could explain why Eyes did not later attract Face-level 
descriptions during pair-comparison proper — the child 
had already found Face-level descriptions for Eyes led
to confusion.
Once again, there was some relationship between the 
type of reference given • and the physical structure of the 
stimulus it was connected with. For Mouth, most of the
Face-level references w^^e attached to faces 1 and 2 — 
the critical Mouth pair, having curved variants. Simi­
larly, almost all of the Point-level references to Nose 
occurred with faces 5 and 6. Nose on the other faces
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could be easily described as "straight" vs "curved" (etc.), 
whereas presumably the necessity of specifying direction
of curve with 5 and 6 led the children to resort to the
Point-level method. In keeping with what has already been 
said about the incidence of Face-level references to Eyes 
and the tendency here to switch later into Feature-level, 
there was no particular correspondence of type of refer­
ence to type of variant for Eyes. Where one might have 
expected faces 3 and 4 to account for most of the Face-level 
references, in practice no such relationship held.
Summary and discussion
In pair-comparison performance in this section of the 
study. Mouth was by far the most often correctly discrim­
inated of the three attributes. Yet Mouth did not appear 
especially prominently in the children's justifications 
for their judgments. The frequency with which each attri­
bute was referenced, and the order of reference among the 
attributes in multiple responses, seem instead to have been 
linked to the type of stimulus pair with which the refer­
ence was associated — that is, to whichever of the attri­
butes appeared in its curved form.
The descr iptions elicited during the f amd-iarisatj^on 
period of Experiment 6 demonntrate that the children were 
well able to perceive and discriminate the variants of all 
three attributes when the stimuli ;were viewed individually, 
and stand in marked contrast with their subsequent pair- 
comparison performance and justifications.
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There were no outright erroneous descriptions of 
the features of the second set of stimuli. Where there were 
failures here, they were either of ambiguity or of omission 
— e.g., saying "the nose .is curly" for both faces 5 and 6 
without specifying the opposite directions of curve, or 
justifying a wrong "same" decision iy indicating an
identical attribute iut not mentioning the attribute(s) 
that differed. But such "inadequate" descriptions of the 
stimuli w^^e comparrtively infrequent, and there is little 
evidence from the justificatory responses of a failure 
to detect Nose or Eyes differences that would correspond 
with the proportion of confusion errors made on these two 
attributes relative to Mouth in the pair-comparison judgments.
The finding that in Experiments 5 and 6 references to 
Nose were at least as frequent as references to the more 
dominant attribute Mouth is striking in this regard, and 
suggests that the children were aware of the Nose although 
they often called faces actually differing in Nose the same. 
Moreover, references to Nose occurred despite the fact that 
this attribute posed a lexical problem paralleling that of 
Shape in the previous experiments, in that it was difficult 
for young subjects not yet able to apply the terms "right" 
and "left" to capture verbally the distinction between its 
two curved variants. In the case of Nose, however, the 
children w^^e able to overcome the problem by resorting
to the Point-level kind of reference.
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Understanding of the word "same" in the context of the
test-question
There is some suggestion in the justificatory responses 
that the curved Nose forms appeared "odd" to several of
the subjects. The large majority of the unclassif iable 
responses that occurred were associated specifically with 
Nose — see Appendix 3.2, ExampJLes 26 and 49-55. (This
was also remarked on earlier: p.125 footnote, and pp. 138 - 139-)
It is clear from the appended examples that a straight 
Nose was judged to be the same and a curved Nose to be
not the same — but (not) the same as what? The child
seemed to be comparing each test face separately against 
the stimulus set as a whole, i.e., to be answering the 
question "Are they the same as the others?" instead of 
"Are they the same as each other?". And in that comparison, 
evidently, faces containing a curved Nose were seen as 
"out of place". Similar responses emerged in the earlier 
pair-comparison task of Experiment 3 with the first stmmulus 
set (see Appendix 3.1, Examples 42, 44, 46), although 
there they were not tied to any one of the attributes 
in particular.
Children who made these kinds of responses appeared 
to be assessing class mernmership and hence taking the 
test-question to refer to "same kind of entity" (as the 
others) rather than to "perfect identity of features"
(between a pair). This reflects a syntacticppragmatic 
misunderstanding of the question posed to them, i.e., of
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the task requirements. It is, however, quite distinct
from the kind of immature appreciation of the semantic
components of the word "same" itself that is suggested by 
the sernai-inic-feature theory type of explanation for children’s
confusion errors in sameness judgments { cf. pp. 5-7).
In fact, a fair proportion of the justificatory res­
ponses displayed a remarkably well-developed sense of the 
meaning of "same", incorporating such subtleties as the
notions that entities can be or less alike and that
similarity without perfect identity entails difference too. 
Expressions such as "they’re nearly the same (but) ... ",
"not quite the sa^e", "not at all the same", "the very 
same", and "they’re the same but they’re different" were 
by no m^^ns uncommon. (For illustration, see Appendix 3.1, 
p. v, Mouth-matcher on pairs 14 and 15 ; 3.1, Examp].es 2, 3,
5, 11-13, 15, 22, 23, 28, 32, 36, 39, 41; 3.2, Examp.tes 29,
37.) These point to a degree of linguistic and perceptual 
competence beyond that which one would have supposed from 
main-task performance alone, if one considered simply the 
relatively large proportions of confusion errors without 
the justificatory responses.
The children’s use of the word "but" in justifications 
on trials involving non-identical face pairs is interesting 
in this regard. Clauses beginning with "but" occurred 
in two main types of con-text. In one, the child made a 
successful discrimination, saying something like "They’re
not the same but (a particular indicated feature) is the
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same". This reflects adultlike performance. 1
In the other type, the child was scored as making a *
confusion error following his decision "They're the 1
same ... "; however, he then added something like X
" ... but (a particular ffature) is not hhe srnie’ ' — or, |
equally, "(A pararcular ffatureI is not hhe srnie but (
they're the same faces". Adult subjects never gave this
sort of response; if the stimuli differed in any respect, i
the adult judgment was "They’re not the same because (a par-
J
ticular feature) is not the same". In such insaances,
the Experimenter often asked the child additinnal questinns
to the effects: given the presence of some difference, J
could the pictures still be exactly the same? Almost
I
invariably, the child remained content that they were the
same while openly acknowledging' that a specified part
differed — and despite the fact that: an e n^igmi. have
expected him to reverse hhi jj^dgg^enn on tth groundi■thet
the extra questioning implied the Experimenter thought
his first answer was wrong. (Appendix 3 confa^i many
examples of such responses. See especially 3.1, Example 29;
also 3.1, p. v, Mooth-matcher; 3.2, Examples 16, 18, 36,
etc. )
In the pair-comparison task of Experiment 3, with the 
first stimulus set, a total of 78 of the confused trials 
received justificatory responses. In more than 60% of 
these, although judging the pictures to be the same, the 
child correctly noted that a particular, specified attribute
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differed.* This is a substantial proportion, and ,is
persuasive evidence against the contention that confusion
errors were due to failure to perceive an attribute or failure 
to detect the difference between its levels. Furthermore, 
the children's generally sophisticated use of the word "same" 
exhibited elsewhere in the justifications, together with
the non-r^^r^dc^m nature of the distribution of confusion errors
among the attributes, help to eliminate immature understanding 
of "same" (& la sem^nnic^-feat^ure theory) as a major contri­
butor to the confusion errors. The argument now seems more 
convincing that, at least with the first■ stimulus set of 
schematic faces, confusion errors arose because the children 
chose deliberately to ignore certain differences.
The evidence is less weighty with respect to the second 
set of stimuli, used in Experiments 4-6, but mainly because 
of the smaller numbers of justificatory responses produced 
altogether, not many of which fell on trials receiving a 
wrong "same" judgment. Nevertheless, in-more than half of 
these few instances, the child again explicitly noted some 
aspect of difference ■ along with his assertion that the pictures
were the same.
In Experiment 3, about three-quarters of these justifi­
cations were to the effect that Mouth was the same ' but Shape or 
Eyes was not. In Experiments 4 - 6r this kind of justification 
fell almost exclusively on pair 56, and was to the effect "They're
This phenomenon has also been recorded by other investigators, e.g.,
Oldron (1962), Ricciuti (1963, cited in Gibson, 1969), Taylor & Walls,
(1970), Vurppilot & Moal (1970), Kemler &'Smith (1979).
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the same but the noses are going different ways” (without 
explicitly mentioning the identical attributes). Thus it 
appears that Shape/Eyes in the first stimulus set, and Nose 
in the second, were deliberately being treated as irrelevant 
for the task in hand, and that Mouth was actively selected 
as a major criterion of sarneness/c^i^ifference, on at least a 
considerable proportion of the trials.
Perhaps there is some connection here with the incidence 
of Face-level references in the justifications? For, recall,
Face-level references were associated almost exclusively with 
Mouth throughout all of the main tasks. These sorts of des­
criptions involved characterisation of a stimulus figure 
by reference to just the one of its attributes; that is, the 
entire figure was globally identified (as, say, a "happy face” 
or a "sad face") in a manner that depended solely on the form 
of the Mouth. Assuming the justificatory responses reflected 
something of the way the subjects perceived the stimuli 
and of their underlying decision processes, then what the 
children were doing here could be taken as amounting to 
classification of the entire stimulus set on the basis of
a single attribute. Thus the first set could be partitioned 
in two, according to whether the Mouth was curved or straight, 
while the second set divided into three, faces with Mouth curved 
up (happy), curved down (sad) or neutral (straight). Such a 
notion is appealing because it provides a convenient, econo­
mical way of labelling stimuli — of both linguistic and per­
ceptual-cognitive encoding — that would aid the child’s 
dscision-making by reducing information load.
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If the children were indeed engaging in such stimulus 
grouping, the implication is that — like the subjects noted 
earlier (pp. 211 -212 ) who seemed to treat the curved Nose as 
not the same in relation to the rest of the stimulus set — 
they understood the term "same" in the sense not of "identical 
in all respects" but of "belonging to the same class of entity". 
Wile such an interpretation would be quite legitimate in 
many circumstances and is common enough adult usage, in the 
present stimulus and task context it is considered inappro­
priate, since adult subjects always operated on the basis of 
number of identical features, not on a classification principle.
Classification, discrimination and sameness judgment are, 
of course, closely-related activities. Obbiously, classification 
behaviour is at least partly dependent on perceived similarities 
and dissimilarities among the items being categorised. But 
the reverse can also be true: a subject's samennss/difference 
judgments may be influenced by the way he sorts the stimuli 
into categories (see, e.g., Garner, 1966; Gregson, 1975;
pp. 221-223).
This latter effect has been neatly demonntrated by 
Tversky (1977). He notes that, in order to optimise information 
capacity and processing, stimulus classification must
involve mEacimising both the similarity of members within
groups and the dissimilarity between groups. The posited
relation between similarity and grouping he calls the "diagnos­
tic ity -hypothesis". "Diaggnsticity" refers to the importance
that a given stimulus feature has for classification purposes
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and it varies according to the structure of the stimulus set 
within which the feature appears. Tversky obtained support 
for his diagnosticity hypothesis through experiments using 
stimulus sets composed either of so-called "visual features" 
(schematic faces) or of "semantic" material (na^^s of countries). 
Adult subjects were given either a matching-from-sample type 
task or were instructed to sort the stimuli. The resulting 
match-choices and groupings, although independently obtained, 
both followed the same patterns and changed in tandem with
minor alterations to the stimulus con-text.
Tversky's stimulus sets contained no totally identical 
pairs, so that subjects given the matching task were obliged 
to respond in the "similar in some respect(s)" manner.
What is important is his finding that, under those circum­
stances, the subjects’ choice in the similarity judgment 
was not founded on sheer physical identity. Their criterion 
of similarity was at least partly subjectively determined, 
and it paralleled the criterion selected (by other subjects) 
as the basis of classification — even when the subjects were 
adults. This lends weight to the argument that the children 
in the present study who produced a dominatttattribute 
matching pattern with confusion errors on non-dominant attri­
butes may have been partly operating by what amounted to a 
classification strategy.
The final part of this study moves on to test an 
hypothesis about the basis on which the children may have 
been class if ying/uudging sameness among- the schematic faces.
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First, however, a supplementary experiment was conducted
on the detection-versus-selection of attributes issue.
EXPERIMENT 7
Maaching Game
In none of the pair-comparison tasks so far presented 
was the precise sense in which the subjects were expected to 
take the word same made overtly clear. That is, there was 
nothing explicit in the task format or the Experimenter’s 
questions to tell the child that he should judge in terms 
of sameness of all features rather than of similarity in some 
way or same kind of thing. (The fact that adults always 
took the first interpretation is irrelevant to this point.) The 
child had no way of knowing when his answer was wrong, by the 
adult’s expectations, since no specific feedback was pro­
vided about the (incorrectness of responses. Instead, he 
received general verbal encouragment at random intervals — 
which, in the case of an incorrect matcher, may have had the 
effect of encouraging him to keep on making the same kind
of confusion errors!
The familiarisation period of Exp^^iment 6 was designed 
to induce subjects to attend to all of the stimulus attributes 
and to ensure discriminability of variants. The attempt was 
successful to the extents that the children’s preliminary 
descriptions of individual faces did distinguish all stimulus 
features with fair precision and subsequent pair-comparison 
performance was generally superior to that observed in
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Experiment 4, when the faces had been unfamiliar to the
subjects. It failed in that even after practice the children 
typically had to be prodded into giving com^l^lte, unambiguous 
stimulus descriptions (clearly shown in the samples in Appen­
dix 3.2, pp. xvi - xvii, by the number of appearances of 
"(Q)", standing for "further questioning by the Experimenter"), 
and in that Eyes and Nose continued to be confused in pair- 
comparison significantly more often than Mouth.
Following that "failure", Experiment 7 was added as a 
supplement, out of curiosity as to whether young children 
could ever operate on the basis of compete identity of all 
the stimulus features, and could ever volunteer complete 
stimulus descriptions. The aim was to promote perfect matches 
and full descriptions, if they could indeed be achieved, 
by establishing for the child that partial description and 
partial similarity would not suffice — by providing him 
with explicit feedback that each response was correct, wrong, 
or inadequate according to-the adult's expectations.
The idea for the experimental task stemmed from the 
research of Glucksberg, Krauss and Weesberg (9966) and 
Glucksberg and Krauss (9967) on referential commmuication 
between children, and roughly followed their model. A game­
like situation was set up in which one child had to describe 
a stimulus figure to another child in such a way that the 
second child could select that same figure from an array with 
only his partner's description to go on.
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Materials
The first two sets of schematic faces (Appendix 1,
Figures 1 and 3 ) were each employed, with separate groups 
of subjects. The faces of the first set were mounted on 
square white cards as before, but with the surrounding 
square frame omitted. Preliminary training was given with 
an assortment from the stick-figures and geometric forms 
already used for practice trials in the previous experiments. 
Three copies of each stimulus set were required: the two 
subjects per game each had on view a complete array of the 
appropriate set, and the first child had an additional copy
of the set stacked in a deck.
Subjects
The first stimulus set was presented to a final sample 
(after drop-outs) of 29 pairs of children. Fourteen pairs 
were in a nursery unit in St. Andrews and came from a 
variety of home backgrounds, while the remaining 15 were in 
a community-centre playgroup in Oxford that pooled mainly 
from working-class families. Their ages ranged from 3;10 to 
5;2, with a mean of 4;7 years. Ten more pairs, all from 
the Oxford community-playgroup, were given the second stimulus 
set (after which the attempt with the second set was abandoned) 
Their ages were 4;2 to 5;3, mean 4;8 years.
Procedure
A table was set up in a corner of the nursery or 
playgroup room, with a chair at each of three sides. The
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children were invited in pairs to come and play a game
with pictures. The two children sat facing each other on 
opposite skdes of the table, with the Experimenter occupying 
the middle chair. A cardboard screen was erected across
the middle of the table so that neither child could see the
other but the Experimenter could see both.
The Experimenter laid on the table before each child 
an array of all the stimuli of the appropriate set. The 
eight faces of the first set w^^e arranged in a 3 x 3 square 
with a space in the centre bottom row. The six faces of 
the second set were displayed in two rows of three. Within 
a subject-pair, the locations of stimuli in the array were 
the same for both children and remained fixed throughout their 
game. The cards were re-ordered for the next subject-pair 
by shuffling. The two subjects were told that they each had 
the same group of pictures in front of them but that they
would not be able to see each other’s.
On each trial, the Experimenter shuffled the third deck 
of copies of the appropriate stimulus set and handed the deck 
face-down to the first child, having surreptitiously looked 
to see which card was on top of the stack since this would be
the test stmmulus on that trial. The instructions w^^e as
follows, with "Cl” and "C2" substituted for the respective 
names of the first and second child. (Each child heard his
partner's instructions as well as his own.)
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To Cl: Turn over the top card and have a good look at it.
Don•t show it to C2 — you must keep it hidden.
C2 is going to try to find which one of the pictures 
you are looking at. He's got to find the only one 
that is just the smme as your picture.- You have oo 
help C2 find the right card. TelS hmm as much as 
you can about your picture. Remember C2 can't see 
your picture, so you have to tell him everything 
about it so he can find the one that's just the same. 
(Experimenter pointed to the card in Cl's array 
that matched the eesS and he was holding.)
To C2: Cl is looknng at a pctture that's just the aame as
one of yours. He'll tell you about his picture, 
and you have to find which one of all of these 
(Experimenter indicated C2' s array generally) is 
just the same as Cl's. When you think you've found 
it, hold it up like this (E. demonntrated holding 
up card above the dividing screen) so Cl can see 
if it really is just the same as his. If you can't 
find the right one on your first go, then you can 
ask Cl some m^:re about what hss pct^ee looks liee.
To Cl: When CS holds up a pitture , ouu have oo eell hie if
it's the right one. Look carefully at his picture, 
and look carefully at yours, to see if they really 
are just the same as each other. Then tell him. right 
or wrong.
To both: Let's see if you can get them just the same as each 
other.
The Experimenter lemonitrated the entire sequence, then 
gave the children several practice trials with the training 
figures until they seemed comfortable with the procedure.
At least six practice trials were needed, largely because Ci- 
subjects persisted in trying to show C2 the card instead of 
describing it. Cl's earliest attempts at description were 
generally inadequate through omission of stimulus features, 
but improved as Cl learned that C2 could not find the correct 
match. C2's choices as match to the description, and Cl's 
decision as to whether or not the choice was indeed a correct 
match, were satisfactory from the start of the practice.
Following practice, the children received three or four trials
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with the test stimulus faces. Although the children were 
enthusiastic about the game, it was decided to limit the 
num^(er of test faces to only a portion of the full set 
because of the length of time taken for each trial and 
the large amount of practice required beforehand.
The matches that C2 chose to Cl' s descr iptions could 
be included in the data only when Cl had on that trial given 
a satisfactory description that uniquely distinguished the 
test stimulus from all the others in the set. The rest of 
the time, C2 served as unwitting "Expeeimenter’s accomplice" 
to induce Cl to amend his so far problematic description.
That is, when Cl gave a descr iption that was false, ambiguous 
or omitted a feature, the Expenmenter "helped" C2 to find a 
face that matched the description as far as it went but dif­
fered from the test stimulus in the unsatisfactorily-described 
attribute(s) . This mismatch was then held up for Cl to judge 
whether or not it was the same as his test card. If at this 
point Cl gave a wrong "same" judgment, the Experimenter indi­
cated that and where an error had occurred, and asked Cl to 
try again to describe the test face, A total of four attempts 
was permitted before the trial was abandoned, but only the 
first attempt was scored in the data. No Cl ever gave a 
wrong "not the same" judgment wien an identical match was 
offered. If C2 chose a mismatch to a satisfactory description, 
Cl showed him the test card, and C2 then tried to find a
match to the visual stimulus.
No hypotheses were tested, no predictions made; the
experiment sought simply to "see what happens
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Results
This game yielded data concerning three types of per­
formance: .
(1) C2 ' s choices as matches to Cl‘s descriptions (where the
latter were satisfactory); these were equivalent to matching- 
from-sample choices (cf. Experiment 1), except that the 
"standards" were described instead of presented for visual t
inspection.
(2) Cl's decisions as to whether or not C2's choices were
correct matches to the test stimuli; these amounted to (visual) 
pair-comparison judgments.
(3) Cl's verbal descriptions of the stimuli; these corres­
ponded to the justificatory responses and familiarisatoon-period J 
descr iptions from the previous experiments. 5
The first of these can be quickly dealt with. A total |
of 109 trials was presented to the subject-pairs who receiv^ed 
the first stimulus set. On 74 of these, the Cl~subject 
produced a satisfactory stimulus description. And in only 
three of those 74 instances did the C2-subject select a mis­
match. This was an astounding achievement — compare with the »
matching-from-s ample performance of Experiment 1 (Tables 7 and 
9, pp. 54 & 56), w^^^e the highest proportion of perfect matches |
attained by any subgroup of subjects was 56%, (scored by 
Group I with Framed stimuli) and the overall success rate was 
a mere 39%! •
With regard to the Ci-subjects' "pair-comparison" perfor­
mance, it has already been noted that no wrong "not the same
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judgments were given to actually identical pairs. With
the first stimulus set, C2~subjects presented a total of 
38 mismatches for Cis to compare with the test-stimulus
(109 trials in all, minus the 71 correct maaches-to-
satisfactory-description, considering f irst attempts only) . 
Eight of these were wrongly judged to be the same as test 
figures. This success rate of 79% is marginally better than 
the corresponding pair-comparison results of Experiment 3, 
which yielded 72% correct overall (Table 16, p. 85 ).
All three of the C2s' mismatches, and all eight of 
the Cis1 wrong "seme" judgments, involved differences of 
just one attribute, and never of Mouth. That is, the only 
conifusions that occurred of Shape or Eyes, and Mouth
was universally correct.
The case was rather different for the second stimulus 
set. Here, a total of 37 test trials was presented, 27 of 
them producing satisfactory descriptions. Only two-thirds 
of these 27 "standards" were correctly matched by the 
C2-subjects. Nineteen mismatches were thus returned to the 
CLs for pair-comparison. This t^me, some of the mismatches 
differed from the test figure by two attributes, and while 
Nose was almost always among the differing attributes, Eyes 
and Mouth were each confused on occasion. The Cis made correct 
"not the same" judgments on only 11 of these (58% . In this 
phase. Mouth was again universally correctly discriminated, 
and Nose most often confused.
On the surface, these results with the second stimulus
set appear rather poor, but there is no way of directly
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comparing them with earlier performance, e.g., in Experi­
ment 4. For one thing, matching-f rom-sample was never pre­
viously attempted with this set. For another, the earlier 
pair-comparison results not examined in terms of percen­
tage of correctly-judged pairs overall; the focus had been 
on successful discriminations of the three critical pairs 
separately, differing by Mouth, or Eyes, or Nose. In Experi­
ment 4, Mouth was discerned on three-quarters of its critical 
trials, Eyes on half, and Nose on only a quarter. In this 
light, performance in Experiment 7 is seen to be superior, 
since most of the problems here occurred with Eyes and Nose 
again, yet with better than 50% success even on Nose.
The Ci-subjects' descriptions of the test stimuli were 
examined in the same way as were the -ustificatory responses 
of the previous experiments. Samples are not necessary si^nce 
they followed the pattern of the familiarisation-period 
descriptions in Experiment 6 (see Appendix 3.2, pp. xvi - 
xvii), except in that the Experimenter did not intervene 
with questions and prompping. Although the Cis received
feedback in the form of the C2's choices of match or mismatch 
and could then amend their descriptions, only the first attempt 
at each description counted here.
Order of reference to attributes. With the first stim­
ulus set, the orders of mention E>M>S and S>E>M w^jre 
equally popular, with M>E>S next. Thus there was no 
preference for any one attribute over another in first place. 
The second stimulus set elicited references mostly in the
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J
single order E> N>M (corresponding to top-down visual i
$
sequence). These patterns disagree with those found ea^!.ier J
in Experiments 2-6, where either Mouth tended to come j
first in the sequence, or else the order depended on the J
particular stimulus being described. •’j
Type and adequacy of reference to attributes. Refer- 'i
ences to each attribute were classified as Face-level, 5
Feature-level, Unclear, or Wrong. To be classed as Face- or
Feature-level, the reference had to be accurate. Wrong
references were false and misleading ones, e.g., calling
black Eyes "white". Unclear references were not erroneous \
descriptions but failed to differentiate an attribute's ■;
levels; they were usually ambiguous (e.g., calling a curved i
Nose "crooked" without specif ying direction of curve), or *
so idiosyncratic as to be largely meaningless, even though S
the child himself might have been successfully differentiating 
attribute-levels according to his own private system (e.g.,
calling Eyes "red." when there was no way the listener could 4
tell whether that meant black or white). Unclear references 
also covered total omission of an attribute, though this 
happened very rarely. Point/Nsme and Point-level references 
were of course precluded here, when the C2 could not see the
Cl's test stimulus. ■
Table 39 shows the proportions of the various types of 
reference for each attribute. Although percentages have been 
used for ease of com^^ri-son, it should be noted that with the
second stimulus set these were based on a total of only 37
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TABLE . . 39 (Experiment 7)
Percentages of references of each type for each attribute
ATTRIBUTE
REFERRED TO • :
TYPE OF REFERENCE
Total
no.
references
Face-
level
Feature-
Wronglevel Unclear
First 1 - MOUTH 61 27 7 6 109
stimulus < EYES 0 88 7 5 109
set v SHAPE 1 80 15 5 109
Second 1 * MOUTH 41 49 11 0 37
stimulus - EYES 14 73 11 3 37
set NOSE 0 73 28 0 37
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references, so that the "3%" entered in the Wrong column 
actually represents only one Wrong description in all.
Predictably, Mouth was as usual associated with a 
high proportion of Face-level references, especially with the 
first stimulus set. The percentage is lower for the second 
set because here the happy/sad dichotomy no longer sufficed, 
and the neutral variant now tended to attract Feature-level 
descriptions ("straight") while "happy" and "sad" were applied 
to the two curved variants. False descriptions were equally 
distributed among all the attributes in the first set and 
w^:re uniformly rare; in the second set, only the one false 
reference occurred altogether. The two attributes that have
been shown before to be the most difficult for the children
to describe verbally, Shape and Nose, were those that caught 
the largest share of Unclear responses, that is, ambiguous 
or idiosyncratic descriptions.
It was problems over Nose and Eyes that led to the 
abandonment of the game with the second stimulus set after 
only 10 subject-pairs had been tested. The Cis were struggling 
over their descriptions and became frustrated when they could 
not find the right words. Even when they did manage what 
seemed to the Experimenter to be a satisfactory description, 
it might turn out in practice to have been ambiguous, eli­
citing a mismatch from the C2. Thus it was one matter for 
the Cl to call both forms of curved Eyes "round" — this 
simply provided insufficient information and was a fault on
the Cl's part. It was another matter when Cl called the
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curved-up Eyes "rounded up the way", a seemingly fair des­
cription but one to which C2 responded with the curved-down 
variant, showing that for him at least the description was 
unclear. Similarly, "sleeping" might refer to the curved-up 
Eyes variant for one child but to the neutral form in his 
partner's system (recall the parallel difficulties the chil­
dren in Experiment 6 experienced within their own systems 
when they began with Face-level descriptions of Eyes and 
subsequently had to adjust their terminology or switch’to 
Feature-level reference). As each child persistently failed 
his partner, the trials took so long and the subjects became 
so exasperated that it was decided to discontinue this part 
of the experiment.
Adequacy of whole stimulus descriptions. The children's 
first attempts to describe each stimulus were examined in 
terms of whether they uniquely distinguished the test face 
from the rest of the set, or led to choice of a mismatch 
because false information was conveyed, or left the choice 
open because precise information was lacking. With the first 
stimulus set, 68% of the test faces w^:re described completely 
and accurately, 20% imprecisely in some way, and 12% falsely 
in some way. The figures for the second set w^jse 73% com­
plete and accurate, 24% imprecise, 3% (one test face) false. 
(These proportions based on the Experimenter's assessment
of the Cls' descriptions, not the C2s' reactions.) These 
percentages compare favourably with the success rates achieved 
in the matching-from-sample and pair-comparison decisions 
from the earlier experiments. Notice that failure was
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associated considerably m^;re often with inadequacy/ambiguity 
of description than with outright false description. In 
a number of the ambiguous cases, the Cl was actually clearly 
able himself to distinguish all three stimulus attributes 
but could not convey the distinctions in words. Cis frequently 
tried to use a (correct) Point-level reference, showing the 
stimulus to the Experimenter, but of course this did not 
help the C2.
Summary and conclusions
Experiment 7 added little new to the findings from the 
previous experiments in terms of the kinds of responses 
given. As before, Mouth proved the easiest attribute to 
describe clearly and accurately, and the form of Mouth was 
taken to characterise a state or action of the whole face.
Shape and Nose were the most difficult for the children
to describe verbally, ' and their precise form was sometimes 
left ambiguous. Recall, however, that in the familiarisation 
period of Experiment 6, the children rarely spontaneously 
produced a full stimulus description; one or features
^^re typically omitted and were mentioned only after consi­
derable prompting. In contrast, the present game situation 
generated comppete, accurate descriptions on the first 
attempt (i.e., before the child received feedback in the form 
of his partner's match-choice) in about 70% of cases. Thus 
while manner of referring to stimulus features was much as 
before, there was a general improvement in adequacy of 
description in terms of number of attributes mentioned and
accurate differentiation of variants.
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The children's choices of match-to-described-standard 
and the pair-comparison judgments as to whether the choice 
was really the same as the "standard" likewise showed improve­
ment over past performance. This was especially striking 
in the matches chosen to the test stimuli of the first 
set, which were perfectly correct in 96% of cases, as com­
pared with the general success rate of less than 50% in 
Experiment 1.
In answer to the questions that Experiment 7 set out to 
investigate, then, the reply is that this task design, with 
its pro-vis ion of specific feedback on (in)correctness of 
responses, did yield higher levels of performance than did 
the previous experiments where the children had not been 
penalised for responses based on partial identification of 
stimulus features. Yet performance still fell short of 
adult standards: unsatisfactory descriptions and incorrect 
matches and sameness judgments still occurred, even if less 
frequently than before.
It must be added, however, that the task and stimuli 
employed here were perhaps not optimal for assessing whether 
or not young children can ever attain perfect sameness 
performance.* Glucksberg and his colleagues, whose
On an informal note, the "picture-lotto" games (resembling "bingo" but 
with pictures instead of numbers) commonly found in preschool centres 
provide a similar game, but with all stimuli visually presented and no 
verbal description needed. The task involves both matching-from-sample 
and pair-comparison type responses. Preschool children are quite cap­
able of perfect performance in these games, successfully selecting 
matches and rejecting mismatches even when the differences are rather 
subtle. Many other "educational" toys and games that preschool children 
can handle competently also involve, in one way or another, the concept 
of sameness = perfect identity.
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experimental paradigm the present game followed, found that their
youngest subjects faired rather badly when performing such a task with 
novel stimuli (outlines of irregular shapes) for which they had no 
existing verbal labels. Like the present subjects, their "kinder­
garteners and first-graders ’point’ — that is, said things like ’it 
goes like this while tracing the design with a finger" (Glucksberg & 
Krauss, 1967, p. 314), a means of communication unhelpful to a hidden 
partner. Their young subjects’ stimulus descriptions tended to consist 
of a brief and idiosyncratic name that could not properly be called 
"descriptive" at all.. Whereas adult subjects could find terms that both 
parties shared, the children adhered to their private, figurative refer­
ences, unshared by the partner, and did not alter their idiosyncratic 
terminology even in the face of feedback that the partner could not find 
a match on the basis of such a "description" (Glucksberg et al,. 1966; 
pp. 338, 341; Glucksberg & Krauss, 1967, p. 312; see also Flaveil, 1975).
The present results agree on the incidence of Point-level and 
idiosyncratic references. In the present case, however, Unclear refer­
ences that the C2-partner was not privy to were associated not with an 
entire stimulus figure but with a single attribute. Shape or Nose — the 
other attributes were satisfactorily described almost 90% of the time.
Since Shape and Nose were obviously genuinely difficult for the young 
subjects to describe verbally, less-than-perfect performance here 
probably had little to do with inability to discriminate variants per­
ceptually and to take all features into account in sameness decisions.
Thus face 5 of the second set (straight Eyes and Mouth, curve-right Nose) 
was satisfactorily described only half the time; but perfect performance, 
100% satisfactory in descriptions, match-choices and pair-comparison 
judgments, was attained with face 1 — which was the easiest of the set to
distinguish, in terms like "happy with straight eyes and a straight nose".
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It is possible, then, that under suitable task and stimulus circumstances, 
young children could attend to all features in their stimulus descriptions
and decisions about sameness.
Finally, it should be noted that the kind of stimulus description 
given by the C1-subject in this Glucksberg et al, type of task can vary 
depending on the child's socio-economic background, Part-Descriptive 
encodings — those describing physical properties of just part of the 
stimulus — have been found to be used more by middle than by lower class 
children, while Whole-Inferential encodings — those describing the whole 
stimulus figuratively — were more common among lower than among middle 
class children (e.g., Heider et al.. 19688; Johnston & Singleton, 1977; 
see Heider, Ref. Note 4 for the classification system). These findings are 
relevant to the present Experiment 7: half of the subjects given the first 
stimulus set here came from a largely working class population while the 
rest of the sample tended towards middle class; all subjects tested with 
the second stimulus set here were from the working class source. Since 
Feature-level references to attributes correspond to Part-Descriptive 
encodings and Face-level references follow the Whole-Inferential style, one 
might expect differences in type of reference, according to the source of 
the subject. Although this was not examined here, the possibility should 
be borne in mind. (However’, inspection of the results for subjects given 
the second stimulus set [working class] compared with those given the first 
set [mixed grou]0 suggests little difference between the two — see pp. 228-9.)
Part 5 returns the emphasis to the patterns of confusion errors 
among the attributes observed in the previous experiments, where the 
subjects appeared to be operating on the basis of partial similarity
whether or not they were actually capable of discriminating confused
features.
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PART 5
CRITERIA FOR SAMENESS AMONG SCHEMATIC FACES
In all of the pa1r-c<Mpar1son tasks conducted In this study, the 
majority of subjects were MouUb-rnaachers (or matched Muth along with 
another attribute). Mouth also appeared prominently in the children’s 
justifications for their sameness decisions — even for subjects, like 
the Shape-matchers in Experiments 2 and 3, who did not show a Mouuh- 
dominant matching pattern — and references to Mouth were of a different 
type (Face-level) from references to other features. Throughout all of 
the preceding experirants, Eyes, in contrast, have consistently attracted 
a high proportion of confusion errors, whether the levels to be discrim­
inated involved variation of colour within a fixed outline (black versus 
blank-white circles) or of orientation of the outline itself (mirror- 
image curves, up versus dowi).
The present section examines one possible reason for the occurrence 
of these consistent patterns of Mouth dominance and Eyes confusions. Two 
of the main contenders as explanations have been eliminated already: the 
"objective saliency hypothesis” — that the children failed to detect 
certain variations because they were not visually salient by virtue of 
their objective, physical structure — was ruled out in Exppriments 4 to 
6 through the device of equating the structural proi^^r^^ies of all attri­
butes and their variants; and the "location-of-gaze hypothesis” — that 
the children were directing visual attention primary to the bottom of 
the stimulus (Mxjtih) — was disproved in Experiment 5 when the stimuli 
were presented upside-down so that Mouth appeared at the top. A third 
possibility, the ^^^^t^bo^^'tive weighting hypothesis", however, not only 
remained unconnested on the experimental evidence but actively received
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support from the children's justificatory responses, which demonstrated 
that subjects were frequently aware of the differences in non-dominant 
attributes' variants when they called unidentical stimuli the same.
This subjective ^^”ighting account posits that Moth was deliber­
ately selected as more important than the other attributes and that Eyes 
variations tended to be deliberately treated as irrelevant to the question 
of the sameness of these schematic faces. Then what was it about the 
stimuli or the attributes that led to the assignment of wre weight to 
Muth and less to Eyes? Is the mouth typically a criterial attribute, in 
the Gibsonian sense, for young children dealing with faces in general in 
such situations? Or was there rather so^^ith’ing peculiar to the structure 
of the particular stimulus sets so far employed here, such that the 
patterns of matches and confusions observed up till now might not -gener­
alise to other designs of schemaaic or realistic face stimuli?
The clue comes from the justificatory responses. We have already 
noted that Face-level encoding could provide a shorthand way of stimulus 
grouping to which the children might resort in order to facilitate 
informaaton-processing and decision -making. In the previous two sets of 
schematic faces, the form of the Mouth seemed especially to lend itself to 
Face-level description, much more so than the other attributes. It might 
therefore be that the pair-comparison judgments tended to be based pri­
mary on Mouth simply because its particular structure here provided a 
more ready means of labelling and classifying the stimuli than did the 
other attributes (some of wiose forms were extremely difficult for the 
children to label verbaaiy).
But there is more to the story than that. References of the Face-
level type were defined as those which went beyond the physical form of
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the feature itself, taking a single feature to the who!e
face as being in some state or action. From the many examples that have 
been supplied, it will by now have become obvious that Mouth was not. 
simply associated with a_ state or action, but with a particular kind. 
Almst universally in these sorts of responses, Mouth was taken to repre­
sent an affective facial gesture or mood: happy, sad, smiling, grumpy, 
etc. This imneeiaaely suggests the possibility that it might not have 
been Mouth per se that the children were attending to, but the affective 
significance of its form. In that case, Mouth could be regarded as a 
criterial attribute only in an incidental sense — because in the partic­
ular stimulus sets used so far. Mouth chanced to be the only one of the 
attributes to be constructed in such a way as to encourage the ascription 
of affect.
EXPERIMENT 8
Pair-comparison with affectively-significant stimuli
It was now taken for granted that the children who made systematic 
confusion errors in the present study were deliberately focussing on only 
certain aspects of the schemaaic faces. Experiment 8 was designed to 
test the possibility that what they were attending to was facial, expres­
sion. The hypothesis was that faces were being called the same if they 
could be taken as alike in affective expression, and were being called 
not the same if they expressed different affective By this
account, any affectively-significant feature(s) would appear to be 
treated as "^r^iterial" whhle those features not interpretable in affec­
tive terms would tend to be ignored. This would explain the patterns of 
correct Mouth judg^^i^^s and Eyes confusions consistently observed
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throughout the preceding pair-comparison tasks, for any affect expressed 
in the faces of the first and second stimulus sets was conveyed solely by 
Muth. Alternatively, those results could be interpreted from the mre 
traditional criterial-attribute standpoint: that Mouth has special sig­
nificance in its own right and that, given roughly equal ph/sical saliency 
and discrimlnabbiity across attributes, Eyes would always incur relatively 
rare con-fusion errors, regardless of any affective connntatlons. The 
affect hyppohesis, however, received additional support from the children's 
verbal descriptions of the stimuli and justifications for their decisions 
(examined in Part 4).
To test the proposal that, when possible, the children would take 
(dls)similarity of affect as their criterion rather than autornattcally 
giving Mouth the mot weight for its own sake, a new set of stimulus 
faces was required in which Mouth was not the only attribute whose dis­
tinctive levels were encodable in affective terms, but in which form and 
type of transformation were not so disparate across attributes that the 
"unequal physical saliency" objection could be raised again. The first 
cond^lon was easily mt: a person's face-shape or nose do not norma^aiy 
convey information about affect, but his eyes do. So the two critical 
attributes would be Mouth and E/es. But the second stricture was .harder 
to comply with. Whie the mouth expresses different emotions by wide 
mmscle movements that alter its whole outline, changes in the eyes are 
more subtle. For continuity with the previous experiraeins, it was desir­
able to retain the curve-up/curve-down Mouth forms .of the second stimulus 
set. The Eyes variants then also had to consist of single lines. The 
forms ultimately chosen played on the moobiity of the forehead imudes, 
caricaturing lowered and furrowed eyebrows.
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Materials
As much as possible was carried ovrr from ehr second stimulus sre 
(srr pp. 115ff for Its design). Thr original circle-template (Figure 3, 
p. 117) was rr-used to construct ehr fixed outer shape. Thr neutral
levels of thr attributes again consisted of 2-cm straight lines. Nose 
was now invariant, a vertical straight line placed centrally, identical 
to the former neutral Nose. All three Muth forms were exactly as
before — one curve-up and one curve-down transformation along with the 
straight neutral level. Howeevr, the Mouth was repositioned: whereas 
before it was located half-way along the radius from the centre of the 
Nose to thr circumference of the outer circle, now it was lowered to lie 
midway between the bottom of the Nose and the circle's circumference. 
(This was done simply because thr lower Mouth "looked better" in the face 
configuration produced with the new Eyes.)
As to Eyes, in place of curves the two critical transformations now 
consisted of pairs of diagonal straight lines, each 2 cm long and set at 
an angle of 450/135° from the (neutral) horizontal (see faces 3 and 4 in 
Figure 6, next page). in one Eyes pair (face 3) the two opppsitely- 
inclined diagonals were widest apart at their upper ends and sloped down 
and in towards the top of the Nose; in the other (face 4), the two 
diagonals inclined towards each other at their upper ends and sloped down 
and outwards. AH these diagonals projected equally above and below the 
location of thr neutral horizontal Eyes bar. Regardless of variant, the 
two Eyes in each face were always sited 1 cm apart at their nearest 
points. (This mant that in the neutral level, while retaining thr same 
straight-line form as in the second stimulus set, the two Eyes now lay 
slightly closer together on the horizontal plane than previously;
~ 2A0 -
Figure 6
Third stimulus set — used in Experiment 8.
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however, their vertical distance above the Nose was as before, i.e., 
half-way along the radius from the centre of the Nose to the circum­
ference of the outer circle.)
The complete stimulus set contained five faces, illustrated in 
reduced size in Figure 6 above and reproduced in their original scale as 
well in Appendix 1, Figures 5 and 6. They compplsed one critical fouth 
pair, faces 1 and 2, equivalent to pair 12 of the second set; and one 
critical Eyes pair, faces 3 and 4, intended as affective counterparts to 
the former, non-affective pair 34. Since Nose was now irrelevant, the 
third set contained no equivalent to the previous Nse^-^^i-ffering pair 56. 
In its place was a single stimulus, face 5, neutral in all respects. All 
stimuli were mounted on the same (unframed) square, white cards as the 
second set.
Differentiation of the M-critical pair was expected to be associ­
ated with such terms as hyypy!sm^ing and sad, as tefore. Ad^ts reacted 
to the E-critical pair with terms like angry/frowning/scowe ing for face 3 
and sad/anxious/worried for face 4. (AduUs universally agreed that they 
clearly conveyed something ewrtional and that the particular eMotion 
expressed clearly differed between the two faces.) Pilot children, asked 
to describe faces 3 and 4, were able fairly readily to distinguish them 
as, e.g., angry versus sad.
These Eyes forms were arived at partly by deliberate design, and partly by 
trial and error and the opinions of aduUs and children who were shown 
various versions. The aim was to keep Eyes as comppttble as possible with 
Mouth in terms of physical structure and objective discriminabiiity, wile 
allowing the Eyes variants each to be associated with distinct affective 
connotations that could be readily appreciated and verbaaiy labelled by 
young children.
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The neutral face 5 was added for interest, to see whether it would
be confused with or distinguished from the others in the set. This 
curiosity was aroused by the justificatory responses to the second 
stimulus set, in Whch the neutral touth was called either happy or sad, 
depending on what it was paired with. tost often, it was contrast that 
was captured: it was called sad in compprlson with the curved-up (happy) 
Mouth and happy against the curved-down (sad) one. On occasion, however, 
the term indicated sameness; for illustration of such confusion of 
Mouths as both happy or both sad, see Appendix 3.2, Exai^es 21 and 23 
(both produced by the same subject).
Stimulus presentation conditions
A total of 15 pairs can be generated from the five stimuli of the 
third set: five complete^y identical pairs, three differing in just 
Mouth (pairs 12, 15, 25), three differing in just Eyes (34, 35, 45) and 
four differing in both features (13, 14, 23, 24). The pair-comparison 
test session romprised all 15 possible trials.
Order of trials. Response sheets were drawn up listing the 15 
trials in a different, randomly-determined order for each subject, with 
the proviso that pair 12 (M-critical) appeared on the very first trial in 
half the lists, and pair 34 (E-"-;^'^^!) appeared first in the other half. 
(Following the initial critical trial, the second critical pair could 
appear on any one of the next 14 trials.) This order-of-trials condition 
was added to permit a check on whether the subjects developed any "set" 
to keep on attending more to one attribute than to the other as a function 
of whichever had been the distinguishing feature on the first trial. The 
reason for considering this possibility was that the random encouragement 
of responding could reinforce neglect of a particular attribute if the
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child was praised early on for confusing it. Wile casual inspection
of the data from tie previous experiments had revealed no such tendency,
it seemed worthwhile to investigate it systeratically.
Stimulus alignment. In the second stimulus set, the two opposite
curved forms of each attribute constituted mirror-image reversals of each 
other. Mirror images still obtain with the third set. Since faces 1 and 
2 have simply been carried over alnost intact from before, they again con­
tain an up-down reversal of Mouth. The two new pairs of Eyes, in faces 3 
and 4, are also up-down reversals of each other. To counter any mirror- 
image confusion effects, then, the Left-Right (L-R) and Up-Down (U-D) 
conditions of stimulus alignment were retained. Stimulus location within 
pairs — on the left or right/top or bottom — was randomised over trials 
and over subjects.
For practice, a selection was drawn from the practice stimuli used
in the previous experiments.
Subjects
Thhrty-two children were tested. Fifteen came from a community- 
centre playgroup in Oxford, six from a playgroup within the University of 
St. Andrews, and the remainder from another St. Andrews playgroup.
Between them, they covered a wide range of home circumstances.
These subjects were assigned to subgroups to receive different 
stimulus presentation conditions, as follows. HaK of the children 
viewed all pairs in L-R alignment, where the two stimuli were always dis­
played side by side. The other half received only U-D alignment, the two 
stimuli displayed one above the other. The ages of the 16 subjects in 
the L-R Group spanned from 3;2 to 5;2 years, with a mean of 4;1. The 16
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in the U-D Group were aged from 3;1 to 5;2, mean 4;1 years. Each group
was further subdivided: half to receive the M-ccrvical pair 12 on the 
first trial, and half the ^^c^rl’tical pair 34 first. Age, sex and source 
of subjects were counterbalanced as far as possible across the various
subgroups.
Procedure
In the university playgroup, stimuli were laid out on the floor in 
a quiet area of the room, and the child and Experimenter kneeled side by
side on the floor to view them. In the other two centres, stimuli were 
displayed on a table set up in a corner 0T toe room, with child and 
Experimenter seated side by side on chairs. Subjsubs were inwired nne ad 
a time to look at some pictures.
The usual pair-comparison method was followed. On each trial, the 
approprrate pair was turned over and placed in front of the subject, who 
was asked, "Are these two (pictures) the same or not the same?". Verbal 
encouragement was given, but no feedback as to (incorrectness of judg­
ments. Every child was asked to justify h1s answer ("How are they (not) 
the same?") to both critical pairs, 12 and 34, and to at least one of the 
five identical pairs. A reason was requested on an arbitrary selection 
(differing across children) of the other unidentiral pairs. Altogether, 
each child was asked for a reason on about a third to a haaf of his 
trials, although children who were reluctant to answer were not pressur­
ised into doing so. Additiona^,y, a number of children ipsntanesus1y 
offered justifications when nnon had been requestue. Prelimipaey prna- 
tice was provided using the "nosnCace" stimHi uutii hhe Experimenter 
was satisfied that the child understood the task and could discern all 
the relevant aspects of the practice figures. Four or five practice
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trials normaHy sufficed. The entire session took about 10 to 15
minutes per subject.
Prediction
Experiment 8 set out to explore the Hkelhhood that error-making 
children might be assigning weights among the various face attributes on 
the basis of their affective significance, and taking (dissimilarity of 
expressed affect as the criterion in their pair-comparison judgment.
This explanation for the previously-observed patterns of correct Mouth 
judg^^nnts and Eyes con'Fusions was preferred to the criterial-attribute 
view that Mouth is universally treated as the more important feature in 
this kind of context.
To test this theoretical position, stimuli were provided in which 
variations in affective expression were carried by Mouth in some cases 
and by Eyes in others. According to the affect hypoohhsis, this should 
now enable fyes variants to be discriminated as weel as Moiith. The main 
prediction was therefore that the E-critical pair 34 would receive as 
many correct "not the same" judgments as the M--ritical pair 12. The 
alternative hypothesis was that the E-critical pair would continue to 
receive fewer correct judgments than the M-mtlcal pair. The latter 
outcome would be in line with the view that Mouth is rr1tsrial in itself, 
or might result if the attempt to capture affect in the structure of the 
Eyes were unsuuccesful.
Of subsidiary interest were how the children would react to the 
neutral face 5, and how they would handle pairs differing by two features 
(i.e., where two sorts of affective messages were being conveyed), though 
no precise expectations ware formulttsd on these questions.
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RESULTS
OrHy twice in the entire experiment were actually-identical stimuli 
called not the same. Tabbe 40 summanisei the data for unidentical
stimuli, showing the number of correct "not the same" judgments given to 
each of the 10 pairs, both overall and under the various subconditioni 
separately.
Stiuui differing by two attributes were called the same 14 times 
out of a total of 128 oppootuunties for confusion here. Whi'ie this repre­
sents a fairly low dou^e-confusion rate (10.9%, it is slightly higher 
than those observed with the second stimuuus set ((5.8% in Experiment 4 
with unfamiiiar stimuui, and 2.4% — oMy one error — in Experiment 6 
following famiiiarisntion with the stimu^*). This point will be returned 
to when the children's justifications for their decisions are considered.
But the third stimulus set was by no means associated in general 
with inferior pair-comparison performance. On the contrary, 14 out of 
the 32 subj’ects in Experi^nt 8 (44%) gave a correct judgment on every 
trial. Coimare this with the 15% entirely correct in Experiment 4.
Even among children familiar with the stimuli (Experiment 6), only 
43% produced entirely correct sessions. Nooice, further, that the 
average age of the Experiment 8 subjects, i.e., just turned four years 
old, was about six months younger than in the previous experiments. A 
younger samp^ was taken hhee since pilot; tests showed that rising"^ve- 
yeat-olds produced "too many" all-correct sessions — it was errors that 
were the primary interest. The success of even three-year-olds in dis­
tinguishing both Eyes and Mouth with the third stimulus set was remark­
able. Correctness was not related to age or subgroup of subjects.
(Experiment 8J
Number of correct "not the same"judgments for the ten non-identical pairs, by stimulus 
alignment and order-of-trials conditions.
TABLE 40
SUBJECT GROUPS:
Stimulus alignment/distinguishing 
feature on first trial
STIMULUS PAIR AND DISTINGUISHING FEAIURE(S)
total
correct
actual
/ total |
correct \
^possible 1
critical non-critical pairs: 
l-attrihute differing
non-critical pairs: 
2-attrihutes differing
M & EM
12
pairs
E
34
M E
15 25 35 45 13 14 23 24
f M first ( n = 8) 8 7 6 6 8 7 8 8 8 7 73 (80)
L_R V E first (n = 8) 6 6 7 5 7 7 7 8 8 7 68 (80)
f M first ( n = 8) 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 5 67 (80)
U D \_E first ( n — 8) 6 6 5 5 6 6 7 7 7 7 62 (80)
All L-R Group. ( n = 16) 14 13 13 11 15 14 15 16 16 14 141 (160)
All U-D Group (n = 16) 13 13 12 12 13 13 14 14 13 12 129 (160)
All M-first Group
(n = 16) 15 14 13 13 15 14 15 15 14 12 140 (160)
All E-first Group
(n=16) 12 12 12 10 13 13 14 15 15 14 130 (160)
All subjects (N = 32) 27 26 25 23 28 27 29 30 29 26 2 70 (320)
% correct overall 84% 81% 78% 72% 88% 84% 91% 94% 91% 81% 84%
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The principal question in Experiment 8 concerned the proportions of 
discriminations of Eyes relative to Mouth on trials when only one of the 
attributes differed, the two critical stimulus pairs being 12 (M-distinct) 
and 34 (E-dist1nct). Was Mouth still dominant 1n correct judgments here? 
Of the 32 subjects, 24 succeeded in distinguishing both critical pairs, 
and three confused both. A further two children confused Mouth but not 
Eyes while three confused Eyes but not Mouth. Clearly, the Eyes and Mouth 
scores — 27 correct on pair 12 and 26 on pair 34 — do not differ sig­
nificantly. The only subcondition to produce any difference between 
Mouth and Eyes scores was the L-R-alIgnment + pair-12-first permutation, 
where all eight subjects were correct on Mouth but one made an error on 
Eyes. The null hypothesis therefore stands unrejected: the critical 
Mouth-distinct pair and the critical Eyes-distinct pair were not associ­
ated with different proportions of correct judgments.
Responses on the non-critical trials involving a single-attribute
difference (pairs 15, 25 for Mouth and pairs 35, 45 for Eyes) were 
★
examined by the Binomial test (one-tailed, since the alternative hypoth­
esis was directional, predicting fewer E- than M-discriminations). For 
all subjects combined, p = 0.113 (N = 11, x - 3); p-values associated 
with responses within the separate subconditions all exceeded that level.
A further test was conducted between just pairs 25 (M-distinct) and 35 
(E-distinct), the location of the greatest discrepancy between Eyes and 
Mouth scores: for all subjects, p = 0.090 (N = 8, x = 2). Although it
*
Cf. the method of the McNemar test for the significance of changes; see 
Siegel (1956). A subject was classed as “changing from + to -" if he 
judged more of the M-pairs than of the E-pairs correctly, i.e., if he 
scored 2 (or, 1) correct on Mouth and 1 (or, zero) correct on Eyes. Con­
versely, he was classed as changing from - to + 1f he was correct on 
fewer of the M-pairs than of the E-pairs.
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was not statistically significant, notice that the tendency lies in the 
opposite direction to that expected on the alternative hypothesis: these 
Eyessdistinct pairs were distinguished slightly more often than were the 
corresponding MoUt-ddsi^-inct pairs (86% as opposed to 74% correct, over­
all). This was surprising after the results of the previous experiments, 
especially since all of these pairs had in common the inclusion of the 
neutral face 5, whose straight-line features one would have expected to 
be about equally physically discriminable both from the curved Mouth 
variants and from the diagonal Eyes variants. Either this assumption of 
equal objective discriminaaiiity was false, or the Eyes differences were 
more subjectively salient than the Mouth differences.
As a final check, a Cochran g test was performed across all ten 
unidentical face pairs. The highest values of g obtained were: for all 
subjects corn^ned, 12.86; for that half of the sample given L-R stimulus 
alignment, 13.73; and for that half given the E-critical pair first, 
11.93-(df = 9 throughout). All fail to reach significance. Frequency of 
correct judgments did not vary among the face pairs, whether the two 
stimuli differed by Mouth, by Eyes or by both attributes.
As far as the pair-comparison judgments themselves were concerned, 
then, the mi^ii^i^l^ltion of the attribute variants in Experiment 8 appears 
to have been successful and the prediction based on the affect hypothesis 
was strongly confirmed. Performance was uniformly high across all 
stimulus pairs, regardless of which attribute had to be discriminated.
The children were certainly attending to Eyes as much as to Mooth. The 
level of success attained here with Eyes is striking not only in relation 
to its parity with Mouth in the present experiment, but also in relation 
to the large proportions of Eyes confusions observed previously. Figure 7
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highlights this, graphically comparing the overall percentages of correct
judgments of Muth and Eyes across Experiments 8, 4 and 6.
The stimulus-alinnment and order-of-trials conditions need little 
commmnt since neither had much effect. Although performance was slightly 
worse in general (not significantly so) with U-D alignment, U-D subjects 
were not so far behind L-R subjects in Experiment 8 as they had been pre­
viously, despite the continued possible interference from the up-down 
mirror images of the attributes’ variants. Simiiarly, subjects given the 
E-critical pair first fared generaHy slightly worse than those given the 
M-critical pair first. But there was no evidence whatsoever of an atten- 
tional bias as a function of the distinctive attribute first presented; 
on the contrary, both of these subgroups of subjects confused maarinaHy 
fewer Eyes-d-jstinct pairs than Mootth-i's^nct pairs overaH.
Justificatory responses
From the pair-comparison judgments themseeves, we cannot tell 
whether or not the high level of performance on Eyes relative to Mouth 
was related to the ascription of affective significance to the features. 
Is there any evidence from the children's justificatory responses? The 
justifications were anlaysed in the same manner as before (Part 4). 
Samples of these responses are provided in ApposI-ix.3, Section 3. Only 
two children (four-year-olds) failed to answer at all under this section, 
and the response rate was high among the others — almost 50% of all 
trials received a justification.
Order of reference to attributes. The children produced a total of 
47 m^ul^'iple responses, referring to both variable attributes and some­
times including the invariable Noss as well. Not surprisingly, the four 
face pairs that differed in both Eyes and Mouth attracted over half the
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double references. Neither attribute was favoured over the other: Eyes 
were indicated first 22 times and Mouth was first 25 times. There was
no obvious relationship between order of mention and the face pair 
referred to.
Ninnber of references to .each attribute. Agaan, neither attribute
predominated. Muth received a total of 117 references, Eyes a total of
*
121. In single responses, which attribute was mentioned did depend on 
the particular face pair referred to: Mouth was what was indicated when 
that was the sole distinguishing feature (pairs 12, 15, 25) while pairs 
differing by E<es (34, 35, 45) received references to Eyes. Ths is 
evident in Table 41.
Type of reference. References were classified according to the 
system established in Part 4 (pp. 181-185 and 20-4-205). Since a total of 
only three Point-level references occurred altogether, these are here 
subsumed under the Point/Name heading. The Feature-level and Poont/Name 
categories were otherwise as before. The Face-level category, however, 
was split into references pertaining to an Affective state or action and 
those pertaining to some Other, non-affective, state or action. (For 
examples of the latter type, see Appendix 3.3, Examm^ 7, 13, 32.) The 
particular attribute with which a Face-level reference was associated is 
no longer specified, since pairs differing by a single feature were 
characterised in terms of that feature alone (so the referent in these 
cases is obvious), whUe for pairs differing in both attributes it was
Addiiionaaiy, there were several Face-level references that could not be 
attached to a single attribute specifically. These fell to pairs differ­
ing in both attributes or including face 5 (neutral in both attributes), 
where it was often unclear what was giving the face its "cross" or "happy" 
(etc.) character unless the child pointed to a feature.
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often impossible to tell what the characterisation was founded on —
Eyes, Mooth, or the global configuration of both.
Table 41 shows how the references were distributed by type over the 
ten unidentical face pars. Since frequencies were rather low, raw 
scores are presented, although the number of Affective Face-level refer­
ences is also given as a percentage of all responses for each row to 
allow comparison across face pairs and with past experiments. For 
simpOicity, face pairs have been grouped together on the basis of their 
kinds of distinguishing features.
To dispense with a minor point first, notice that compared with the 
previous experiments there were now relatively fewer Point/Name refer­
ences and more Feature-level distinctions. /or was pointing a resort of 
only the younger members of the samppe. The features of the third 
stimulus set seemed generally easier than those of the second set for the 
children to describe adequately in words.
The main concern, however, is the affect-related responses. It is 
ibl1beiute^y obvious from Tabbe 41 that pairs distinguishable by Eyes 
alone (34, 35, 45), while not reaching the same proportions of affective 
responses as the Motth-ii^-lnct pairs attracted, . nevertheless received 
Affective Face-level references about a fifth of the time and were suc­
cessfully differentiated on that basis. Thi's is a substantially higher 
percentage than was previously attained in the Face-level category with 
the second stimulus set. Before, only one or two Eyes references in an 
entire experiment were Face-level (considering only the pair-comparison 
tasks and not the famiiiarisation-period descriptions of Experiment 6).
It is the figures in the present Other (non-affective) Face-level cate­
gory that in fact correspond with the earlier findings, in terms of both
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frequency and content — the previous Face-level references to Eyes did 
not concern affect. In both cases, phrases like "he’s closed his eyes" 
and "he’s pulling Ms eyes down like this" occurred.
Affective Face-level responses were even given to identical pairs, 
Where there was no contrast to highlight the affective significance of 
the face or feature; pairs 11 and 22 together received 13 justifications 
of wiich seven wre affective; pairs 33 and 44 received five affective 
descriptions out of 13 responses. Even the neutral face 5 when paired 
with Itself received two affective descriptions, out of ten responses 
(presumably because a "set to respond affectively" had been established 
with these stimuli?).
Affective descriptions given on trials in which a pair-comparison 
confusion error was made are interesting, for although a wrong "same" 
judgment was given the descriptions themselves could not be called 
erroneous. The presence of acceptable descriptions associated with con­
fusion errors is marked in Table 41 by a superscript "t": they fell 
either to pairs that included the neutral face 5 or to pairs differing in 
two features. Instances of acceptable descriptions associated with such 
confusion errors are given in Appendix 3.3 (e.g., Examples 22, 34, 50,
55 — an asterisk against the examppe in the lists indicates a wrong 
pair-comparison judgmmnt).
In the case of the neutral face 5, we already noted the possibility 
that it might be taken as either happy or sad (p. 242). Moot often, it 
was called by wMchever term would contrast it with its partner in the 
pair; but sometimes it was ascribed the same affective character as its 
partner. The list in the Appendix provides a number of illustrations of 
the switching of face 5 between happy and sad, with the occasional resul­
ting confusion error. For instance. Ecai^mp^s 16, 23, 28 and 34 were all
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produced by the same subject, who called face 5 sad against face 1, happy 
against face 2, happy against face 3 (almost a wrong "same" judgm^r^t:, but
self-corrected!) and sad against face 4 (with a wrong "same" judgmenn).
With respect to the pairs differing in both Mouth and Eyes, we have 
already seen that a slightly greater proportion of confusion errors 
occurred than would have been expected on the basis of performance on 
two-attribute differences with the second stimulus set (p. 246).
Although at the outset of the experiment expectations had been left open 
as to how the children would react wren the stimulus pair incorporated 
two sorts of affective signals (i.e., differed in both Eyes and Mouth), a 
speculation was entertained, which has been entered in Table 41. There, 
it is suggested that pairs combi* ning face 1 with either face 3 or face 4 
might be distinguishable on the grounds that face 1 represents positive 
affect (happy, smiling) while faces 3 and 4 are interpretable in negative 
affective terms (cross, sad); whUe it is speculated that pairs com­
bining face 2 with either face 3 or face 4 might be indistinguishable 
since all three faces could be taken to signify negative affect (all 
cross, sad). in reality, face 3 turned out typically to be called happy 
to distinguish it from the negative (sad/cross) face 2. But confusions 
of the negative-negative type did occur with pair 24, where each was 
called cross, or each sad. Ths tendency is reflected in Table 41 in the 
lower percentage of correct "not the same" judgments of pair 24 relative 
to the other MooUh-p^ut-Eyes-distinct pairs.
These confusion errors involving the neutral face 5 and pair 24
*
demonstrate the strength of the influence of affect for some children.
* The discussion here pertains to acceptable affective descriptions of the 
faces in conjunction with wrong "same" pair-comparison judgmnts. Erro­
neous references on unidentical pairs were extremely rare, and amounted
- 257 -
In these cases, app^c^r^e^r^tl.y, the children’s justificatory coimmets were 
not simply post-hoc reasons, concocted after the event of f^ir-comparison 
decision. They had, rather, the character of reasonings, revealing some­
thing of the cognitive processes whereby the child arrived at his decision 
in the first place. It appears as though the stimuli of the third set 
were being not only talked about in affective teres, but perceptually- 
cognitively encoded in those teres, too. Thus, the results sug<^^^-t, it 
was precisely because the faces were being interpreted in affective light 
that they were confused in certain instances and successfully differen­
tiated in others.
Summary and conclusions
Experiment 8 followed the conventional pair-comparison task method 
employed in Experiments 3 to 6, but with a new set of schem^^i’c faces as 
stimuli. It was predicted at the outset of Experiment 8 that, in con­
trast with the previously-observed tendency for Eyes to be confused, Eyes 
would now be correctly discriminated as often as Mooth. This was very 
clearly confirmed. The level of pair-comparison performance was uni­
formly high on both Mothhdisi^i^^-t and Eyee-distinct pairs. Even three- 
year-olds could perform entirely correctly. The Eyes variants were dif­
ferentiated more than 80% of the time, where before the success rate on 
this attribute was consistently less than 50%, despite the slightly older
/continued/ to simply saying "The lm)uths/eyns are the same" (etc.) when
the feature actually differed. The presence of such erroneous references 
is marked in Table 41 by a superscript against the appropriate Point/ 
Name colimn cells. Onny the pairs including face 5 or differing by two 
features incurred such false statements. Given the occurrence of affect- 
based confusions on these face pairs, there is some doubt as to whether 
the Point/Name references really were erroneous. The children who said 
things like "They've got the same eyes" might have meant "Their eyes con­
vey the same kind of affect" rather than "TFi^-^r eyes have the identical 
physical form". ........ ......
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subject samples In the earlier experiments. This achievement with the 
third stimulus set was espeeialiy surpeislng 1n vVew of the physical 
structure of the Eyes variants here — pairs of diagonal lines forming 
error-image reversals of each other. In other studies, as we have 
already seen (pp. 8ff), diagonal straight lines differing in orientation, 
and particularly in mirror-image reversal, have been found to be espe­
cially confusable for preschool children. Evvdenm.y, there was southing 
about the face-like visual context in which the present diagonal lines 
were displayed that facilitated their differentiation.
The prediction that tyes and Mouth differences would now be cor­
rectly judged equaHy often had been founded on the hypothesis that thh 
affective significance of the features in the kinds of face stimuli 
employed in the present study might be important to the children in thher 
sameness-judgment task. Over all subjects, justifications for pair- 
compprison decisions were produced on a total of 215 trials; 37%* of 
them consisted of a description of one or both stimuli of a pair in terms 
that characterised not physical identity/difference between attributes 
ind1eiduany, but the global affective expression of the whole face.**
This figure of 37% is higher than that quoted in Table 41 (30%, because 
in the latter case Featurr-level and Point/Name responses that were mul­
tiple (i.e., that referred to both Mouth and Eyes against a single trial) 
were counted as two separate references. This brought the total on which 
the Table 41 percentage was calculated to 262 instead of 215. Face-level 
references, however, by their very nature, did not usuaHy mention Mouth 
and Eyes separately, and were scored as only one reference even when they 
did. It is therefore a fairer comeprisot, for present purposes, if muP 
tiple Feature-level and Point/Name references to a single pair are also 
counted as only one response per trial.
In this connection, it should be noted that the third stimulus set 
received very few justifications of the type "Thhy're the same but the 
eyes are not the same" or "The eyes are not the same but the faces are 
the same because they're both happy" (etc.), which were common with the 
first and second stimulus sets (see pp. 212ff). Thi’s is probably partly 
because commpaaaSvely few con-fusion errors now occurred; but in those 
that did arise, the child usually focussed solely on what was shared in 
the faces (i.e., typically the part conveying sameness of affect).
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Haaf of the subjects produced two or mom Affective Face-level references, 
showing that they were attending to affect at least some of the time.
(And this does not take into account the possibility that some of the 
Point/Name references — "The eyes are not the sa^", etc. — might have 
been founded on affective rather than physical grounds.) To de^mrttliatn 
just how pervasive the influence of the affective character of the 
stimulus faces could be, records of the comelete 15-trial sessions of two 
of the subjects have been added to Appendix 3.3 (p. xxiii).
More important^. Affective Face-level references no longer fell 
solely to Mouth. Of those cases where it was clear which of the attri­
butes the child was taking as carrying the affective expression, just 
over a third wem associated with Eyes. Although Eyes were not yet on a 
par with Mouth in terms of proportion of Affective references, then, it 
seems probable, that there was a connection between the increase in cor­
rect Eyes discriminations and the fact that Eyes could now be disti- 
g^shed on affective grounds.
The children's justificatory responses further suggested that the 
effect of the experimental maaipplation of the affective significance of 
the stimulus features was twofold. Whie it likely contributed to the 
overall improvement in Eyes discriminations, paradon'caHy it is certain 
that it also contributed to some of the observed wrong "same" judgmenns. 
Espon'aHy tell ng in this regard were the false "same" judgments given 
to stimulus pairs that actually differed in both Eyes and Month. Such
It is also possible that the attempt to lend affective signifc'cance to 
Eyes as well as Mouth might not have been entirely successful. From a 
child's point of view, the simple happy-sad (positive-negative) dichotomy 
afforded by the curve-up and curve-down Mouth forms might have been mom 
salient than the relatively more subtle cross-sad (negative-negative) 
distinction between the diagonal Eyes variants.
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double-attribute confusions were rare in the earlier experiments, and in 
the present experiment even the number of confusion errors when there was 
only a single attribute’s difference was small. On those grounds, one 
would have expected double-attribute confusions now to have been minima! 
indeed. That they were not virtually absent is perhaps one of the most 
interesting findings of this entire series of experiments — at least 
when the children's justifications for their decisions are also taken 
into consideration. Faces 2 and 4, for example, were called the same a 
firth of the time, being described as both cross or both sad, clear 
indication of why the two stimuli were being confused.
At the start of the final part of this study, two explanations for 
the patterns of results obtained in the preceding experiments were con­
sidered: (1) that Mouth is a m^iv^i^^^lly important (criterial) attri­
bute such that it would consistently receive greater attention, and 
greater proportions of correct sameess-^i^ifi^e^r^e^nce judgmenns, than other 
attributes of schematic faces; (2) that what was important here was 
affect, and that any feature carrying affective significance would be 
"criterial". The results of Experiment 8 argue convincingly against the 
first of these two possibbi^ities: Eyes can be differentiated just as 
often as Mouth under certain conditions. That the variants of an attri­
bute be differentiable on the basis of affective significance is one of 
those conditions is strongly suggested from the patterns of pair- . 
compprison rssponies and the types of justificatloni given by the young 
subjects in this last experiment.
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OVERVIEW AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The present research programme began with the assumption that 
young children make "confusion errors" when they are given tasks 
requiring them to judge sameness and difference among visual stimuli.
The occurrence of confusion errors 1s widely documented elsewhere. In 
experimental tasks such as matching-from-sample (with the instruction, 
e.g., "Find one the same as this one") they often choose a misratch 
instead of the perfect match to the standard; or in pair-comparison 
("Are these two the same or not?") they call items the same when they 
exhibit points of difference. Confusions are also observed in tasks 
involving serial recognition, discrimination learning, and so on. For 
adults given these kinds of tasks, things are the same only if they are 
identical in all visual features. Why then do children call things the 
same when they are not physically identical? Do they not yet fully 
understand what is meant by "same"? Or does the source of their con­
fusion errors, lie rather in the perceptual-cogn1tive processes of visual 
inspection and compprlson across stimuli?
One interesting fact to emerge from the literatures on children's 
iameensi-difference performance is the systemaUcity of their confusion 
errors. They are fairly likely to occur with certain types of discrim- 
inanda, and are unUkely with other sorts of discriminanda. Thuu, for 
instance, stimuli that differ only by orientation seem highly confusable, 
while distinct shapes are rarely confused. Such findings point to the 
operation of (at least) perceptual-cogm*tive factors in the production 
of errors.
This then formed the background to the present study. The initial 
brief was to carry out experimental maa1pplationi of visual aspects of
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the stimuli In srmentns-diffnrnnce judgment tasks, 1n order to examine 
some of the effects of particular perceptual factors on the differential 
distribution of confusion errors among various stimulus attributes.
The starting point was provided by the seemingly contradictory 
results of John Taylor (1973) and Roger Waes (pers. comm, 1974). Those 
investigators both emp^yed a stimulus set consisting of eight schemanc 
faces, originally designed by Tversky and Krantz (1969). In both cases, 
the faces were constructed from three attributes each taking two levels: 
a horizontal or vertical ellipse for Shape of head; black or blank-white 
circles for Eyes; and a straight line or an upward curve for Mouth (see 
Appendix 1, Figure 1). It sernred pooslble that th discrepancy tetween 
Tayyor's finding of correct Shape rratches with internal feature cm- 
fusions and Waaes's report of corrrct internal feature ^mrtCes with Shm 
confusions might reside in wheeher or noo the stimu^s cards Incorporated 
a square frame drawn around the face. Speelfica^e» the proposal was 
that the presence of an external visual frame (as in Taylor's stlmuH) 
might be associated with correct matching of the outermost feature. Shape, 
wnle in the absence of such a frame (as in Waee^'s stimuli) Shape 
be mom confusable than the internal features E<es and Mooth.
The three experiments in the first part of the present study set 
out to test this explanation. Chi"^^ from preschools and early primary 
school classes were presented with the Taylor and Waes schemanc faces, 
either Frarad or Unframed. Their patterns of confusion errors were 
investigated under three task conditions: matching-from-sample (goal, 
to find from an array the only perfect match to the standard); choice- 
from-triads (choose from terne unidentical stimuli the two that look most 
alike); and pair-comparison (decide whether two stimuli are the same 
or not).
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The results clearly showed that presence/absence of o surrmur.ding
frame was net the soils de/eirnincnC of wWice attributes wer eorremetly
mtehnd ncd Wiei etcfteee. There wae nc ncternetloc Setwe/e th& visual 
Frnrmid/Unfrnmee condition and the type of task used to elicit sameness 
decisions from the ehildrec. When nil tf the stimuli ic the set w^re tc 
view simultaneously in n Inrge nmy, ns in matchicg-frtm-stmples Shnre 
was eorrectly matehed ncd Eyes were eonfused rngaed^nes of whether n 
frame was provided or nno. In ce^nntrns, wwhn onny two stimuli were pre- 
sectnd nt a time for patr-eomprtinone the tendency wwn more towards 
interctl fen^re mnchicg, especially with Unframed stimuli. The "inter- 
TOdiate" triads task revna^ee both effeets elenrly — Sh^e matching with 
Framed ncd Mouth m^^^hing wth Unframnd stimu^. The eiscrrtnnyy Setennn 
Taylor's nnd Wales's findings is thus exp^icaSln only if both the method- 
ologienl md frame eonditions nre taken into neeount, in etmbSnetitn.
For, Taytar's Shnpe-matehing suSjeets reenivne n batching-frob-samp^e 
task with the Framed stimul, Mriln Watas's internnl fenine matches were 
elicited under raie-comrarieon with Unframed fnees.
Exactly why this interaee^oe of frame md task varlnSles should 
hnve produeed the observed effeets on the distr1bution of eonfusion 
errors nmong the stimulus aternSttes remained somewhat puzzling. One 
might eonjeeture thnt the targe nmy of the maaching-from-sampln method, 
in wneh the eight een^mtli plus standn^ were e1srlayee ndjacen-tly in n 
3x3 squm nrrangemnt, peeiaps made the two distinet Siape levels 
highly cotieenble, even without the frame, Seense of their proximity in 
numbses. In the smUer ehoiee trray of the triads task, Shnpe was then 
presumably less snlient nnd the teigieally-predicted frame effeet e^me 
through. That is, nm)ng Unframed stimuli ehoiees ^re Snsed on stb^ness 
of Month; but the preennee of m nxternal frame npparently ngnin high­
lighted the outer Siarne of the fnees.
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The above proposals rest on the difference in stimulus array 
between the mtching-from-sample and triads methods. In the pair- 
compprison task, resembling triads in its small array, however, the 
Framed versus Unframed effect was less marked. Although Unframed stimuli 
elicited the predicted internal feature matching, the Framed condition 
did not produce the expected contrasting superiority of Shape — Mouth 
was also correctly One must now appeal to the effect of the
task requirements as well as of the visual array. Pair-comparison dif­
fers from both of the preceding methods in requiring "passive" visual 
scanning of the figures and verbal Yes/No answer, rather than active 
choice of one or two stimuli from mLntiple options. Yet precisely how 
such factors would operate is not at all clear, and work remains to be 
done before the complexities can be disentangled. Beyond noting some of 
the problems to be dealt wth in the future, this line of inquiry was not 
extended here. The findings from the first part of the study do suggest,
howwver, that the literatures on children's errors in sameness judgments 
and discrimination learning tasks (etc.) need to be interpreted with 
caution, in view of the diverse mthodologies — as well as the variety 
of 01scr1minanda — emp^yed by different investigators.
The second part of the study examined the role of differential 
visual sall'encles among the stimulus attributes from a new angle. It was 
possible that the bias of confusion errors towards one rather than 
another of the attributes in the first experiments might partly have 
resulted from the widely differlng physical structures of the original 
three attributes.
Throughout Experirants 4 to 6, the task was held constant (pa1r- 
comppr1son). A second set of schema^ c faces was constructed (see
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Appendix 1, Figure 3) in wHich Shape was invariant and the relevant 
attributes were all internal: tooth, Eyes and The aim was to
dntnemion wether confusion errors were due to failure to perceive an 
attribute or failure to detect its distinct levels, or instead due to 
deliberate selection of one attribute and rejection of another as the 
basis for sadness decisions. Ws question was examined by equating 
physical structure across the attributes as far as possible. Each attri­
bute had the same ternn variants: one neutral straight line, aod two 
curved lines oriented in opposite directions.
Through this section. Muth dominated the correct judgeeens, being 
sue cess fully discriminated as much as twice as often as ^re Eyes or 
Nose. This pattern held even when the stimuli werepresentee upspde- 
Sowo, or when the subjects received •,pretrasning" to famiiiarise them 
with the discriminanSa and to ensure that they could discern the variants 
of each attribute. Visual factors such as mirror-image reversal effects 
and bias due to location of gaze and direction of scanning were elimin­
ated as contributors. Also discounted was the "objective physical 
smetcy eyporhenis", by which Eyes would have been expected to be mom 
noticeable than toolth, there being two Eyes and only one Mouth it each 
stimulus.
The "subjective weighting (sallenc) hypothesis" — that the sub­
jects were deliberately treating Mouth as a more impprtant determinant of 
srlmntsssdiffnrencn among these schemanc faces, aod were deliberately 
treating the other attributes as less relevant -- stood unrejected. This 
eyportenis, moreover, received active support from the children's verbal 
commnts on the stimuli and justifications for their juSgeeets, examined 
io Part 4. These showed that often children who confused Eyes and Nose
were able to discern differences there, but were disregarding them in
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their sameness judgments. In this regard, comments from the subjects 
such as, "They’re the same but the noses are going one that way and one 
that [the other] way" or, "The eyes are not the same but the faces are 
the same because they're both happy" were quite typical. As well as con­
firming that the child is intentionally treating Eyes and Nose as rela­
tively unimportant, this sort of response refutes the claim that young 
children do not fully understand the word "same" itself. Rather, it 
demonstrates a quite mature appreciation of the various senses in which 
"same" can be used in the adult language.
As with the pair-comparison judgments proper, then, the children's 
justificatory responses pointed to the weight they were assigning to 
Mouth over the other attributes. Where the other features were indicated 
by gesture or name or at most by a description of their purely physical 
appearance, the Mouth was often described in terms that took it to char­
acterise the whole face by action or mood (smiling, sad, etc.). Indeed, 
"mouth" and "face" were frequently treated as synonymous, sometimes to 
strange effect (as in "It's got a straight face", meaning the Mouth was a 
straight line). This never happened with the other attributes, and it 
points once again to the special Import of Mouth here. The terminology 
of the subjects' justifications suggested that what they were focussing 
on might be the affective significance that could be ascribed to the 
particular Mouth forms (but not to any of the other attributes) employed 
in the first two sets of stimulus faces.
The final experiment of the series was designed to decide between 
two competing possible reasons for the children's weighting of Mouth over 
the other internal features of the faces of the first two stimulus sets. 
One, based on the results of the present study, was that it was not
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sameness-difference of Mouth itself that was crucial, but samness- 
difference of affective facial expression (which up to now had been con­
veyed by Mouth alone). The alternative explanation was that, at least in 
such elementary schemaaic drawings, Mouth is for young children a 
criterial attribute of faces in its own right.
To test this, a third set of stimulus faces was devised in which 
Nose as wll as Shape was held constant, wiile Mouth and Eyes varied (see 
Appendix 1, Figure 5). The Mouth forms were retained from the second set, 
but now the Eyes variants were constructed in such a way that they too 
could be distinguished on affective grounds (as, e.g., angry versus sad). 
The task was again pair-comparison. The results clearly countered the 
view that Mouth is a criterial attribute, for Eyes were now cor^r^^^-tly 
differentiated as often as fouth. The children's references to affect in 
their justifications further supported the argument that their pair- 
compprison decisions relied on whether or not the faces were alike in 
type of mood or em^on expressed. Several of the (few) pair-comparison 
confusion errors that were made were clearly due directly to the ascrip­
tion of affect. Thus, for example, faces were called the same because 
"they're both cross", even though the pair differed structurally in both 
Eyes and Moto uh, Eyes conveying the "crossness" in one face and Mouth con­
veying it in the other. This was convincing evidence that judgments were 
being made independently of the precise physical forms of the stimulus 
features except insofar as they permitted particular kinds of affect to 
be ascribed to the faces.
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Evidence In support of the idea that affect cat be important in the 
perception, classificdt'ko aod discneSortioo of face stimuli exists io 
other sources. With regard to schema tic representations of faces. Pick et 
al. (1972) found that children confused lines curving upwards in various 
degrees more often than they confused curved-dowo lines in a learning/ 
recognition task, whether the curves appeared as mouths in faces or 
whether they were presented in isolation. They suggested that the 
inferior performance on curved-up lines might be due to the children's 
classing them together as all "smiiing m^o^^hs" among wHd they did not 
differentiate. Interestingly, they reported instances of the chndren's 
referring to the curved-up lines as "smiles" even whet they wwee pl^^^^l^i^<ed 
out of the face context. TUs suggests that "smiling" maa be a ve^r^e' 
fuoSaeental concept for young children.
Simiiarly, Hess and Pick's (1974; see also pp. 108-110 above) 
finding of more pair-comparison confusions oo mouth than on eyes could be, 
attributed to interference from affective 'intnrpretrtion of the stimulus 
features. In that study, the mouth forms were all curved-up lines, w^i'cI 
again appeared to be treated as indistinguishable because they all 
belonged to the same class of "poritive-apperring mouths". The eyes, 
howwver, ^re constructed from ellipses of varying This mant
that not only did the shape of the eyes vary quite widely across the 
variants according to their curvature, but also the space between the 
eyes varied — rhice, as Hess and Pick noted, may alter the global char­
acter of the facial expression. The superiority of eyes over mouth in 
Hess aod Pick's experiment thus fits oeatly into the present framework.
Other authors who have found that cei^iir'^o attend mort^y to the 
upper, eyes part of the face when the stimuli are photographs of real
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faces have also attributed this bias to the importance of facia! expres­
sion or similar social factors (e.g., Goldstein and Mackcnterg, 1966). 
Langddll (1978) reported that, unlike various groups of control subjects, 
younger (nine-year-old) autistic children identified photographed faces 
not from the upper portion of the face but from the lower half. He 
claimed that autistic children do not see the social character of faces 
but attend only to their visual, physical aspects; therefore they focus 
less on the social!y-1noomative eyes. Odom and Lemond (1974) found that 
kindergarten children, given the task of recalling the position of a 
photographed face in a large array of such stimuli, performed tetter when 
they used facial expression than when they used personal identity. And 
Ahrens (1954) found that babies, looking at real faces, began by focussing 
on the eyes but soon switched to the mouth. Then, after about eight 
months old, the infant switched again, now attending to global expression 
instead of to individual facial features, responding positively to a 
smiling face and negatively to a frowning onnl
Young children may also give precedence to minor ph^^’ical differ­
ences over larger (mrre objectively salient) ones when the former involve 
affective distinctions and the latter do not. This emerged from the
£
investigations of Chalmers and her colleagues (1980 and pers. comm) 
into the relationships between children's apparent referential inade­
quacies (cf. Gucksberg et al., 1966; FlaveH, 1975) and perceptual and 
contextual stimulus variables. C^ldm of various ages were presented 
with schematic drawings of people, in description and matching tasks. 
Menmbrs within a stimulus set varied in height (tall-short), hair colour 
(b!ack-whits) and mouth (curved up-curved ddnn1. In objebtive physiphl 
terms, overall size and hair were "large" featurn wMle moott was a aom- 
paratively tiny one, and the differences ^t^^en the two levels of height
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and hair colour would be expected to be considerably more salient than 
the difference between the two levels of mouth. Size and colour varia­
tions, moreover, are generally agreed to be less confusable for young 
children than is the kind of up-down mirror-image reversal inherent in 
the two mouth variants. Yet the responses dernoontrated that mouth was 
highly salient for the younger subjects. For example, when the figures 
^re presented individually for free description, the first of the three 
relevant attributes that four-year-olds mentioned was the mouth (although 
this was not so true for seven-year-olds). References to mouth, more­
over, were not descriptions of the objective visual charaacteistics of 
the feature, but were couched in terms of whether the person was happy or 
sad. That is, in line with the findings of the present study, mouth 
references were of the global Affective Face-level type instead of de­
scribing the physical Featurr-level.
Even for adults, affect ma be a salient aspect of schematic faces. 
This was evident in the classic studies of Brunswik and his colleagues 
(e.g., Brunswik & Reiter, 1938). He was particularly interested in the 
"impression -value" of the face features, and winch physical variations 
were associated wth differences of mood and character, etc. (For a 
summary of this work, see 1956, especially Chapter XV.) .
Dspite the highly simple, schemaaised nature of the Brunswik faces, sub­
jects could readily describe and rank them according to seven categories 
of global "■mpmssion characteristies": mood ("gay" versus "sad”), age, 
character, likeabiiity, beauty, intelligence and energy. In an analysis 
of the extent to which subjects' ascribed charaacterstics depended on the 
actual phyica! features of the faces, Brunswik found that it was varia­
tion of mouth that produced the widest range of responses, wMch were
especially extreme in the "mood" category of impression. Brunswik also
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discussed (1956, pp. Ill & 113) a study by Samuels (1939) who found that 
in pair-comparison with Brunswik faces the highest percentages of correct 
discriminations (by aduu-t subjects) were associated with distinctions of
mood, along with beauty, out of all the seven impression characttristics,
Within the domain of affect, some types of emotions are more 
salient for aduu-ts than others. The dimension happiness-sadness or 
happiness-worry seems to be especially important (e.g., Frijda, 1969). 
Basss'li (1979) found happpness and surprise, indicated by mouth m>ve-
to be the most readily identifiable expressions. This might 
explain wiy, in the final experiment of the present series, the children 
gave a greater pn^j^oo^-tion of Affective Face-level references to Mouth 
than to Eyes: Mouth captured the readily-recognisable happy/sad 
dichotomy, while the distinction between the affective expressions of 
the Eyes was nm>re subtle.
The results of an experimeft conducted by Tversky (1977, pp. 341­
342) also comment on the fact that aduuts may take affect as the basis 
for classification and similarity judgments of schem^ic faces. His two 
stimulus sets are reproduced below (Figure 8). They differ in only one 
stimulus: the “happy" face P in Set 1 is replaced in Set 2 by the 
"cross" face Q. Instructed to sort the four stimuli into two pairs, 
aduut subjects given Set 1 produced the pairs AB and PC. But subjects 
given Set 2 did not group A and B together; instead, they divided the 
set as AC and BQ. Further, when fresh subjects ^re asked to choose from 
the array B,P,C or B,Q,C the one that was most like the standard face A, 
face C was the clear choice from Set 2, but with Set 1 face B was favoured
Notice that faces B and C each share only the eyes with the 
standard A. The subjects' responses muut therefore have been founded on
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Figure 8
Two sets of schemaaic faces presented to adin-t subjects for 
classification and oaaching-to-standard (Tversky, 1977, p. 341)
A
A
(Arrows have bssd added to indicate the mst common partitioning of the 
stimuli in classification and the stimulus chosen as match to the 
standard face A in similarity judgmesd.)
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something other than points of physical sameness and difference. 
E^i<^^nnt.y» those given Set 1 were grouping the stimuli as (in Tversty’s 
terminology!) "smliing faces" versus "nommiiing faces", while Set 2 
stimuli were treated as "frowning faces" versus "nonfeownieg faces".
That a change in only one mermen of the stimulus set could produce such a 
striking shift in aduRs' similarity choices supports the case for the 
importance of affect in the perceptual and cognitive encoding of faces.
It also reveals the operation of a kind of "chain reaction": stimulus 
context determined the basis of classification, win'ch in turn influenced 
the basis of individual similarity judgmenns. One could in fact say that 
there was no real shift in the subjects' decision-criterion across the 
two stimulus sets — similarity of affective facial expression was used 
in both cases.
The empphtis placed here on Affective Face-level responding is not,
of course, to be taken as saying that young children will inevitably
match face stimuli according to global physiognomic similarity. In the
present study, many of the Moutt/atfect-oatching subjects dem>uetrated
their awareness of other features of the st1ouli. It is likely that
differing mouth forms (= diff^^^i^r^g affect) would be ignored if the visual
saliency of other, non-affective attributes were increased or if there
were a large enough numter of other points of physical identity between 
*
the faces.
Cf. the demouettations of .the "dimeneiunal additivity" effect by, e.g., 
Tversky and Krantz (1969), Gati and Tversky (1982): as the number of 
aspects of physical identity between stimuli is increased, but the number 
of differences remains constant, so the stimuli are more likely to be con­
sidered the sa^. It is as if the increase in actual (and hence, per­
ceived) sameness brings about a reduction in the perceived difference even 
though the actual difference is no smaller. Cf. also Carey and Dia^c^nc^'s
(1977) finding that young children have difficulty recognising a photo­
graphed face when extra-personal "disguise" features are added — hat, 
spectacles, etc. WhUe those ptraphernalia did not hide the face, they 
appeared salient enough to "distract" the child away from the face itself.
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The experiments of the present series have themselves shown that 
there are circumstances in which young children do not take shared affec­
tive expression as the criterion of sameness among the faces. Certain 
task and stimulus variables (finding a match to a given standard fromi a 
large array; presence of an external visual frame) were found to lead to 
higher proportions of correct matches of the outer head Shape than of the 
internal features, even when the confused Mouth forms could be inter­
preted as affectively different.
Wen the child did treat shared affective expression as a necessary 
criterion for samennss, it was often not his only criterion. Wen the
. stimuli contained three attributes — Mouuh, Eyes, and either Shape or 
Nose — wrongly-matched face pairs tended to differ by just one attribute 
That is, (where possible) an "affect-atennding" child would typically 
decide on the basis of sameness of Mouth (affective) plus one of the non­
affective attributes. Confusions of two attributes at once were espe­
cially infrequent with the second stimulus set. (The third stimulus set 
was exceptional in provoking some double-attribute errors, where similar­
ity of global facial expression overrode physical differences.) The 
children did tend to take into account the number of points of physical 
identity as well as the manner in Wich the stimuli were alike, to the 
extent that those two criteria did not yield conflicting answers.
Setting aside the complications introduced by the maanpulations of 
task and frame variables in the first three experiments, the present 
findings have impHcations that go beyond mmrely adding to the list of 
types of discriminanda that children are mre, or less, likely to confuse 
They offer fresh com^t on what ma and what may not underly these sorts 
of confusion errors. For one thing, it was verified that the children
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were assigning differentia! weights among the stimulus attributes on sub­
jective rather than objective grounds, where in the past subjective 
weighting factors have often been overlooked or simply assumed 1n theory 
but rarely rigorously examined in practice (cf. Goodman, 1970; Tayloo & 
Wa^s, 1970; Hale & Lipps, 1974; Gregson, 1975; Tversky, 1977). In 
the present instance, features that did not contribute to (variation in) 
facial expression were deliberately assigned low priority and their dif­
ferences ignored even though they were detected. This in turn shows that 
the problem here was not simply a perceptual one of inability to discern 
features or failure to inspect stimuli fully enough.
It also suggests that Kemler and Smith's claim that young children 
operate in terms of ov^r^^l 1 similarity and only graduaHy come to dif­
ferentiate individual stimulus properties should not be interpreted too 
sim!is-tically. (This theoretical standpoint and the emir^'ical research 
on which it is founded were reviewed in some detail in Part 1, pp. 25-28.) 
Smith and Kemler (1978) themselves note that certain dimensional axes may 
be primary and highly salient to very young children, despite their 
apparent tendency to perceive globally or integrally. The present 
results suggest that attending to "global" similarity may, paraddxicaHy, 
entail focussing on just a part of the stimulus figure instead of the 
whole. One might, indeed, speculate that children's reputed failures on 
the side of psi^^^iving and detecting — their "inadequate" or u^c^^oII;!ike 
paths of visual inspection of stimuli, for examppe (e.g., Vurppllot,
1968; Vu^Hot et al >, 1971) — may not stem from im'iaaurrties in per­
ceptual functioning but may be the result of deliberate scanning strate­
gies. If what the child is (intentionally) looking for is global likeness 
in a particular respect, he does not need to inspect every detail of the 
stimulus figure thoroughly.
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This area of research also points to the danger of assuming tidy, 
structurally-specifiable and -measurable relationships between the 
physical properties of the stimuli and people’s perceptions of them (cf. 
the psychometric approach — see pp. 28-30 and the introductory sections 
of Part 3). John Taylor described the eight schematic faces he used in 
his third experiment (1973) -- those forming the stimulus set for the 
first part of the present programme (see Appendix 1, Figure 1) -- as 
composed of orthogonal elements that vary discretely. Even though that 
may be the case structurally speaking (which is debatable), in terms of 
people’s actual behavioural interactions with those stimulus faces they 
may be treated as if composed not of separable but of integral attributes, 
such that a change in the physical characteristics of a single feature 
may serve to effect a change in the way the entire stimulus is perceived.
What about the language side of the problem, the child's under­
standing of the word "same”? In adult speech, this word has multiple 
usages (which is appropriate in a given instance normally being clear 
from the linguistic and non-linguistic context). It can refer to a 
single entity that re-appears in space/time; it can indicate that two or 
more entities are physically identical in all respects; or it can 
indicate that two or more entities, while perhaps not physically iden­
tical, belong to the same class with respect to some principle, i.e., 
share some quality, function, etc., that defines the class. For the sake 
of brevity, let us call the third sense qualitative sameness; the
second, by contrast, could then be regarded as involving quantitative 
★
sameness.
* This distinction is akin to that made by Gregson (1975, Ch. I), who took 
"quantitative similarity" to be determined by counts of numbers of shared 
physical features, and "qualitative similarity" as involving those of the 
"potential similarities" among stimuli that are actually used by people in
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In laboratory tasks of the kind emp^yed here, adults universally 
adopt the second, quannttative interpretation, judging items to bb imor 
and less the same according to the number of shared physical featurm.
The many children who exhibited consistent eeeue patterns in the present 
study, however, seemed to be deciding peioari^y by qu^aitative sameness 
and only secondarily by quannitative Since their verbal com­
ments indicated that they were able themselves to apply the word "si^os" 
approprrately in each of its senses, they muut have been deliberately 
choosing to take the Exprrimoener,s test question to refer to "same kind 
of thing".
This conclusion is corroborated by the work of Kafrmioff-Smlth 
(1977), who found that French-speaking children also interpreted ."same" 
(meme) to ^an "sios kind", but this time in a situation where the aduut 
intnrprntttioe was the first of the thenn senses distinguished above, 
i.e., when it was intended as "the very sa^ms one". For exai^e, when 
asked to act out what happened when "The boy pushed a cow and then ths 
girl pushed the same cow", children below ags five pushed not one cow 
twice, but two separate cows. Interestingly, whUe three-yetr-olds 
limited their responses to two identical cows, four-year-olds often chose 
two unidentical cows (e.g., cows differing by colour). But unlike 
younger children, four-year-olds did alter their responses to the "very 
same one" if the Experimenter added some further clarification, such as 
"... the same cow as ths boy just pushed". Further, when given two toy 
ducks differing only in colour, some of these children answered No to ths
/continued/ a given situation. It is not to be confused wth the 
terminology of Lian (1981, pp. 43-49), who called ths first of ths three 
domaans ,'nmneica^ idneiiity^" and apparently confounded the second and 
third under "quulitativn identity".
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the question "Is it the same?" but Yes to "Is 1t the same duck?”.* This 
again illustrates that they did appreciate that "mem", like "same", has 
diverse senses, even if they were as yet unable to match sense and con­
text appropriately. By age five, Kmiloff-Smith found, children could 
correctly perform the task requiring them to push one-and-the-same cow 
twice. In their spontaneous comment, moreover, they differentiated the 
two senses of "same" ("very same one" versus "same kind of thing") by 
using ungrslm^etScal periphrastic constructions — specifically, according 
to Kaariloff-Smith, in order to avoid the aimig^ty normaiy inherent 
in "mAme".
Vu^Hot et al. (1971) and Vurrmot (1976) also noted children’s 
adoption of the "same kind of thing" interpretation in the pair-comparison 
situation, while Donaadson and WS(?s (1970) and Webb et al. (1974) sug­
gested that something along these lines also occurred with the term 
"different". That is, children who responded to a request for a different 
one from the target by selecting an identical one seemed to be taking 
"different" to mean "another one of the same . class".
Two further imppications follow from the proposal that the children 
in such studies were taking "same" to mean "same kind". Firstly, the 
important research question becomes not so much how well young children 
understand the word "same" itself, but why they interpret the test ques­
tion in these task contexts to refer to quaaitative samness when for 
adults it is uname^guour^y perfect identity across all features that is
This finding emprises that care should be taken in interpreting the 
results of pair-comparison tasks in which the test question is something 
like "Are they the same?". Different forms of the question may elicit 
different answers. Cf. the footnote on pp. 94 and 96.
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meant. Secondly, children do not make confusion errors simply because 
they take "same" to msan "alike in some respect(s)" instead of "identical 
in all respects". It is not any kind of sadness that will do I The
precise criterion or criteria that a child will use in a given situation 
as the basis for deciding that stimuli belong to the same class will be 
defined for him by the stimulus context.
The influence of context has been comrneeted on in the past (e.g., 
by RosenMith, 1965; Garmer, 1966; Garner & Felfoldy, 1970; Taylor & 
Maaes, 1970; Gregson, 1975; Tversky, 1977). The present results re­
affirm its importance, in this case for the particular "meaning" it can 
impart to individual stimuli or individual stimulus features. To 
illustrate: The subjects given the second stimulus set, in Experiments 
4 to 6, were consistently highly successful in discriminating the mirror- 
image curved lines that they interpreted as "happy" and "sad" mouths.
Yet they often failed to discriminate those very forms when they appeared 
as nose or eyes in a face. Agaan, subjects were able to differentiate 
the two sets of mirror-image diagonals that formed the Eyes of the third 
stimulus set. But wren presented in isolation, such orientation and 
reversal transformations are notoriously confusable for young children. 
Clearly, the face con-text facilitated differentiation of those lines 
because of the meaning that they took on: they ^re not the same because 
one signified "happy" and the other "sad" or "cross". Deprived of that 
meaning, the isolated lines could be regarded as the same kind of thing — 
both curved lines.
The combined notions that young children take the que^a’itative "same 
kind of thing" interpretation of the Expprimeaner’s instructions, and 
that they attend to the "imaning" ascribable to stimuli or their features
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on the basis of their context, could thus perhaps help to explain some of 
the results reported by other investigators. As noted, confusion errors 
are comn)n1y found for stimuli that differ by orientation, reversal, per­
spective, etc. (ses Part 1, pp. 8ff). These sorts of traesformatiuei — 
what Zusnn (1970) calls "transpositioetl" operations — do not alter the 
"essence" of the figure itself; it remains the same kind of thing. 
Mooreovr, young children are accustomed to ignoring such transpositional 
variation in the real world. (Two physically identical toys remale, for 
most purposes, identical if one of them is turned upside-down.) At the 
other extreme, differences of form or contour itself are rarely confused 
by young children (see pp. 13ff). These sorts of transformations — 
called "topological" by Gibson and "transitive" by Zusne — do change the 
essence of the figure, in a way that may mean it is no longer the same 
kind of thing.
Cearly at the momnt these are speculative proposals that remain 
to be verified. But the tests should include asking the children not 
just whether items are the stm, but why they are the same and what dif­
ferences there are between unident.1cal stimuli that they decide are the 
same. Such questions have not often bnee system Really asked of . 
children in past research on confusion errors; in the present case, 
their answers have proved highly informative.
A few final, broad remarks. It is obvious that the present study 
has very little to say about the developmental side of children's sad­
ness judgments. Whhre age groups were 1x10*111 separately, older sub­
jects were generally found to make fewer confusions than younger ones.
In children over about five-and-a-half years old, correct judgments pre­
dominated, or where errors did occur thn child usually at least showed
- 281
signs of attending to number of points of sameness along with kind of 
sameness. But no light is shed on Wiat brings about this transition from 
the childlike mods of operating in terms of qualitative classification 
into the adiltlike mode of deciding on the basis of quantitative physical 
identity — whether it be changes taking place within the child’s cog­
nitive system an^/or imposed from outside (for examppe, via education 
from adults), or Whatever. The general age trend was comppicated, more­
over, by the anomalous resuLts on Nose judgments in Experiments 4 and 5, 
where older children actually attained fewer correct discriminations than 
did younger ones. At the other end of the age-scale, some of the three- 
year-olds managed to achieve entirely correct performance; and those who 
made errors still came to the tasks with an already well-developed con­
cept of sameness and difference. How they might have attained that level 
of competence in the first place is not elucidated.
The fact that such issues were not addressed in the present study 
is not to say that differences between age groups or changes over time in 
performance were regarded as unimportant to the questions of how children 
understand the term same, how they scan and process visual stimli, and 
how they make decisions about sameness and difference. But the overall 
proportions of errors in general and their elimination with age were of 
only secondary interest here, because the present approach to these 
questions was through the types of confusion errors that occurred. The 
focus was therefore not on the ultimate achievement of error-free per­
formance, but on the distribution of occurring errors among the stimulus 
attributes. The observed error-distributions generaaiy were not found 
to differ between younger and older subjects in any major respect. 
Neveetheeess, there were some suggestions of minor age-related variations 
To determine conclusively why young children msdce confusion errors and
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■Wait happens later to eliminate them, obviously the details of develop­
mental changes miut be investigated more rigorously than was attempted
here.
The degree of competence that even the youngest subjects brought 
to the tasks in general, and the high success rate throughout the find 
experiment of the series in particular, serve to remind us of the mun­
dane but nonetheless important point that laboratory-style studies can 
mislead; they may sometimes mask the true extent of the young child’s 
capaccties and provoke errors by artefact (see, e.g., Brryant, 1974; 
Donaldson, 197&). As Gelman and CadistellL (1978) empphaise, it is as 
important to consider what the child can do as what he fails in. The 
experimental esychologiit’i focus on confusion errors should not blind 
one to the fact that young children can deal accurately with sameness 
and difference — and indeed must do so constantly as they get about in 
the world.
A comment by Schader and Harris (1974) serves aptly to conclude 
this discussion. They suggest that the term "error" may be an inappro­
priate one for children's judgments of unidentical st^muLi as the same. 
From the present results, too, it is clear that the subjects were not 
failing — in the sense, for examppe, of failing to detect a difference. 
Rrther, as Schaller and Harris point out, the children were taking active 
decisions about "when a difference makes a difference". While the out­
comes of those decisions may not be what an aduLt would expect, they do 
not properly constitute errors; within the child’s own system, they are 
legitimate. They reflect not so much misunderstandings of the situation 
as unconventional understandings of it. In 1972, Goodnow wrote that it 
is not enough for the developing child, in his intellejct^ual purssuts, 
simply to enlarge his repertory of linguistic, perceptual and cognitive
- 283 -
capacities. He must also acquire the "tricks of the trade", that is, 
he must learn if and when to apply a particular skill and be able to 
evaluate his success or failure. The present study reinforces Goodnow's 
point, for by age three or four years the child already has considerable 
perceptual and linguistic mastery of sameness and difference. At that 
level of competence, his job then becomes largely to learn under which 
circumstances a particular decision-strategy is appropriate or 
inappropriate — to learn to conform to adult convention.
APPENDIX 1
Figures illustrating the three stimulus sets 
employed in the present study
Appendix 1
Figure 1
First stimulus set — used in Experiments 1, 2, 3 and 7.
Stimulus composition followed that of Taylor (1973) and Wales (pers. comm, 
1974). The above array illustrates the Framed set (cf. Taylor).
Figure 2
First stimulus set: Examples of two of the faces actual size. (Between 
them, they illustrate both levels of all three attributes used in the 
construction of the eight faces in the set.)
SET 1
(frame)
FACE.
S£T1
(FRAttfcb)
Face
5
Figure 3
Second stimulus set — used in Experiments 4, 5, 6 and 7.
(The same three variants make up each of the attributes)’
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Figure 4
Second stimulus set: of three of the faces actual size.
S6T2 
FAC6 1
/SfeT 2 
FAce 3
Appendix 1
Figure 5
Third stimulus set — used in Experiment 8.
Appendix 1
Figure 6
Third stimulus set: Examples of three of the faces actual size.
iAPPENDIX 2
SUPPLEMENTS TO EXPERIMENT 1
Section I
Comparison between Experiment 1 of the present study and Experiment III
of Taylor (1973): Individual subjects1 patterns of confusion errors
In Table XVI of his dissertation (1973), Taylor gives the numbers 
of subjects who followed particular patterns of confusions among the 
three attributes Shape, Eyes and Mouth — i.e., the numbers who chose 
matches on the basis of a consistent "order of (perceived) similarity" 
among the attributes. He lists six such possible orders. For one- 
attribute confusions, these are: M>E>S, M>S>E, E>M>S, 
E>S>M, S>M>E, S > E > M (where " >" = "is/are more similar 
than" « "is/are more often confused than"). The corresponding orders 
for two-attribute confusions are: ME > MS > ES, MS > ME > ES,
ME > ES > MS, ES > ME > MS, MS > ES > ME, ES > MS > ME. For the 
present study, however, it was possible to say only that particular 
individuals made the most confusions, e.g., with Mouth (and fewer with 
Eyes and Shape equally), or most with Mouth and Eyes equally (and fewer 
with Shape). Finer distinctions of order among the attributes were 
usually not discernible in the present Experiment 1.
For comparison with Taylor's pattern of results, these data are 
presented in Table A2-1 (next page). Taylor's six possible orders have 
here been collapsed into three, to show simply the numbers of subjects 
who confused Mouth most, or Eyes most, or Shape most. Three new cate­
gories have been added to take account of those subjects in the present 
stuc(y who confused two attributes equally often. Also shown are the
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TABLE A2-1 (Experiment 1)
Order of perceived similiarity among attributes: 
Number of subjects most confusing each attribute or 
combination of attributes.
Taylor 1s Sample Present Sample
Attribute(s) most 
often confused ( Framed Set)
Framed
Set
Unframed
Set
Mouth
Eyes
Shape
Mouth & Eyes equally 
Mouth & Eyes equally 
Eyes & Shape equally
unclassif iable
32
9
7
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
9
3
6
1
0
0
2
6
3
6
0
2
0
2
5
Key:
© Compiled on the basis 
tation (1973).
of Table XVI in Taylor's disser-
Data for first responses only.
N.A.= not applicable. Three categories here are not applicable 
to Taylor's data from his Table XVI. All of his subjects 
fit into the first three categories, except for the nine 
omitted from his Table XVI, who are "unclassifiable".
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numbers of "unclassifiable” subjects: those whose confusion errors were
too infrequent or too inconsistently distributed over the three attri-
*
butes to allow categorisation.
Shape was the attribute confused by the fewest subjects in all 
cases. whereas mst of Te^lor's subjects confused Mouth above all,
the tendency in the present sample, wth either stimulus set, was to 
confuse Eyes most of all. This merely confirms what we have already seen 
from the analyses of pooled response patterns for Experiment 1 presented 
in the main text.
*
In this experiment, Tayyor ran a total of 57 subjects. Forty-eight are 
accounted for in his Table XVI, so presumably nine were omitted from this 
analysis — a rate of 16% undassifiable. In his Table XVII, however, he 
states that only 33 children showed a consistent order, while seven were 
inconsistent, and 17 were "not relevant" (because they made too many per­
fect matches or twooattribute This would appear to give in
real ity a rate of 42% nnclassifilb^e. Cf. the rates of 285% and 33%Tfive 
and six out of 18) undassifiable in .the present samm^, shown in 
Table A2-1.
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Section II
Differential choice frequencies among the eight stimulus faces of
Experiment 1: Comnenn on response biasses, and supplementary test
Why should certain of the faces be chosen more often than others 
as match to any standard? Recall that the order of the stimulus array 
was constant over all subjects and all conditions. Figure 1 of Appen­
dix 1 displays the eight stimulus faces in this fixed array. Faces 
numbered 1, 2 and 3, which were among the least often chonen as match to 
any standard, formed the top row of the array. Could it then bb that the 
children simply chose those faces nearest them in the array and over­
looked the top row? (A bias towards the right-hand side of the array 
would have to be added too, to explain the relatively few choices of 
face 4, at the left of the middle row.)
Such a position preference seems unlikely. For one reason,
Taylor's subjects apparrntly did not exhibit a position preference in his 
corresponding eeaching-from-smmp^e task with these schemaic faces. 
Although he does not state so directly, there are two grounds for sup­
posing this: (1) Whhre position biasses arose elsewhere in his series 
of experiments, he notes them explicitly; but he makes no direct ^^r^ition 
of them at all in this particular context. (2) He does note certain
asyeIetfies in the frequencies of choices, referring to cases where 
stimulus A is chosen more often as match to stimulus B than B is chosen 
as match to A (Table XXII of his dissertation, 1973). BBt these asym- 
^^i^i^ies exhibited no consistent pattern, and in any case do not corre­
spond with the preferences found in the present Experiment 1. So there 
is no a priori reason to expect a position bias.
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Secondly, several adults were informally con-fronted with the fixed 
stimulus array and were asked, "Which face do you like best/least?".
Faces 5 and 8 were preferred, and face 4 was least liked -- a pattern 
that roughly paraHeled the children's choices in the matching-from- 
sample task.
To check more forma Hy on the possible influence on the children's 
choices of global preferences among the faces, as opposed to a real posi­
tion bias, a supplementary test was conducted.
The subjects were 22 children from the first-year class of a 
primary school in St. Andrews and from an adjoining preschool nursery 
class. They were divided into four groups, according to whether they 
received Framed or Unframed stimuli first and whether they received the 
original stimulus array or a new, "random" one;
Group I-O; n = 6; ages 4;3 - 5;7, meea 4;9 years
Group I^R; n = 5; ages 4;2 - 5;7, mmaa 4:10
Group II-O: n = 6; ages 4;3 - 5;4; iimen 4:10
Group II-R: n = 5; ages 4;4 - 5;;, iimea 4;10.
The experimental design is sue^enised in Figure A2-1 (next page). 
The stimuli were those used in Experiment 1: the eight faces of the 
Framed set and eight cut-out faces of the Unfranied set. Chi’ldren in 
Groups I received the Framed set first, and the Unframed about a week 
later; the order of presentation was reversed for Groups II. So as in 
Experiment 1 proper, each child acted as his own control with respect to 
the two stimulus sets.
A new stimulus variable was added; Original versus Random array. 
For Groups 1-0 and II-O, the order of the faces in the array was the same
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as in Experiment 1 (see Figure 1 of Appendix 1), constant over all sub­
jects in these groups. Groups I-R and II-R received a new, ’'random*' 
array. In the original array, recall, faces 1, 2, 3 and 4 (the least 
often chosen as matches to any standard) appeared on the top and middle 
rows, while faces 5, 6, 7 and 8 were on the middle and bottom rows. To 
control for position biasses, in the new array faces 1, 2, 3 and 4 now 
appeared in the middle and bottom rows, and faces 5, 6, 7 and 8 in the 
top half. Within the limits of this proviso, the locations of the faces 
in the new array were determined randomly, the order differing across 
children in Groups I-R and II-R and across test sessions with the same 
child.
Subjects were tested individually. In each session, the appro­
priate stimulus set and array was laid before the child, who was asked, 
(1) "Which one looks most like a face?" and (2) "Which face do you like 
the most?". The order of the two questions was randomised across sub­
jects and sessions.
The general pattern of results is shown in Table A2-2. In overall 
terms, faces 5, 6 and 8 were chosen the most often. This accords with 
the distribution of choices as match to any standard that emerged in 
Experiment 1 proper (cf. Table 12, p. 58), except that the high choice 
frequency observed earlier for face 7 has now been superseded by that of 
face 2. Little information was gained by further breakdown of the choice 
frequencies into sub-conditions (e.g., comparing results on Original 
against Random array within the sub-conditions Framed set plus Question 
"Which is most like a face?", etc.). Fisher tests on the numbers of 
choices accruing to faces 1 to 4 versus 5 to 8 in such subgroups gave no 
significant values in any instance. There were no apparent differences
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TABLE A2-2.
Distribution of choices ( % ) among the eight faces.
The highest scores ( 15%) are ringed, to show more clearly
which of the eight faces were the most often chosen in each
sub-condition.
Experimental
Condition*
Array
Original (n - 11)
Random (n = 11)
Question-type
Most like a face (n = 22) 
Face liked most (n - 22)
Stimulus set
Framed (n » 222
Unframed (n = 222
Face Number
1_ 2 3 4 A 6 JL 8
4 8 2 4 © © 6 13
3 13 4 0
§ ©
10 ©
5 5 2 2 © 2 ©
2 © 5 2 0> 14 11
5 11 5 2 © 9 ©
2 9 2 2 09 7 ©
Overall (n = 22) 3 10 3 2
* Within each condition presented here, all other conditions 
are confounded; e.g., each of the array levels Original 
and Random cuts across both levels of stimulus set, question- 
type, and order of presentation.
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between the two levels of any condition, nor any interactions among 
conditions.
The absence of a difference between the Original and Random array
conditions argues against the position-preference view suggested earlier
as a possible explanation of the uneven distribution of choices over the
eight faces. Faces 5, 6 and 8 between them account for 70% of the
choices in the “random" array — almost double the rate expected on an
even-distribution basis — despite the fact that these stimuli were now
located near the top of the display, farthest from the child. Face 2
ranked next. Notice that all four of these "most popular" faces share
one feature in common: the Mouth variant is always the curved form
resembling a "smile". It may therefore be that the smile was an impor- 
★
tant variable in attracting children's choices. In fact, two of the 
subjects (one each from Groups II-O and II-R) who chose face 7, with the 
straight Mouth, as the face most liked volunteered reasons: "It's the 
funniest-looking face" and "It doesn't go with the other" — where "the 
other" referred to the child's most-like-a-face choice (face 8 for both 
these subjects).
In any case, the absence of position bias, together with the fact 
that the most popular faces here fit reasonably well with the faces most 
often chosen in Experiment 1, suggest that the children's responses in 
the matching-from-sample task may have been partly governed by subjective 
preferences among the faces. Consider, for example, a child who chooses
At the time, this was a tentative suggestion. The results of the next 
experiments, however, will be seen to point in this direction, too. The 
precise significance of Mouth and the smile will be directly examined in 
their own rights in later parts of the study.
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matches on the basis of shared Shape and Eyes, and confuses Mouth. Given 
face 1 as the standard, he has two possible Shape-plus-Eyes-sharing 
alternatives: faces 1 and 5. It 1s possible that he regards these as 
equivalent 1n terms of their goodness of fit to the standard; but he 
may then decide on face 5 rather than face 1, simply because he 1 ikes it 
better. The possible role of such subjective preferences in multiple- 
choice tasks of this nature deserves further study.
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EXAMPLES OF SUBJECTS' JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THEIR SAMENESS JUDGMENTS
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KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS (ETC.) USED IN JUSTIFICATION-TRANSCRIPTS
M, S, E, N 
C
( )
(P«)
e.g., (p.
(P-
(Q)
Mouth, Shape, Eyes, Nose 
Child (subject)
Anything enclosed in brackets is Experimenters 
addition, not uttered by subject 
Subject pointed to stimulus or part of it 
4) — Subject pointed to face 4
M on 56) — Subject pointed to Mouths on faces 5 and 6
Experimenter asked a further question. E.g., if child 
said, • ’They’re all the same" in triads task, Experimenter 
asked for "the two most the same", etc. Or if child 
gave a wrong "same" judgment but then explained how the 
pair differed, Experimenter asked more about sameness 
and questioned that if there was something different, 
could they be "just the same". Etc.
Child offered no spontaneous justification and Experimenter 
did not press for one
Child broke off speech (usually to point at something 
instead of continuing to comment verbally)
(?) The word immediately following the bracketed question-
mark is not certain, since the child spoke it unclearly 
and did not clarify it
underlining Word(s) underlined in child’s utterance were spoken
” with heavy stress
= Against triad trial, denotes a triad in which all three
faces shared the same level of the subject's dominant 
matching attribute, and which elicited an "all the same" 
response (see main text, p. 174)
* Against pair-comparison trial, denotes a pair that
received a wrong pair-comparison judgment — a false 
"same" response for an unidentical pair, or a false 
"not the same" response for an identical pair. (All 
trials not marked by the asterisk were correctly judged.)
The numbers given in the columns headed TRIAD or (CHOSEN) PAIR correspond 
to the numbers assigned to the various stimuli within each set. Ihese 
numbers are shown against their faces in Appendix 1, Figures 1, 3 and 5. 
(For ease of reference, rough drawings of the stimuli with their numbers 
have been provided at the beginnings of the appropriate lists of examples.)
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EXCERPTS FROM RESPONSE SHEETSs TRIADS (Experiment 2)
(a) Shape-matchers
TRIAD
CHOSEN
PAIR
SHAR­
ING
Boy, 587 58 SM
age 4;9 
Framed 345 35 S
set 167 67 SE
126 26 SM
437 47 SM
368 38 SE
268 26 SM
138 = 15 SE
236 26 SM
Boy, 578 58 SM
age 3;4
Unframed 345 35 8
set 167 67 SE
126 26 SM
437 47 SM
368 38 SE
268 26 SM
138 = 58 SM
236 26 SM
JUSTIFICATION
Two smiling faces
They,re both the same
Except that one*s cross (7) and 
that one's smiling 
They've both got the same mouth 
They're both grumpy faces
Except... (p.M). They're the 
same shape
But that one's got black eyes 
(p. 6 then p. 2)
They've both got black eyes. 
They're all the same.
i’s NOTES
cross/
grumpy = 
straight
Mouth
= 138 all
share Shape
I don't know, (Q; C just nodded)
I don' ' t know, (q)
That's a fat face and that's 
a fat one
Got the same mouth and eyes <— 
They two have the same mouth
(p* M)
(p. all 3 faces in turn) (q)
(chose 58, refused comment)
They two's got round mouths
Eyes wrong
= 158 all 
share Shape
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EXCERPTS FROM RESPONSE SHEETS» TRIADS (continued)
(b) Mouth-matchers
TRIAD
CHOSEN
PAIR
FAR­
ING JUSTIFICATIONS E's NOTES
Girl, 128 23 EM Ihey're both happy
age
Framed 237 37 K They both have straight mouths
set 148 l4 M They both have straight mouths
258 = 58 SM Ihey both have the same shape and = 258 all
they're both happy. Ihey're all share Mouth
happy but these two are best the same.
367
134 =
568 =
135
257
348
37
13
58
13
25
34
M
SM
SM
SM
M
EM
—
These two both have the same 
shape, but they're all the same.
They're all the same, they're all 
happy. But these two are best 
the same.
They're the same shape
They're both happy
Straight mouths, and they both 
have the same eyes
= 134 all 
share M
= 568 all 
share M
Boy, 128 28 EM They've got the same eyes and
age 5;3 the same mouth
Unframed
set 237 37
M They've got the same mouth
148 14 M Same mouth
258 58 SM The same mouth
367 37 M They've got the same mouth
134 34 EM The same mouth
568 = 56 EM All of them, (q) (Chose 56:) = 568 all
They've got the same eyes share M
135 13 SM But...(p. 1 & 5, Eyes) same eyes
257 25 M They've got the same mouth
348 34 EM They've got the same eyes and the
same mouth. Ihey've all got the 
same eyes but not the same mouths.
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EXCERPTS FROM RESPONSE SHEETS! TRIADS (continued)
(c) Eyes-matcher
TRIAD
CHOSEN
PAIR
SHAR-
ING JUSTIFICATION
Girl, 
age 3»9
348 = 34 EM (p. all 3 faces in turn) (q)
(chose 34:) They’re two sads.
Unfraaed
set
56 7 56 EM They’re funny ( = M on 56) and 
that’s sad ( = M on 7).
14-7 17 EM —
256 36 EM Two of them are funny and one’s 
sad.
356 36 EM Funny (p. Mon 36). Sad (p. M on 3) •
136 16 E —
248 = 28 E5 (p. all 3 faces) (q) (Chose 28)
Two funny and one sad (M on 28 vs 4) ,
143 13 SE —
238 = 23 EM (p. aLl 3 faces) (q) (Chose 28) 
They’re funny (M on 28) and that’s
sad (M on 3)•
E’ 8 NOTES
= 348 all 
share Eyes
funny = happy 
i.e., curve M 
sad = straight 
Mouth
= 248 all 
share E
= 238 all 
share E
(d) Mifteedmatcher
Girl, 4-36 36 Hi They’re both sailing and two
age 3;11 black eyes.
Framed
set 378 37 M They’ve got lines across the aouth.
123 13 SE They’ve both got black eyes.
168 68 M They’ve both got a sale on the face
233 23 M They’ve both got a sale on the face
578 38 SM They’ve both got a sale.
343 34 EM T!ey’ve both got white eyes and a
line across the ao^h.
167 17 EM They’ve both got black eyes and a
line across the aouth.
126 16 E They’ve both got black eyes.
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EXCERPTS FROM RESPONSE SHEETS: PAIR-COMPARISON (Experiment 3)
SHAR-
PAIR INGT JUSTIFICATION E's NOTES
Shape- 46 s The eyes are not the same but the face
matcher is and the mouth isn’t. face = just
girl, 47 SM * The faces are tut the eyes aren’t Shape, or whole
age 4;3 (the same) stimulus. In
Framed
set
48 E — coding "Type of Reference?,
56 EM The eyes are the same. classed as
57 E Not that one (p. M), not the mouth.
whole stimulus.
58 SM * Not the eyes, (q) The mouths are right. 
(q) They’re the same.
67 SE * —
68 M The eyes are not the same.
Mouth- 13 SM * The two eyes and the flat mouths are ; Note this C
matcher
boy, ,
age 5,2 l/+
Unframed
set
15
16
M *
SE
the same. One’s got eyes not coloured 
and that one is coloured.
They’re the same hut different, (q) 
They’re the same, both are egg-shaped. 
But one is a standing-up egg and the 
other is a fallen-down egg. (q) They’re 
the same.
No, hut something*s the same. They’re 
both standing-up eggs and both got 
coloured-in eyes.
perfectly happy 
to call a pair 
’’just the same" 
while explicitly 
admitting some 
differenee. 
Insisted on 
"same" even when 
asked how they 
can be the same 
when they are 
different.E
17 EM * That one’s a standing-up egg and that
one’s a falling-down egg. They both 
got flat mouths and they both got 
coloured-in eyes.
18 S One’s sad and one’s happy.
23 E Not the same. But they’ve both got no
coloured-in eyes.
24 SE But they’re both fallen-down eggs.
25 M * They’re both happy. But one hasn’t got
coloured-in eyes and they’ve got different 
shapes.
26 SM * (C kept changing his mind: first not same,
then same, not same, finally sameT)
But this one* s got no coloured-in eyes and 
this one has (coloured eyes).
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EXCERPTS FROM RESPONSE SHEETS* PAIR-COMPARISON (Continued)
SHAR-
PAIR ING JUSTIFICATION Es NOTES
Eyes- 17 E4 * (p. M) Both got black eyes
malcher
boy,
18 8 One* s got a flat face and one’s happy flat face =
and they've both got different eyes straight Mouth
age 5;1
Unframed
23 E * (long time before deciding; refused 
reason)
set 24
25
26
27
SE
M
SM
8
But they've both got smiling faces
O^^*s got black in the eyes and one’s 
got no black
No, bft they've both got the same shape.
Bit they've got different faces, 
different eyes.
23 EM * Yes, but they’re bolh different shapes
34 El * ...
S+M— 37
matcher
boy, 38
age 4}0 45
Framed 44
set
47
48
56
57
58 
67
M Tiat’s a long mouth and that’s t long
mouth, but the shape is wrong
SE A long mouth and a round mouth
nil It's a round mouth and a straight mouth
S -----
SM * TiaVs a long one and that’s a long 
one (p. M)
E A long mouth and a square mouth
EM it's onLy the same mouth. It isn’t 
the same head
E A long mouth and a square mouth
SM * Square mouth and square mouth
SE A long one and a square one (Re. M)
C meOtes explicit 
his criteria!
square = 
curved Mouth
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EXCERPTS FROM RESPONSE SHEETS i PAIR-COMPARISON (continued)
SHAR-
PAIR ING JUSTIFICATION E’s
Mixed- 34 EM * They’re the same but one’s fat and one's thin.
matcher
girl, 
age 5;4
35 S * One* s sad with white eyes and one’s happy 
with black eyes. They’re both thin heads.
(q) They’re both the same.
Framed
set
36 nil One’s got black eyes and a fat face and he’s 
smiley and the other’s got white eyes and 
a thin face and he’s sad.
37 M One’s thin with a sad face and one’s a fat 
face and it’s not got black eyes.
38 SE * One’s sad and one's happy, (q) They’ve both 
got thin faces, they're the same.
45 nil —
46 S One’s got black eyes and a smiley face and 
one’s got white eyes and a sad face.
47 SM * —
48 E One’s thin and one’s fat, but they’ve both got 
white eyes.
56 EM * They’re the same but one's fat .and one’s thin.
Correct-
matcher
15 SE They're black eyes, thatts a smile and 
that's sad.
girl, 
age 4$6
16
17
E It’s black eyes and a smiley face, black 
feyes and a straight face.
Black eyes, black eyes. Straight mouth,
straight face ■ 
straight Mouth
Framed EM
set straight mouth. But they're not the same 
because the body is not the same. body = Shape
18 S It's got no eyes ( = 8). That's a sad 
mouth ( = l). But the body's the same.
23 E A straight face and eyes and a round body
( = 3) and a smiling face and round eyes (2).
24- SE That’s a straight sad mouth and no eyes (4). 
But it's the same body.
25 M —
26 SM It's got no bright eyes ( = 2). That’s a 
smile, black eyes (6).
27 S The same head. There’s a smiley mouth and 
white eyes (2), a straight face, black eyes
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EXAMPLES OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTIFICATORY RESPONSES 
(Experiments 2 & 3c Triads & pair-comparison)
12 34 5678
EXAMPLE
TRIAD-
CHOSEN SHAR-
JUSTIFICATIONPAIR ING
1. 136-13 SM They’ve got the same everything except they 
eyes. Ihey’ve got the same shapes.
2. 123-13 They’ve both got a round head, straight face, 
and the same eyes, nearly, (round head = 
vertical S; straight face = straight M)
3. 123-13 They’ve nearly the same face. The toouth is 
the same but the eyes are not.
4. 347-47 They're all alike but these two (47) are best. 
Ihey’ve got the same shaped faces and the same 
eyes. (Etyes wrong',)
5. 147-4? I don’t know, they’re all some bit alike. 
(Refused to choose for a long time, then 
refused reason)
6. 267-26 They’re all the same. (Q^ All of them, (q)
They all go together, (q) (C chose 26i)
They've both got sort of round faces, both 
got round eyes and a round mouth.
7. 267-26 They're all the same. I’m going to take the 
two smiley faces.
8. 258-58 Maybe all of them because they’re all smiling. 
But these two (58) are best because of their 
round heads ( = vertical S).
9. 568-58 Because of their straight heads (= horizontal S) 
and they're both smiling. But they're really 
all the same.
10. 258-58 They’ve got the same shape and mouth. Ihey’ve 
all got the same mouth. But that one (5) hasn't 
got the same eyes.
11. 135-15 SE All same, (q) (Chose 15:) They're a little bit 
not the same. That one's smiling and that one's 
not.
12. 135-15
A
C’s <
AGS
4;4 |
5»9
6;4
,A:
6;4
6;11
3;5
4;9
5l5
fl
5;5 4
4,-8
They’ve both got black eyes and... just black 5;11
eyes.
Appendix 3*1 ix
EXAMPLES OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTIFICATORY RESPONSES (cont.)
EXAMPLE
TRIAD-
CHOSEN
PAIR
shar-
ING JUSTIFICATION
C's
AGE
13* 567-67 SE Because these two differ on just one thing 
(p. M). All the other two’s differ on two 
things. (Not True: 56 share EM'.)
6;4
14. 248-24 They're all the same, (q) They all don’t 
go.- (Q) They all are (the same), (q) These 
two (24) are the same in heads and eyes but 
not the mouths. These two (28) are smiling, 
they're the same except the heads. These two 
(48) are the same except the mouth and heads. 
(q) (Finally chose 24 but refused reason.)
11
15* 248-28 They've all got the same eyes. But these 
ones (28) have got the same eyes and the 
same mouth.
5i2
16. 278-28 EM They've got smiling faces and the eyes are 
the same, but not the head. This one (7) 
doesn't go because these two things don’t 
go. (p. E & M) .
6;2
17. 147-17 Till of them, (q) (Chose 17 :) They've got 
the same eyes and mouths, except for the 
shapes.
4.4
18. 348-34 They’ve got the same mouth and eyes. But they 
all have the same eyes. But those two (38) 
don't have the same mouths.
5i5
19. 148-18 S They've both got round heads ( = vertical S) . 
But if they all had straight mouths, they’d 
all be the same.
5i5
20. 237-23 E They have the same face except for the mouth. 4;4
21. 167-16 They two got black eyes (l6). (Then re. 67:) 
They don't fit the same because they've both 
got... (p. horizontal S),
5S4
22. 348-48 They've both just got white eyes. 5 ill
23* 478-78 nil They've nearly got the same kind of eyes. 5i3
'TJnclassif iable" responses in "Type of Reference" coding:
24. 168-18 S The mouth's changing to the other mouth. 6;2
25. 458-48 E The mouth is covered up. 4jll
26. 236-36 nil One touching the same. 5;2
27
PAIR-COMPARISON TASK
47 SM * They’re the same but one’s got white eyes 5»4
and one’s got black eyes, (q) They’re the same 
cos they’ve both got a fat head.
Appendix 3.1
EXAMLES OF INDIVIJUM JUSTIFICATORY RESPONSES (coni;.)
EXAMPLE PAIR
28. 58
Is
AGE
5;2
29.
30.
31.
321 
33.
15
67
67
56
28
34. 28
35. 28
36. 34 Mi
37. 45 nil
38. 36
39. 36
40. general
comment
41.
SHAR­
ING JUSTIFICATION
SM * They’re the same tut they’re different,
One’s got not coloured eyes. But they’re 
both standi ng-up eggs and they’re both the 
same faces, (q) They're just the same.
(face = whole stimulus, not just M or S)
SE * The mc^i^-ths are not the ^ame. (q) The eyes 4;4
are the same so the faces are the same.
* That’s got sad ahdi that’s got smiling, (q) 5»9
They’ve got blue eyes the same ( = black E) .
Same. No, not the same. You’ve got to look 6;6
at them a lot*.
Hi * They’re the very same faces (p. E & 14). 5» 11
* They’re the same because they’re both happy. 5»2
But there’s one thing not the sames this
one's an egg-shape (8) and this one's not an 
egg-shape (2). (q) They’re the same all over.
* Same . They’ve got the amne eyes and the same 5;7
faces. (face = Mouth)
* That one’s got orange and that one’s got 5;9
orange eyes ( = White E).
* They’re not quite the same’ Bit they’ve both 5»10 
got straight
Not the ame. One’s a straight face and one’s 4;11 
a smiling face. (face = Mouth)
Not hde sos. One’s got HLack eyes ahd a big 5;5
head and he’s smiley, and the other's got 
whhte eyes and a long head and he’s sad.
They’re not at all the arnie (p. E & M). 5;11
Soeetemes hhe inidde acres are hie aaie but 4;10
the outside heads have one going that way and 
one going that way (p. Shape orientations; 
Correct-matcher) •
If hhey’re not hhe sm1s hhape and they'vs 5;4
still got the same things on (p. M, E), they’re 
not the same. (Correct-matcher)
"Uuilassifiahle'l responses;
42. 56 EM That one’s the same (5) but that one isn’t (6). 4;0
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EXAMPLES OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTIFICATORY RESPONSES (cont.)
EXAMPLE PAIR
SHAR­
ING JUSTIFICATION
C's
AGE
43. 56 EM * They’re the same all over. (Refused further 5?2
44. 34
reason)
That’s the same (3) and that’s not (4). 4;2
45. 16 E They're not at all the same. (Refused 4;8
46. 45 nil
further reason)
Not the same. But that’s the same (re. 4. 4;9
I.e., 0 had seen face 4 before, on a previous 
trial ??)
C
O H
Appendix 3*2 Xll
JUSTIFICATORY RESPONSES ; EXPERIMENT 4, Conventional Pair-Comparison
2 3
EXAMPLE PAIR JUSTIFICATION
C's
AGE
1. 12 That one's sad and that one’s happy. 4;0
2. It's a sad and a happy face. 4;5
3. That one's happy and that one's sad. 4;9
4. That one's sad and that one's smiling. 4;9
5. No, cos that one's sad and that one's happy. 4;10
6. That one's got a smiling face and that one’s got 5;0
a sad face.
7. 11 They're two smiling faces. 5;0
8. 22 (They're the same) Cos they're sad faces. 4;0
9. Yes, they're both sad. 4,10
10. 34 The eyes are lines going that way and lines going 4j5
that way (p. E, curve-up vs curve-down)
11. (p. Eyes as not.same) 4;8
12. That one's eyes go down and that one's eyes go up. 4,8
13. (p. Eyes as not same) 4,10
14. 56 The noses are one going that way and one going that 4;5
way (p. N, curve-right vs curve-left).
15. The noses are going not the same way. 4,9
16. * They're the same but the nose goes a different way. 4,11Cq) They're the same.
17. * Mouths the same. 4,11
18. * They're the same but the noses are going different 5,0
ways, (q) They're all the same faces.
19. That one's got a bit that goes that way and that one 's 5,0
got a bit that goes that way (p. N, curve-right vs
-left).
20. 66 They've got the same noses. 4,8
21. 15 No, but they're both happy. 4,10
22. That one's got a happy face and the nose goes that 4,11
way (p. M then N on 1, vs on 5).
23. 26 They're both sad. 4,10
24. 45 The noses have one going that way and one going 4,5
that way (p . N, straight on 4, curve on 5) •
25. 36 (p. Eyes as not same) 4jl0
26. 55 * (Not the same) They're funny, (q)| 3,5
Because they're funny. ["unclassifiable" 1
27, 46 They're not the same faces, (q) j responses 4,1
(C refused further comment)
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SAMPLE JUSTIFICATORY RESPONSES* EXPERIMENT 5, Inverted Stimuii
1 2 3 4 5 6
EXAMPLE PAIR JUSTIFICATION
C's
AGS
28, 12 That one's got fcne.that way emd hat one's got 
one that way (p. M, cirve-ip vs -down)
4;3
29. Not the same. Weei, they're nearly the same, but...
(p, M as not same),
4;6
30, The noses are.,, (p. M, then tried to turn cards 
right-way-ip), That one faces that way and that 
one faces that way (p, M),
4;8
31 • * (p.. N as same) 4;10
32, 22 They're sd. 4;4
33, 34 Smme , oh , not the smne . One like taat add one like 
that (p, E cirve-ip vs -down),
4;6
34 , The eyes (are not the same). 4;10
35. * (p. M& N as ^ame). 4;10
36, 56 * Not the same. No, they're the same. But that one's 
that way and that one's that way (p. N cu:lrreklefa 
vs -right), (q) Same.
4;3
37. Same, no. different. They're nearly he same. bit 
that's the other way (p.
4 ;6
38. They're two.,, (p. nJ They've got no "one".
(one » straight N, i.e., resembling written 
nimber "1")
4,6
39* That one's that way and that one's that way (p. N). 3;0
40 , 55 Ttley'k e sa, . 4;4
41, 16 (p. M & N as ntt aame) 4 ;3
42, 5) he e 11^011^ ndd he e noe e ar e dfffekonp . 4;10
43, 33 T^iee mouth ss a liee p, • M oh 3) . hee noee ss a liee 
(p, N on 1 & 3), Those are.., (p. E cirve on 3 and 
straight on l).
4;6
44, 2& tt's a strile e mouth ndd a iurly mouth . ndd hh^t's ot t 
str^-ent eyes (p. E on 2),
4?3
45. 2b The yyss ree dffktkont. 4;l
46, 6 hatt nness iuzdy ndd haat nhess ttraigtt pp. E, . 4 *3
47, 45 woo liess p, • ttslgha t E oh 5 & N nn 4), not hee 
same (p, cirved E on 4 & N on 5).
4;6
48. 46 Ios that one’s got a nose that way (p. curved N on 6). 3;0
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EXAMPLE PAIR JUSTIFICATION C’sAGE
"Unclassifiable" responses:
49. 55 * That one’s that way (p. N), *H3
50. 66 * That one's that way (p. N). ft
51. * There's no "one" on it (i.e., it hasn't a 4; 6
straight N).
52. * (p. N as not same) 4;6
53. 15 That one isn't the same ( = 5) but that one is 4;6
(- 1)
5^. 16 That's a different face ( = 6). (q) That's the 4;10
same ( = l) and that's not ( = 6}.
55. 35 That one's alright ( - 3) and that one's not ( = 5). 4;10
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SAMPLE JUSTIFICATORY RESPONSES t EXPERIMENT-6 
Pair-comparison with ’'pretraining”
1 2 3 4 5 6
•EXAMPLE PAIR JUSTIFICATION
56. 12 Same. No, not the same. It’s upside-down 
(p. M on 2).
57. He’s sad and he’s happy
58. The same eyes and the same nose. A sad mouth and 
a happy mouth.
59. That one’s this way and that one’s this way (p. M)
60. 11 Cos they’ve got the mouths the same.
61. 34 * Because they’re the same faces. (Refused further 
comment)
62. (p. E as not same)
63. His eyes go up the way and his eyes go down the 
way.
64. These eyes are this way and these eyes are this 
way (p. E).
65. 56 They go two different ways (p. N).
66. * It's straight eyes, a straight mouth, and the 
nose is curly, (q re. N curl-left vs curl-right). 
They’re the same.
67. One’s this way and one’s that way (p. N)
68. No, cos of the noses.
69. 55 (p. N as same)
70. 66 (p. N as same)
71. 23 It's a sad and a straight mouth.
72. 24 Same, not the same. Hasn’t the same mouth.
73. 15 * They're both happy and straight, (happy = M on 
both, straight = E on both)
7^. 25 The mouth isn't the same, or not the nose.
75. 26 It's a straight mouth and a round mouth.
76. 35 The noses, (q) They go that way (p. N) .
77. 36 Same. Oh, no, not the same. His nose is round 
and his is straight.
78. 45 That one’s nose goes like that (p. curved N on 5).
79. 46 The eyes aren’t the same. But the mouths are
the same.
C’s
AGE
3»9
4;0
4;6
4;9
3»8
3;9
4;2
4j5
4;9
4;2
^;7
^;9
5j0
3»9
4;9
^iZ
3.8
4;0
3;8
4;0
4;9
4;0
^;2
4;6
EXPERIMENT 6 s Samples of descriptions of stimuli given during prior "familiarisation” period
C’s
AGE DESCRIPTION OF PACE 1
DESCRIPTION OF FACE 2
3;8* He’s happy, (q) He’s asleep (re. E). (q)
[It’s a straight thin nose. ]
He's sleeping again ( = straight E, seen 
already on another face), (q) It's got a thin 
nose, (q) The mouth is bent, it's up like 
that (p. M).
4;7 He's happy, (q) He's sleeping, they’re line 
eyes, (q) It’s a straight nose.
4jl0 It's a happy face, (q) He's got a line nose 
and line”eyes again.
A funny mouth, he's crying. (Q)[He's awake. J(q) 
Got straight eyes. (Q)[Got a long thin nose.]
It's a sun (re. Shape circle), (q) He's sour, (q) 
He's sleeping (re. E). (q) The nose is shut 
( - straight), (q) The mouth is sour.
He's sad and he's sleeping, (q) Straight nose.
He's got a sad mouth, (q) He's got his eyes shut 
too. (Q) Got a line nose.
ido
PbH*
X
ro
C's
AGS
3;9*
DESCRIPTION OF FACE 3
(p. E) The eyes look like an (?)oval, because 
they're squint, (q) The mouth is straight and 
the nose is straight.
The eyes go down, (q) The nose goes up the way. 
(q) The mouth goes along the way.
^;9 A straight mouth, (q) The eyes are this way 
(p. E). (q) Up (re. E curve), (q) That's a 
straight line (p. N).
5;0 * It's a face with a nose like that, mouth like
that, eyes like that (p. each in turn). They're 
right eyes, they're looking up. (q) (p. N & Ms) 
They're not bent.
DESCRIPTION OF FACE
It’s upside-down. (re. E). (q) He's sleeping.
(p. M & Ns) Straight.
The eyes are looking up. (q) The nose is going up 
the way. (q) The nose is going along the way and 
the mouth is going along the way.
The eyes are going down and the nose is just 
straight, (q) The mouth is straight across.
He!,s looking down. (p. N & Ms) They're straight.
KEYs * means the subject later gave a wrong "same" judgment of the face pair described on that line.
[ ] Phrases enclosed in square brackets were produced only after much prompting from the Experimenter. TA
X
EXPERIMENT 6t Samples of descriptions of stimuli given during prior ’’familiarisation" period, (cont.)
DESCRIPTION OF FACE 5 DESCRIPTION OF FACE 6
W
 W
^;0 * He’s got the wrong nose. (Q re. N) That way
(p. right for curve-right of N). (Q) The mouth 
and the eyes are straight.
^;6 It’s an along the way face. (p. M). Ihe eyes 
are straight, (q) The nose is half-way round 
that way (p. N curve-right).
4;9 * It’s a face, (q) He's asleep, (q) Ihe eyes 
are like "ones" ( = straight lines, like 
written number "1"). The mouth is a "one".
Ihe nose is like a moon. (Q re. N) That way 
(p. N curve-right).
4;9 * Mouth that way, nose that way, eyes that way 
(p. each in turn), (q) Got a square thin 
mouth. (Q) The eyes are closing. The mouth 
is closing, (q) Ihe nose is a rainbow, (q)
It goes touching that way (p. N curve-right).
He's got the wrong nose, (q) Going that way (p. 
left for curve-left of N). (q) He's got straight 
eyes and mouth.
It's a bent nose, (q) Goes like that (p. N, 
curve-left), (q) It’s straight eyes and straight 
mouth.
The nose is a moon, it's pointing back. Ihe mouth 
and the eyes are lines.
The eyes is that way (p. E). (q) Like a square 
window (re. E, = straight lines), and the mouth 
is that way as well, (q) The nose is like a 
rainbow, (q) It's that side way (p. N curve-left).
A
ppendix 3*2 
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EXPERIMENT 61 Examples of complete profiles from preliminary 
"familiarisation” period descriptions
FACE (& ORDER of 
PRESENTATION) DESCRIPTION
Subject aged 4; 2 (entirely correct on subsequent pair-comparison)
face 1 (1st) It’s a face, (q) It’s smiling, (q) Elbe lines are 
straight lines. ](q) [The nose is straight down.]
2 (5th) The mouth is sad. (q) The eyes are straight, (q)
Ihe nose is straight.
3 (6th) It’s a sad face, sad eyes, (q) Ihe mouth is straight.
(Q) The nose is straight.
4 (4th) The mouth is straight and the eyes are bent, they’re 
working up. (q) A straight nose.
5 (2nd) It’s a funny face, I don’t know that one. (q) They’re 
straight eyes, (q) Ihe nose is bent, (q) The mouth 
is straight. (Q re. direction of N curves) (p. right 
for N curve-right) .
6 (3rd) Ihe nose is bent again, (q) The eyes and the mouth 
are straight and the nose is bent like a sausage.
(Q re...direction of N curves) (p. left for N curve-left).
Subject aged 4;6 (entirely correct on subsequent pair-comparison)
face 1 (5th)
2 (3rd)
3 (^th)
He’s happy, (q) He’s got long eyes, (q) Got a long nose.
He’s sad. (q) A long nose, (q) The eyes are long.
Ihe eyes are down-looking, (q) It's a straight nose 
and mouth.
4 (6th) (p. Ei) Ihey’re round, they're looking up. (q) Ihe 
nose and the mouth are lines — that one’s down and 
that one’s across.
5 (2nd) It's a face, (q) Got straight eyes and straight mouth.
(Q) A round nose, (q) Looking that way (p. N curve-right)
6 (1st) It's a sun, a face, (q) It’s got a straight mouth, 
and straight eyes, but the nose is round, (q) The 
nose is looking that way (p. N curve-left).
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SAMPLE JUSTIFICATORY RESPONSES: EXPERIMENT 8, 
pair-comparison with ”affectively-distinct" stimuli
EXAMPLE PAIR JUSTIFICATION
C’s
AGE
1. 12 That mouth is down and that mouth is up, 3;2
2. Happy, sad. 3;6
3. (p. M) That’s curving down and that’s up. • 3;9
4. Sad and happy. 3;io
5. He’s got a round mouth, the nose is down, the eyes 
are straight (l); he’s got a down mouth, a down 
nose, the eyes are straight (2).
4;2
6. He’s sad, he’s happy. 4;8
7. 3^ The eyes. His eyes are straight (3) and he’s 
pulling on his (4). (C demonstrates, pulling own 
eyes down)
3;2
8. He’s got pulled-down eyes,(4). 3;^
9. Sad (4) and happy (3)• 3;6
10. The eyes are pointed up and down. 3;9
11. They’re smiley faces (p. m) but his are pointing 
down and his are pointing up (p. E).
M-;2
12. He’s miserable (4) and his eyes are up (3). *H3
13. Ihe eyes, like you pull your eyes. He’s pulling his 
eyes up and he’s pulling his eyes down.
4,-10
14. 15 Straight and curly (p. M). 3>9
15. He’s smiling and he’s not smiling. ^;2
16. He’s smiling (l) and he’s sad (5).
17. He’s sad (5) and he’s happy (l).
18. The mouths. One’s round and up and one’s straight. 5;2
19. 25 The mouth, it’s down there (p. M on 2) . 3^
20. He’s got his mouth closed (5) and that one’s not 
closed (2). And he’s sad,(2).
3;ll
21. * The mouth is down, the faces are both sad. 3 ill
22. * The eyes are straight and they might be the same. (Q.) 
Yes, they’re the same cross faces.
4;2
23. He’s miserable (2) and he’s happy (5). ^3
Appendix 3.3 xx
SAMPLE JUSTIFICATORY RESPONSES: Experiment 8 (continued)
EXAMPLE PAIR JUSTIFICATION
C's 
AGE
24. 25 The mouths are not the same hut the eyes are 
the same.
4s3
25. 35 He’s cross (3) • 3;2
26. His eyes are up (3) and his are out (5)« 3;ll
27. That one’s got eyebrows going away (l) and that 
one’s happy (5).
3;ll
28. (Same) He’s happy (5). they’re not the same;
his eyes are up and his are down.
4;3
29. (p. E as not same) 4;10
30. The mouth is the same ahd the nose is the same but 
they’re not the same eyes. His eyes are up (3) and 
his are down(5)«
5;2
31. 45 His eyes are down (4). 3;2
32. He’s pushed his eyes up (4) and he’s got his 
closed (5).
3;il
33. That’s an eye pointing down and that's an eye 
pointing straight.
4;2
34. * They’re both sad. 4;3
35. The same mouth and the same nose but not the same 
faces.
4;10
36. 13 The mouths are not the same. That One’s happy (l) 
and that one’s cross (3).
3 59
37. The eyes are pointing up and straight. 3;9
38. That one’s closed his mouth (3) and that one’s 3»11
smiling (l).
39. It’s happy (l) and sad (3). 3;ii
40. His eyes are pointing up and his eyes are straight. 
That one’s got a smile and that one’s not smiley.
4;2
4l. That one's cross (3) and that one’s happy (l). 4;3
42. 14 He's sad (4). The eyes are not the same, but the 
nose is the same.
3;2
43. That one's mouth is closed and that one's smiling, 
and his eyes are up.
3;ii
44. The mouth is round, the nose is down, the eyes are 4;2
straight (l); the mouth is straight, the nose is 
down and the eyes are down (4).
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SA1PLE JUSTIFICATORY RESPONSES: Experiment 8. (continued)
EXAMPLE PAIR JUfSTIEICATOON
C's 
AGE
45. 14 (p. M& E) They’re different. 4;3
46. He’s sad (4) and he's happy (l). 4;4
47. 25 Sad (2), happy (3). 3;6
48. Straight md pointnng up (p . E) . 3;9
49. One’s sad and one’s happy. ■3; 11
50. * (Not the sane) That's a smilyy Sac. (3) and That's 
a cross face (2). (Hesitated) ThaS’s an eye pointing
UP (3). No, they're both the same because they're 
both cross.
4;(
51. One eyes are ttaaihht nnd one eyes aes up ; a sarnight 
mouth and a curved mouth.
3,3
52. That one’s add (2 ) ndd haat one’s rross (3) . 4(3
53. 24 He’s got a down mouth (2) nnd lee’s r° t pulle d 
eyes (4).
3.2
54. One’s eyes ’s up, add That one’s pp (p. M osi 2). 3HL1
55* * He's s cross face (p. M os )) ndS h’s yyes os oonn (4), 
his eyes are straight (2. . They're hhe arnee bcaune 
aiee'te both cross faces.
4;2
56, That one’s roos s () ) ndd hatt one’s aad 4)) . 4^
57* Tee mouih s ndd he e yyeboows Pp. . Tnat oess pp od d 
that one's straight (p. e).
522
58. 11 (p. E aa sane) 3?6
59. Tihey'le ’otiSi appyy Scis) . 3;11
60. hat’ s straiit t Pp. E) md tee' s a sheLI e ndd 
the nooe is straight.
4;2
61. 22 (p. M as same) 3;io
62. add ndd add. 4:9
63 * 33 The eyee are pointing pp. ehev1 ve both ooc ors ss 
faces.
4;2
64. Tee yess ree pp ndd oonn, iley'le iee ssis. 4 23
65. 44 That's a, smile and the ose e is atsaniht and iee eye 
is pointing down
4;2
66. he e yee s od d ie e mouhhs ie te e smee. 4 33
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SAMPLE JUSTIFICATORY RESPONSES: EXPERIMENT 8 (continued)
•EXAMPLE PAIR JUSTIFICATION C'sAGE
67. 55 They’re both sad. 4 ; 4
68, The eyes are the same and the nose is the same
and the mouth is the same.
5;2
Unclassifiable / erroneous references
69. 12 Broke the eyes off (p. M as not same).
(E unclassifiable)
3;l
70. That one’s bad (p. M on 2) and that one’s not bad 
(p. M on 1).
3sll
71. * (p. M) It’s like that. 4;8
72. 15 * (p. M as same) 4,4
73. 25 It’s the same mouth. 4;8
74. 45 The mouths and the eyes are not the same, (K wrong) 3;9
75. That’s not the same bit (p. M) but the eyes are 
the same, (wrong — it’s M same, E not same)
4;3
76. 13 * The eyes are the same. , 3;lO
77. 11 * That’s not the same (p. M). 4;3
78. 22 * Because they’re just not the same faces. 3;ll
Appendix 3*3 xxiii
Complete response records from two
JUSTIFICATION
"affect-attending" subjects,
Experiment 8
TRIAL PAIR
1. 12
4. 34
7. 15
2. 25
12. 35
15. 45
10. 13
8. 14
14. 23
9.
3. 11
13. 22
5. 33
11. 44
6. 55
That one's happy and that one's sad.
That one's cross (3) and that one's sad (4). 
That one’s sad (5) and that one's happy fl). 
That one’s happy (5) and that one's sad f2J.
That One’s cross (3) and that one's sad ?5).
That One’s happy (5) and that one’s sad (4).
That one’s happy and that one’s cross.
That One's happy and that one's sad.
That one’s sad (2) and that one's cross (3). 
That one's sad and that one's sad, they're the 
They're happy.
That one's sad and that one's sad.
That one's cross and that one's cross.
SUBJECT
girl 
age 3;9
U-D
alignment
pair 12 
first
same.
8. 12
1. 34
14. 15
7. 25
5. 35
13. 45
10. 13
6. 14
9. 23
3. 24
2. 11
4. 22
15. 33
11. 44
12. 55
(Same, no, not the same) Cross (2) and Kappy (l). gj_ri 
He's cross T4) and He's happy (3).
He's cross (5) and he's happy (l). age 3;9
Happy (5) and cross (2). l-r
He's happy f5) and he's cross (3). alignment
He's happy (5) and he's cross (4), .
That's a happy face and that's a sad face. pair 34
Happy and cross. first
He's happy (3) and he's cross (2).
He's sad (4) and he’s cross (2),
They're happy faces.
It’s cross and cross.
They’re two cross faces.
Both cross.
Happy and happy.
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